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Using U.S. cross-border bank exposure data, this study establishes a line of arguments 
and findings, which together constitute the following observation:  “Deregulation of 
U.S. banks, via consolidation and a volatile earnings stream, increased volatility in 
bank lending to emerging economies, and, in due course, worsened the financial crises 
in emerging economies.”  The volatility of U.S. bank lending to emerging economies 
has increased during the past twenty years.  To explain the across-the-board, 
increasing volatility of U.S. bank emerging market claims, this study turns to the 
supply side of the equation:  the deregulation in the U.S. banking sector that 
imparted this commonality to their banks’ investment patterns to emerging economies.  
In so doing, it unveils the linkages through which U.S. banking deregulation ratcheted 
up the volatility of U.S. bank lending into emerging economies.  It starts with the 
detection of a particular feature of U.S. bank emerging market lending that warrants 
further attention — increasing volatility over time.  Unlike bank lending from 
Europe or Japan, U.S. bank lending exhibited the unique feature of increasing 
volatility over time, regardless of its destination.  By looking into domestic push 
factors that could have contributed to this characteristic, this study identified a 
temporal association between important deregulation initiatives in the U.S. banking 
industry and the volatility of emerging market lending by U.S. banks during the same 
period.  This association was then explained by the linkages between the major 
outcomes of deregulation — consolidation of the banking industry and diversification 
of banking activities — and the increased volatility of lending into emerging 
economies.  Together, it argues that the U.S. banking deregulation had the 
unintended and unanticipated side effect of increasing the volatility of U.S. bank 
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The 1990s witnessed a series of financial crises — currency, banking, or both — 
in many emerging economies.1  Starting with Mexico in 1994, the list of emerging 
economies affected by these crises had been growing when Argentina declared the 
biggest sovereign default in history in January 2002.2  The impact of some of these 
crises remained local, while others had fundamentally global implications.  Even 
where the crises’ impact remained local, however, there was hardly a case in which the 
mishap sprang from purely local roots.  The intertwined nature of modern financial 
crises defies a simple taxonomy of their “systemic” origins.  Still, anecdotal evidence 
of the global drivers of financial crises abounds.  Roubini and Setser (2004) provide 
detailed accounts of such dynamics.  
The Mexican government, for example, replaced peso-denominated debts (cetes) 
with domestic dollar-denominated bonds (tesobonos) to finance its budget deficit in 
1994.3  Many of the Mexican banks borrowed in the international inter-bank market 
to finance tesobono purchases.  International banks, mostly American, made short-
                                            
1 The term “emerging economies,” as practiced by the IMF, refers to “developing countries.”  
The list of emerging economies for the main data used in this study, which is from the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) database, is provided in Appendix D.  
2 In order of the first year of the crisis, the affected countries were: Mexico (1994), Korea 
(1997), Thailand (1997), Indonesia (1997), Malaysia (1997), Russia (1998), Brazil (1998), 
Ecuador (1998), Pakistan (1998), Ukraine (1998), Turkey (2000), Argentina (2001), Uruguay 
(2001), Brazil (2002). 
3 The stock of tesobonos increased from 6% of domestic debt in early 1994 to 50% at the end 
of November 2004, just before the devaluation. 
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term loans in dollars to Mexican banks.  When the crisis hit in the wake of political 
shocks, American banks did not want to roll over their loans to Mexican banks, and 
Mexican banks did not want to roll over their domestic claims to the government.  
The near default of the Mexican government caused the peso to plunge, and the 
resulting bank bailout cost over $50 billion.  
Another example is the Russian government, which sold high-yielding domestic 
debt securities (GKOs) to finance its growing fiscal needs.  Foreign owners of the 
GKOs, such as the New York hedge fund Long Term Capital Management, often 
wanted to hedge against the risk that the ruble would be devalued.  Russian banks 
met this demand and sold dollars forward at a fixed rate as insurance against a fall in 
the ruble.  When things turned bad, the Russian banking system was in no position to 
take on this currency risk with few liquid dollar assets to honor the contracts.  The 
ensuing currency, banking, and sovereign debt crisis in Russia led to capital controls 
on the local banking system in 2002.  Regardless of the nature and location of an 
emerging market crisis, linkages to the U.S. financial market — either through U.S. 
dollar-denominated debt or the direct involvement of American institutions — were a 
major factor.  
For the 1990s as a whole, the U.S. economy enjoyed the longest post-war 
economic boom the country had seen, sustaining its place in the world as a stalwart of 
prosperity in a sea of financial turmoil.  The big, money-center banks in the U.S. 
fared surprisingly well for the decade of 1990s despite all the “manias, panics, and 
crashes,” domestic and international (Kindleberger 2000).  For the two biggest banks 
in America, for instance, the glut of corporate bankruptcies in 2001 and 2002 — 
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including the two biggest of all time, Enron and Worldcom — hardly registered a 
tremor on their balance sheets.4  Nonetheless, episodes such as the Enron and the 
Worldcom debacles uncovered weaknesses previously deemed immaterial in the 
plumbing of the market.  These ranged from the commission structure of stock 
brokers, to conflicts of interest between analysts who recommend certain stocks and 
the investment bankers who hire them, to the treatment of stock options and financial 
derivatives in corporate balance sheets, to the independence of auditors who seek 
consulting work from the same firms they audit.  Indeed, the role of large financial 
institutions in fueling the boom-bust Enron episode highlights the conflicts of interest 
that existed between traditional loan activity, investment banking, and equity analysis.  
Bankers at some of the largest U.S. financial institutions allegedly engaged in 
questionable financing arrangements with Enron in return for a promise to receive 
Enron’s investment banking business.  Also, an equity analyst at one financial 
institution was fired for giving unfavorable equity ratings to Enron (The Economist 
2004c).5  Against this backdrop, it is natural to ask how changing incentives in the 
U.S. affected investment decisions into emerging economies.6 
                                            
4 Citigroup’s profits for the second quarter of 2003 were $4.3 billion (12% more than the same period 
a year earlier), and those of J.P. Morgan Chase were $1.8 billion for the same period (78% higher than 
the second quarter of 2002) (The Economist 2003). 
5 JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, and Merrill Lynch together paid a total of $366 million in fines for 
their roles in the Enron scandal. 
6 About Argentina’s recent fall, Paul Blustein of The Washington Post reported (August 3, 2004),  
 
Big securities firms reaped nearly $1 billion in fees from underwriting Argentine government 
bonds during the decade 1991-2001, and those firms’ analysts were generally the ones 
producing the most bullish and influential reports on the country…  Just as in the world of 
stock market investing, where money managers aim to beat the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock 
index, many professional investors in emerging markets are judged every quarter or so by 
how well their portfolios fare in comparison to a benchmark...  During much of the 1990s, 
Argentina had the heaviest weighting in the index of any nation, peaking at 28.8% in 1998 — 
not because of its economic size, but simply because its government sold so many bonds.  
The index virtually forced big investors to lend vast sums to Argentina even if they feared that 
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As to the international aspect of these crises, each of the financially battered 
emerging economies of the 1990s presented a unique set of financing methods, actors, 
and ultimately hybrid creditor/debtor relationships.  Even the role played by the U.S. 
capital market in funneling funds into different emerging economies was unique in 
each case.  In some countries, U.S. banks were the main actors in investing and later 
withdrawing their financial resources for whatever reasons, while in others it was U.S. 
investment banks that underwrote the sovereign bond issues that engineered capital 
inflows into these countries.  Nonetheless, it is possible, and indeed important, to 
identify one critical player that has remained at the epicenter of financial activities 
reaching emerging economies throughout time and geography: money-center banks in 
New York. 
 
The Problem of International Bank Lending 
Many existing studies on emerging market financial crises converge on the view 
that emerging economies “need to be concerned about the form in which they borrow, 
perhaps even more than with the level of borrowing” (Williamson 2005).  Sources of 
vulnerabilities in emerging market financing are numerous, starting from large 
macroeconomic imbalances, fixed or semi-fixed exchange rates, and weak financial 
systems in borrowing countries to commodity price shocks or interest rate changes in 
major suppliers of funds like the U.S.  High on the list of such concerns is the form in 
                                                                                                                            
the country was likely to default in the long run, several money managers said.  Although 
default would hurt their portfolios, they would still lose less than the index as long as they 
were a bit “underweight,” meaning they held a smaller percentage of Argentine bonds that the 
index dictated.  They did not dare be too far underweight.  Money managers who shunned 
Argentine bonds were taking a huge risk, because their portfolios would almost certainly 
underperform the index in the event Argentine bonds rallied. 
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which these countries finance their funding needs — with short-term, foreign-currency 
debt rather than equity.  According to Roubini and Setser (2004), the dangers in such 
a financing method are evident in the risk created by mismatches between a country’s 
existing debt stock and its assets.  
 
If short-term debts exceed liquid assets, a government, bank, or firm risks not 
being able to roll over its short-term debt, thus being forced to seek a 
restructuring or default (maturity mismatch)…  If a substantial portion of 
debts is denominated in foreign currencies, a mismatch between foreign 
currency debts and revenues can lead to an increase in real debt burdens 
without a commensurate increase in the ability to pay (currency mismatch)…  
If a country finances itself with debt, it will suffer from lack of buffers in 
times of trouble.  Debt payments are fixed even in bad times when dividends 
on equity can be reduced in a way that shares downside risk as well as upside 
gains (capital structure mismatch). 
 
Despite such inherent weaknesses, debt flows remain an important vehicle for 
emerging market financing.  Table 1.1 compares the snapshots of external debt stock 
in emerging economies with the stock of inward foreign direct investment (FDI).  As 
a share of GNI of emerging economies, total debt stock was solidly on the rise before 
tailing off in the 2000s.  FDI, while stagnating in the 1970s and 1980s, exploded 
starting in the late 1980s following a welcoming stance from most emerging 
economies.  Among different categories of debt stock, bank loans mirrored the 
movements in total debt stock, while bond investments picked up momentum after the 
introduction of Brady Bonds in 1989.7   
                                            
7  The introduction of the Brady Bonds in 1989 was a catalytic event bringing about transformation in 
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In due course, the share of bank loans in total external debt stock fell relative to 
bond placements.  Even after short-term debts, consisting mostly of inter-bank loans, 
are included in bank loans, the share falls from 58% in 1980 to 39% in 2003.  On the 
other hand, the share of external bonds skyrocketed from 2% to 22% over the same 
period.  Indeed, international bond placements have become a major source of 
funding, especially for governments in emerging economies. 
 
Table 1.1  Total external debt & FDI stock in emerging economies 
Stock of external capital  1970 1980 1990 2000 2003 
   ($ billions at current prices, percent of GNI in parentheses) 
Total debt stocka 70 (.10) 554(.20) 1,352 (.34) 2,305(.39) 2,433(.37) 
 Long- and medium-termb 61 410 1,101 1,923 1,960 
  bank loans (private) 19 191 310 608 580 
  bonds (private) 2 13 105 465 523 
  othersc 7 56 136 70 52 
 Short-term  n.a 132 216 323 364 
FDI inward stock 56(.08) 106(.04) 370(.09) 1,756(.30) 2,148(.33) 
GNI, emerging economies 667 2,772 3,961 5,849 6,604 
Notes: a Total debt stock includes the use of IMF credits.  b Long- and medium-term debt stock 
includes credits from official lenders, such as national governments.  c Other private debt stock 
includes credits from manufacturers, exporters, and bank credits covered by a guarantee of an export 
promotion agency.  
Sources: World Bank Global Development Finance (2004). UNCTAD World Investment Report 
(2006).  
 
This transformation was evident in the crisis episodes in Mexico (1994), Russia 
(1998), and Argentina (2001), in which soaring sovereign bond spreads in international 
markets virtually cut additional private funding options off the table.  However, stock 
figures tell only so much.  They do not show the short-term variability in each form 
                                                                                                                            
emerging market lending.  During the 1980s, a small number of commercial banks, linked through 
syndication, held loans to governments in Latin America, for example.  After a decade of defaults and 
financial turmoil in the region, many of these loans were turned into Brady Bonds — named after 
Nicholas Brady, the then-Treasury Secretary of the U.S. — and consequently the composition of 
creditors to Latin American countries shifted from commercial banks to retail investors. 
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of external capital in and out of emerging economies, not to mention capital flight by 
residents of the crisis-hit economies.  Much of the problem in emerging market 
financing resides in the quick reversibility of capital flows, not the magnitude. 
 
Had flows been reasonably stable close to their averages, it would have been 
difficult to argue big problems would have arisen from the inflows….  It is 
the extreme variability around those levels that made the capital account a 
problem (Williamson 2005).   
 
Obtaining an accurate picture of capital getting in and out of emerging economies 
is itself a complex task.  Different sources give somewhat different pictures, 
depending on the classification methods.  Appendix A provides the juxtaposition of 
the different data sets, classified in roughly the same way to provide useful insights 
about the capital flows data.  Figure 1.1 comes from the Global Development 
Finance (GDF) database of the World Bank, the most comprehensive source with 
disaggregated data for emerging market debt.  The first figure reflects net flows, 
disbursements minus principal payments.  The second figure subtracts from the net 
figures important reverse flows:  interest payments for loans & bonds, profit 
remittances for FDI, and resident outflows (bank deposits and portfolio investments).8   
Together, the charts in Figure 1.1 clearly point to a problematic form of capital 
flowing into emerging economies: bank loans and deposits.  When interest payments 
and resident outflows are subtracted from net flows, cumulative bank lending since 
1990 has been in the negative range of $280 billion.  When it comes to bank lending, 
                                            
8  Resident outflows are from IMF sources since the GDF does not provide these movements.  Bank 
deposits abroad from residents are subtracted from bank lending, while portfolio investments abroad 
are divided in half and each subtracted from portfolio equity and bonds flows.  
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net resources have been transferred out of emerging economies, to use the World Bank 
terminology.  Bonds have not been helpful in funneling capital into emerging 
economies either, especially after the Asian crisis broke out, with cumulative flows 
since 1990 remaining in the negative range of $10 billion.  These debt flows stand in 
sharp contrast to the positive cumulative FDI ($1,005 billion) and portfolio equity 
flows ($230 billion) in the 1990s and onwards.   
 
Figure 1.1  Net private capital flows to emerging economies, by type  












FDI Portfolio equity Bonds Bank lending
 













FDI Portfolio equity Bonds Bank lending
 
Sources: World Bank. Global Development Finance. (various issues).  IMF. International Financial 
Statistics. Balance of Payments Statistics (various issues).  
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The volatile nature of bank flows manifested itself in each crisis episode, although 
rising international bond spreads triggered more recent crises such as in Mexico (1994) 
and Argentina (2001).  In Table 1.2, annual changes in exposure of private creditors 
to each battered economy are listed, starting one year before the onset of crises.  Both 
types of debt flows — bonds and bank loans — were quick to turn around at the onset 
of crises, if not before.  Everyone fled the scene if they could.  Noteworthy is the 
bigger scale of reversal from bank lending in each case.  Bank reversals from 
Thailand and Indonesia, amounting to 40% of the average GDP over the five years in 
the case of Thailand, are not surprising because a sudden stop to inter-bank credit lines 
was a well-known contributor to the Asian financial crisis.  However, in every one of 
the six crisis episodes in Table 1.2, bank loans were a bigger source of capital flight 
than external bonds.  Even in the case of Argentina, the international bond crisis par 
excellence, more money left the country in repaying bank loans than bonds.  Roubini 
and Setser (2004) confirm this finding and note (italics added),   
 
Wild swings in market prices matter a lot to those holding the bonds but don’t 
always correspond to wild flows in and out of the crisis country….  Mexico, 
Russia, Turkey, and Brazil all turned to the IMF because of prospective 
difficulties in making payments on their domestic sovereign debt, not their 
international sovereign bonds.9  The rolloff of short-term cross-border bank 
claims was a bigger source of stress in Asia, Turkey, Brazil, and even 
Argentina than an inability to refinance maturing international bonds.  The 
crises in Argentina and Uruguay demonstrated how residents’ willingness to 
                                            
9  “Mexico, Russia, Brazil (1998 and 2002), and Turkey faced difficulties because of the sovereign’s 
domestic debt, not international bonds.  The Asian Crisis countries faced difficulties because of a 
rolloff of cross-border bank loans to private creditors.  The rolloff of bank loans was also an 
important factor in Brazil and Turkey.”  Roubini and Setser (2004). p 363. 
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shift from dollar-denominated bank deposits (local assets) to dollars and 
dollar assets abroad (foreign assets) can put enormous pressure on a country’s 
reserves.    
 
Table 1.2  Net transfersa in private bonds and bank lending  
                                                   ($ billions) 
  Net bond flows – interest payments Net bank lendingb – interest payments 
Country 
(crisis) Start Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 Yr 5 sum
c Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 Yr 5 sumc 
Thailand 
(1997) 1996 3.1 1.0 -1.4 -2.1 -1.9 
-1.3 




(1997) 1996 3.4 2.4 -1.1 -2.4 -2.9 
-0.6 




(1998) 1997 5.2 10.7 -1.8 -3.0 -3.2 
8.0 




(1998) 1997 -3.3 -1.5 -2.0 -5.6 -4.1 
-16.5 




(2000) 1999 2.5 4.0 -2.5 -1.2 - 
2.8 




(2001) 2000 -2.2 -11.2 -0.4 - - 
-13.8 
(-.07) -4.2 -12.9 -0.7 - - 
-17.8 
(-.08) 
Notes: - Not available.  a Net transfers equal to net flows (disbursements – principal payments) minus 
interest payments on bonds and bank loans. b Changes in bank exposure includes private bank lending 
to public and private sectors plus changes in short-term debts. c Share of average GDP in parentheses. 
Sources: World Bank Global Development Finance (2004).   
 
Of course, the troubles caused by soaring spreads in secondary bond markets do 
not stay offshore.  They raise refinancing costs for governments and firms with 
foreign-currency debt.  With devalued local currency, sustaining current account 
deficits on top of repaying foreign-currency debts often requires running down on 
reserves.  A beleaguered government often turns to the domestic banking sector, if 
not the central bank, for emergency liquidity, causing a ripple effects of higher 
interest rates and further contraction of the economy.10  Things get out of control 
                                            
10  A sovereign that borrows in its own currency is also subject to moral hazard, because it is able to 
reduce the real cost of servicing the debt by inflating it away (Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano 2003).  
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when bank credit lines are cut off and residents pull their funds out of local banks and 
deposit them abroad.  It is no surprise that net transfers in bonds and loans in 
emerging economies move closely together in Table 1.2.   
 










































Europe Japan United States
 
Notes: * Net assets (assets minus liabilities) of BIS reporting banks at the end of each year.  BIS 
locational statistics provide gross on-balance asset and liability positions of banks in Europe, Japan and 
the U.S. vis-à-vis entities (banks, non-banks, public sector) located in other countries worldwide.  
Europe includes 16 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
Source: BIS Locational Banking Statistics. 
 
On a net basis, that is, assets minus liabilities in this case, U.S. banks received 
more money from international investors than they made investments abroad 
throughout the 1990s (Figure 1.2).  Much of this phenomenon undoubtedly stems 
from the fact that the U.S. had been financing its current account deficits with 
massive capital inflows.  However, it would be fair to say that much of the capital 
flight, including resident outflows from the crisis economies, headed for the U.S.  
Accordingly, the volatility of U.S. bank lending to emerging economies should carry 
more weight in any comprehensive analysis of the issue.  As will be shown in 
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Chapter Two, U.S. bank lending to emerging economies has been unique in that its 
volatility has been increasing over the past twenty years, when bank lending from 
Europe or Japan, while more volatile on average, does not show any trend.  It leads 
one to wonder if there has been any particular feature of U.S. bank lending that 
distinguished the U.S. from other industrial countries.  
  
Deficiency in Existing Studies 
The issue of “fickle” capital flows creating boom and bust cycles in emerging 
market financing has been an important theoretical topic since the 1980s, with the 
models of self-fulfilling balance of payments crises (Obstfeld 1996, Krugman 1999) 
and contagion effects (Eichengreeen et al. 1996, Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000, Frankel 
and Schmukler 1998).  Despite increasing focus on different types of capital flows 
and their reversibility during the financial crises in emerging economies, however, few 
studies have directly tackled the issue of “volatility” in capital flows, let alone bank 
lending volatility (Alfaro et al. 2004).  It is not that the volatility of international bank 
lending compared to other forms of capital flows has gone unnoticed.  Dobson and 
Hufbauer (2001), for example, explicitly measured the volatility of different types of 
capital flows by taking absolute deviations, standard deviation of different capital 
flows divided by the average of each flow, and concluded that bank lending had been 
the most volatile form of capital flows into emerging economies.11   
                                            
11  “Bank loans are illiquid fixed price instruments.  They cannot easily convert to cash, although 
they can be bundled into securities.  Once loan terms have been agreed on, the only way a bank can 
adjust for shifting market conditions is by changing the quantity of its exposure.  When a borrower 
runs into trouble, the bank can mix and match from two menus: it can roll over existing loans and 
extend new credits, or it can call some part of existing loans and attempt to recover the principal.  
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Rather, the deficiencies in explaining the “volatility” of capital flows, as the 
authors point out, lie in the asymmetric emphasis given to the issue.  A wide array of 
literature focuses on the pull factors, such as macroeconomic policies, the structure of 
financial systems, legal origins, political regime change, or the degree of corruption in 
host economies.  Not enough attention has been devoted to the supply side of the 
problem.  With respect to financial crises in emerging economies, the debate within 
the club of rich countries has been mostly concerned with whether private-sector 
players should bear more of the costs of resolving crises when they occur (Dobson and 
Hufbauer 2001).   
No doubt as important in explaining problematic bank lending to emerging 
economies are the dynamics in home countries from which the lending originates.  
Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1996), for example, show that low interest rates in 
the U.S. played an important role in accounting for the renewal of capital flows to 
emerging economies in the 1990s.  After the contagion of the Asian financial crisis 
to Russia and Brazil in the late 1990s, the presence and role of common lenders in 
spreading a crisis to countries otherwise unrelated to the crisis-hit countries have been 
emphasized (Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000, Caramazza, Ricci, and Salgado 2000).  
Calvo and Mendoza (2000) suggest that the change in capital flows is driven not by 
fundamental weaknesses in the emerging economy but by investors’ fickleness, 
sudden changes in risk appetite, and, more generally, conditions in the financial 
markets of advanced economies, the so-called “sudden stop.”  There also exists 
convincing evidence showing how strong regulatory changes relate to the banks’ 
                                                                                                                            
When trouble brews, all banks encounter the same conditions; in the aggregate, they prefer less 
exposure, and following credit restrictions lead to volatile bank lending.” (Dobson and Hufbauer 2001).  
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international activities by framing underlying incentives in a certain way.  The Basel 
I Accord on minimum capital requirements offers one such example.  Under the 
Accord, short-term loans maturing in less than a year required a 20% risk weight, 
whereas those maturing after more than a year required a 100% risk weight.  Inter-
bank lending was thus favored.  Loans to banks in OECD countries required less 
capital than loans to private firms in the same countries, creating the anomaly that 
inter-bank loans to Korean banks required less capital than loans to General Electric 
(Dobson and Hufbauer 2001).  Nonetheless, conspicuous by its absence is a 
systemic analysis of the linkages between regulatory changes affecting banks in 
industrial countries and the same banks’ lending behavior internationally, especially 
to emerging economies. 
In fact, there have been fundamental changes taking place in the banking industry 
— nowhere more so than in the U.S. — in the past twenty years toward deregulation 
of banking activities.  As will be elaborated in Chapter Three, U.S. banks no longer 
face the geographic and activity restrictions that tied their hands for much of the past 
century.  They are now free to engage in any financial activities under the holding 
company structure.  Part of this transformation in banking regulation reflects the 
innovation in information technology and financial techniques that left the old 
regulatory framework obsolete.  As such, the new environment under which banks 
have to compete with each other is not particular to the U.S. banks and their 
regulators.  However, the uniqueness of U.S. banking dictated by the tradition — 
“unit bank” (one office) with no interstate branching — and historical events — the 
Great Depression — made the wholesale deregulation in the 1990s all the more 
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spectacular.  The aftermath of U.S. banking deregulation is still unfolding, with 
ramifications being analyzed from various angles.  What has been missing to date is 
an examination of the potential impact of this breakthrough on the international 
activities of U.S. banks, especially their lending to emerging economies that suffered 
one crisis or another during the same period.  
On the domestic front, benefits from the economy of scope, as well as potential 
risks from allowing non-banking activities, were widely debated in the 1990s, each 
shaping the direction of the actual deregulation taking place (Ramirez 1995; Berger 
and Udell 1996; De Young and Roland 1999).  Much discussion was devoted to the 
possible spillover effects on small business and community lending from banking 
consolidation, one important outcome of deregulation (Peek and Rosengren 1998; 
Strahan and Weston 1998).  On the international front, however, the mainstream 
analysis of U.S. banking deregulation has addressed the issue in the context of 
enhancing international competitiveness of the banking industry (Saunders and Walter 
1994, Canals 1997).  Seldom has the issue of emerging market lending of U.S. banks 
been the topic of discussion about banking deregulation.  Given the domestic nature 
of the debate and the status of emerging market claims as a junior asset class, the lack 
of attention is understandable.  However, it is this gap in the existing scholarship 
that this study aims to bridge. 
 
Arguments and Organization 
Using U.S. cross-border bank exposure data, this study establishes a line of 
arguments and findings, which together constitute a simple observation: 
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Deregulation of U.S. banks, via consolidation and a volatile earnings stream, 
increased volatility in bank lending to emerging economies, and, in due course, 
worsened the financial crises in emerging economies. 
 
1. Volatile bank lending worsened, though apparently did not trigger, financial  
       crises. 
Bank lending has been the most volatile form of private capital flows to 
emerging economies during the past twenty-five years.  When it comes to specific 
incidences of crisis, portfolio flows — bond investments in particular — are at the 
center of recent crises, such as Mexico (1994) and Argentina (2001).  Nevertheless, 
bank lending increasingly took the form of short-term flows to private borrowers, 
which are liable to quick reversals at the outset of crises.  Further, in the case of U.S. 
bank lending, volatility shows a consistent negative association with the level of U.S. 
bank claims across countries in different regions.     
 
2. Volatility of U.S. bank lending to emerging economies increased with     
       deregulation. 
There was an unmistakable trend in U.S. banks’ overseas claims towards 
higher volatility, especially to emerging economies, as the U.S. banking sector 
underwent a historic transformation in its regulatory environment, unmatched in its 
depth and breadth by regulatory changes in Japan or in Europe.  This pattern of 
increasing volatility is unique compared to the volatility of bank lending from Europe 
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or Japan.  In no region other than the U.S., does bank lending volatility show any 
trend.   
 
3. There were structural shifts in volatility after important U.S. deregulation     
       initiatives. 
In every single case, be it regional or country exposure to Asia and Latin 
America, there was an increase in average volatility after the two major deregulation 
initiatives: (1) the introduction of Section 20 affiliates in 1987; and (2) the passage of 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act in 1999.  Further, dummy variable regressions 
detect statistically significant structural breaks in volatility after these two 
deregulation initiatives after a time lag of approximately two years.  These upward 
shifts take place irrespective of the changing level of bank claims in different regions.  
U.S. bankers were pulling money out of Latin America and investing in Asian 
countries at the same time that the volatility of U.S bank lending was experiencing 
similar structural shifts in both regions.  
 
4. Banking deregulation led to consolidation and a volatile earnings stream. 
Through a gradual deregulation process over the past twenty years, age-old 
barriers in banking regulation have been all but eliminated, paving the way for 
universal banking in the U.S.  As a result, the U.S. banking industry experienced a 
wave of consolidation.  With the passage of the GLB Act, financial holding 
companies were created that can combine any activities “financial in nature” within 
their holding company structure.  Existing studies illustrate that, partly owing to this 
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diversification of the banking industry, earnings for these universal banks have 
skyrocketed over time.  Despite greater returns from non-bank activities, however, 
there are an increasing number of studies which illustrate that these increased returns 
are associated with higher volatility from taking on new risks.   
 
5. Consolidation played a catalytic role linking deregulation with lending  
       volatility.  
Consolidation of the U.S. banking industry created fewer banks with much 
smaller shares of their assets devoted to emerging market exposure.  Big money-
center banks that emerged from mergers and acquisitions are driving up the trend in 
volatility in almost every category by type or maturity.  By contrast, smaller banks 
show decreasing volatility over time in many categories, such as lending to private 
non-bank entities.  When deregulation dummies are used as instrumental variables, a 
clear picture emerges in which deregulation raises the volatility of U.S. bank 
emerging market lending via a reduction in the number of banks making investments 
into emerging economies.  Furthermore, the share of emerging market claims (in 
total assets) of these reporting banks experiences a drastic downfall as the average 
size of the bank gets larger.  As the importance of emerging market claims in asset 
classes declines, positive gains in the share increase the volatility of such claims.   
 
6. Diversification led to earnings volatility, which in turn increased lending  
       volatility.  
Diversification, the dealing of mixed financial products by commercial banks, 
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is shown to increase bank earnings volatility.  In fact, bank earnings have become 
more volatile after major deregulation initiatives, with the trend heading upward over 
the past twenty years.  At the same time, when earnings volatility of U.S. banks is 
regressed against lending volatility (to emerging economies), there emerges a 
temporal causality.  Bank earnings volatility Granger-causes the lending volatility to 
emerging economies, after a time lag of approximately two years.  This temporal 
causality is pronounced in short-term, private, non-bank claims, and has a shorter time 
lag in Latin America than in Asia. 
This study consists of five chapters.  Chapter One raises and illustrates the 
problem of bank lending in aggravating emerging market crises.  It is aimed at 
emphasizing the issue of volatility in emerging market bank lending, with a focus on 
U.S. bank lending.  Chapter Two measures the volatility in U.S. bank lending from 
quarterly data from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).12  
It shows a clear upward trend in volatility of U.S. bank lending to emerging 
economies over the past twenty years, addressing the negative impact of volatile bank 
lending and the determinants of volatility.  It uncovers the particulars of U.S. bank 
lending that warrant more attention compared to the banks from other financial 
centers such as Europe and Japan.  Chapter Three elaborates on U.S. banking 
deregulation as a common backdrop against which U.S. bank lending to emerging 
economies takes place, and deregulation’s impact on consolidation and diversification.  
Chapter Four empirically tests the linkage between deregulation and bank lending 
volatility through these two channels — (1) consolidation of the banking industry; and 
                                            
12  The data used for this study has been obtained directly from the Federal Reserve Board through the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  
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(2) diversification of banking activities.  Dummy tests for structural breaks establish 
the temporal association between the two separate developments.  The two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) model and Granger-causality test respectively illustrate the 
impact of deregulation on the volatility of emerging market lending through 
consolidation and diversification.  Finally, the determinants of U.S. bank lending 
volatility are revisited with deregulation dummies and bank earnings volatility as 
additional explanatory variables.  Chapter Five sums up the findings and suggests 
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This chapter directly addresses the issue of volatile U.S. bank lending to emerging 
economies by constructing a measure of volatility from bank foreign exposure data.  
For any relevant analysis, it is critical to have the right measure from high frequency 
data to begin with.  What follows is the description of the database and the measure 
of volatility.   
 
Data Overview 
Following the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, a report on foreign 
exposure must be filed by every U.S. chartered insured commercial bank, provided 
that the bank has, on a fully consolidated bank basis, total outstanding claims on 
residents of foreign countries exceeding $30 million in aggregate.  Regulators began 
providing that information to the public in 1984 through the Country Exposure 
Lending Survey (CELS), which is published by the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council (FFIEC).13  Reporting banks fall into one of three categories:  
(1) money-center banks; (2) other large banks; and (3) all other reporting banks.  For 
each bank group, the CELS reports two categories of foreign exposure:  (1) cross-
border claims; and (2) local claims.  The reporting institution is also asked to break 
                                            
13 The FFIEC is an umbrella organization that collects and warehouses data for the Federal Reserve, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.  Much of the 
information collected via the FFIEC is made public, aggregated over all reporting banks, via the 
Country Exposure Lending Survey (FFIEC Statistical Release E. 16).   
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down the outstanding cross-border claims by the type of borrower (banks, public 
sector entities, other) and by the time remaining to maturity (less than one, one to five, 
and over five years).   
According to this data, U.S. banks engaged in international lending have become 
more consolidated since the 1980s, with fewer banks overall, and the remaining banks 
increasingly polarized in terms of size and portfolio allocation.  Starting from a high 
of 185 banks in the mid 1980s, the number of U.S. banks with foreign exposures 
declined to 140 by the mid 1990s and further declined to 71 banks in 2004.  There 
were nine banks classified as large money-center banks in 1982, controlling a total 
market share of about 58% in foreign exposure.  As a result of mergers, that number 
declined to four, and their market share increased to 80%.  In 2005 Q4, the four 
organizations in this group were Bank of America, Taunus Corp. (the U.S. affiliate of 
Deutsche Bank), J.P. Morgan Chase, and Citigroup.   
Table 2.1 provides an overview of U.S. bank external claims.  Total claims in 
emerging economies, in nominal terms, declined during most of the 1980s in response 
to the LDC debt crises, which significantly eroded bank capital.  For example, 
between 1982 and 1994, emerging market claims declined from $151 billion to $123 
billion, with the cross-border claims in 2002 still well below the level reached in 1982.  
The reduction in exposure stands out in cross-border lending.  Over the twenty years 
from 1982 through 2002, cross-border claims in emerging economies fell more than 
one-third from initial exposure.  By sharp contrast, local claims in emerging 
economies underwent tremendous growth.  Notwithstanding various emerging 
market crises along the way, local claims increased to ten times their 1982 level.  In 
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1997, when the Asian crisis erupted, local claims overtook the size of cross-border 
claims in emerging economies.  This phenomenon can be, in part, explained by the 
efforts of U.S. banks to establish a long-term local presence in expectation of higher 
profits, as well as an intent to avoid the severe exchange rate volatility that 
accompanies many emerging market crises (Palmer 2000).  By the same token, it 
suggests that much of the volatility comes from cross-border lending.  
 
Table 2.1  U.S. bank external claims, by type and region  
Item 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 
 Total claims (billions of U.S. dollar) 
Developed countries and banking centers 279 287 269 281 467 611 
Cross-border 213 186 152 160 259 374 
Local 65 101 117 121 208 237 
Emerging market countries (A) 151 133 85 123 176 219 
Cross-border (B) 137 116 62 80 84 82 
Local (C) 14 17 23 43 93 136 
Asia-Pacific (as share of A) 47(.31) 37(.28) 32(.38) 51(.41) 63(.36) 70(.32) 
   Cross-border (as share of B) 41(.30) 28(.24) 18(.29) 27(.34) 23(.27) 24(.29) 
   Local (as share of C) 6(.43) 8(.47) 14(.61) 24(.56) 40(.43) 46(.34) 
Latin America (as share of A) 91(.60) 89(.67) 49(.58) 65(.53) 102(.58) 126(.58)
   Cross-border (as share of B) 84(.61) 81(.70) 40(.65) 49(.61) 55(.65) 50(.61) 
   Local (as share of C) 7(.50) 8(.47) 9(.39) 16(.37) 47(.51) 75(.55) 
 Private non-bank claims as % of cross-border claims 
Developed countries and banking centers 0.26 0.23 0.27 0.38 0.37 0.41 
Emerging market countries 0.25 0.20 0.22 0.39 0.60 0.63 
 Short-term claims as % of cross-border claims 
Developed countries and banking centers 0.68 0.70 0.62 0.74 0.81 0.68 
Emerging market countries 0.41 0.43 0.48 0.61 0.76 0.58 
 Money-center bank claims as % of cross-border claims
Developed countries and banking centers 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.69 0.81 0.79 
Emerging market countries 0.63 0.65 0.77 0.75 0.73 0.68 
Source: FFIEC, Country Exposure Lending Survey (various issues)   
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The regional composition of U.S. banks’ claims has also changed since 1982.  By 
the end of 2002, emerging economies accounted for just 26% of U.S. banks’ foreign 
claims, compared with a share of 36% in 1982.  The share of emerging economies in 
cross-border claims dropped from 39% to just 18% over the same period, while the 
emerging economies’ share in local claims increased from 19% to 36%.  Within 
emerging economies, regional discrepancies stand out as well.  Asia’s share in U.S. 
banks’ emerging market exposure increased from 31% in 1982 to 41% in 1994, only to 
fall back to 32% in 2002.  On the other hand, exposure in Latin America seesawed 
around the 60% range.  Furthermore, the growth in foreign lending in the 1990s and 
onward was driven by the growth in the foreign exposure of a small number of money-
center banks.  Currently, money-center banks represent 80% of total exposure, and 
75% of total cross-border lending exposure.  All of the growth in cross-border 
lending has been concentrated in money-center banks, with a near-flat share for 
smaller banks.  Money-center banks also dominate totals in local claims.  Although 
this dominance is less than what it was in the 1990s (around 90%), it still exceeds 80% 
of the total.   
Figure 2.1 shows the changing shares of the recipients of U.S. banks’ foreign 
exposure.  Over time, inter-bank lending and lending to public entities declined, 
while lending to a broader group of non-bank private sector recipients has expanded.  
The relative share of private non-bank claims (from 28% in 1984 to 46% in 2005) has 
skyrocketed while inter-bank (31% in 1984 to 21% in 2005) and public sector (41% in 
1984 to 31% in 2005) claims declined.  From this remarkable stride in volume, 
private non-bank claims presumably came to dominate the movement of total 
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emerging market claims.    
 
Figure 2.1  Composition of U.S. bank emerging market claims, by  

































On the other hand, short-term credits, or those with maturities less than one year, 
still dominate U.S. international lending.  Their share increased from 55% in 1984 to 
73% in 2005.  This stands in sharp contrast to the dwindling shares of medium-term 
claims (31% in 1984 to 20% in 2005) and long-term claims (14% in 1984 to 7% in 
2005).  The high proportion of international lending accounted for by short-term 
credits is explained by a commercial bank preference for international trade-related 
finance, concerns over default risk, and borrowers in emerging economies seeking 
cheaper external financing.  All in all, most international banks have preferred to 
extend short-term credit, especially to private non-bank clients in emerging economies. 
 
Measure of Volatility 
Existing studies of capital flows often address the issue of volatility in emerging 
 - 26 -
market lending by explaining the size and direction of the fluctuations in capital flows.  
One such effort is found in Goldberg (2001), who sets out to see if fluctuations in U.S. 
bank claims are econometrically explained by changes in the fundamentals of 
countries where these banks have claims.  For the measure of fluctuations in U.S. 
bank claims, she first takes the log of U.S. bank claims in country c and time t, then 
first difference the measure to avoid “estimation problems potentially arising from the 










With this measure, she is measuring the changes in bank claims normalized by the 
size of the claims in each period.  In fact, with discrete values such as U.S. bank 
claims at the end of each quarter, it is no more than a percentage change in U.S. bank 
claims for each period.  Figure 2.2 illustrates the percentage change in total U.S. bank 
external claims over time in both developed and emerging economies, replicating the 
measure used in Goldberg (2001).  It shows the direction of change over time, with 
net negative flows in the 1980s and net positive flows in the 1990s, with overall higher 
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Nevertheless, this measure, while relevant for exploring the determinants of  
 
Nevertheless, this measure, while relevant for exploring the determinants of 
changes in U.S. bank claims, does not measure the degree of fluctuations in U.S. bank 
lending.  It is one thing to witness the trend from quarterly fluctuations, but another 
to measure the actual volatility of U.S. bank claims.  In other words, the right 
volatility measure should specifically reflect how the severity of up-and-down 
movements in U.S. bank overseas lending changed over time.  To capture the degree 
of fluctuations, the following measure of “volatility” is introduced.  
 
VOLATILITY = the three-quarter rolling standard deviation of quarterly changes in 
U.S. bank claims divided by the average claims over the same period. 
 
This measure, the standard deviation normalized by the U.S. bank claims in the 
host country, makes possible a comparison in volatility between different periods, 
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to avoid the dependence on the scale of flows.14  A similar measure has been 
proposed by Alfaro et al. (2004) and Dos Reis (2005).  Constructed this way, the 
measure escapes from the unit root problem endemic in time-series variables, which 
will be reported later by the Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots in Table 4.9.  With the 
same data on U.S. bank external claims, the measure of volatility is superimposed 
upon Figure 2.2.  The red line in Figure 2.3 represents the measure of volatility with 
a clear trend of its own.  An implicit trend in Figure 2.2 is now explicitly measured 
and illustrated.   
 















To cross-examine the validity of this definition of volatility, it is first compared 
against the three-quarter rolling standard deviation of the Goldberg measure of 
fluctuations for U.S. bank external claims in Figure 2.4.  The two measures produce 
nearly identical results, suggesting that the volatility measure defined above is no 
                                            
14  It is important to note that the volatility measure is normalized by average claims, not by average 
flows (changes in claims).  For example, the movement of $10 million in and out of a country is less 
significant in terms of its volatility when there is existing $100 million stock in the country than when 
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more than a smoothed-out version of the standard deviation from the percentage 
change in U.S. bank external claims.  
 
















Secondly, the volatility measure is compared with the outcome of the AR(1) 
process for measuring volatility.  The AR(1) process, as in Rajan (2005), identifies 
the residuals from the regression of U.S. bank claims in each period against its own 
one-quarter lagged value.  In Figure 2.5, each residual is plotted against the fitted 
line between each claim and its lagged value.  These figures represent the difference 
between actual and expected values.  The non-stationary nature of the bank claim 
figures is evident with the coefficient of lagged variable close to one (unit root).  
With the slope close to one, it is no accident that residuals from the AR(1) process 
bear close similarity with the figures from the simple first-difference for quarterly 
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Figure 2.5  AR(1) residuals from U.S. bank external claims  
 
 
As a result, the degree of fluctuations around the fitting line, a three-quarter 
rolling standard deviation of the residuals normalized by the average of the claims, is 
again almost identical with the measure of volatility (Figure 2.6).  Thus, the adopted 
measure for volatility is compatible with other, similar measures of volatility used in 
the literature and will be employed throughout this study.  Before looking into the 
trends and determinants of the volatility in U.S. bank emerging market lending, 
however, it is important to lay out the peculiarities of U.S. bank lending that warrant 
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As briefly noted in Figure 1.2 of Chapter One, U.S. banks have come to hold 
bigger liabilities than assets internationally, while European and Japanese banks have 
been accumulating their net assets overseas during the same period.  This 
observation begs the question whether U.S. banks have been more volatile lenders to 
emerging economies over time.  However, since the BIS Locational Banking 
Statistics used for Figure 1.2 do not tally country-by-country bank claims/liabilities 
originating from U.S., Japan, or Europe, it is not possible to compare the net positions 
of these banks in emerging economies.  The BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics, by 
contrast, were introduced in the early 1980s specifically to help monitor the 
exposures of national banking systems vis-à-vis emerging market countries, whose 
indebtedness had risen considerably in the wake of the oil shocks of the 1970s (BIS 
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2003).15   
The statistics do not report the external liabilities of member banks.  As a 
consequence, no international net-positions are available from the data.  For 
emerging market exposure, however, the Consolidated Banking Statistics tally 
country-by-country bank assets originating from 27 member countries, allowing 
comparisons between U.S., Japanese, and European banks’ emerging market exposure 
over time.     
Figure 2.7 covers regional bank flows in emerging economies from European, 
Japanese, and U.S. banks over the past twenty years.  It combines both cross-border 
and local claims of the reporting banks on the basis of the nationalities of the 
reporting banks, since the BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics includes the exposure 
of foreign offices while netting out inter-office transactions between home and branch 
offices.  Bank loans from the three regions poured into emerging economies 
throughout the 1990s, and this trend accelerated after the Mexican crisis in 1994.  
European banks led the surge, more than tripling their assets in emerging economies 
between 1990 ($272 billion) and 2000 ($845 billion).   
Despite a dramatic cut in their exposure following the Asian crises of 1997-99 and 
Argentine/Brazilian crises of 2001-2002, European banks persisted in achieving a 
higher profile in emerging economies.  Japanese banks had built up a substantial 
exposure in emerging economies throughout the 1980s.  In 1990, they had assets 
($125 billion) well over the size of the U.S. banks’ assets ($90 billion) and nearly half 
the size of European banks’ assets ($271 billion) from 16 countries combined.   
                                            
15 The statistics provide information on international financial claims of domestic bank head offices on 
a worldwide consolidated basis, i.e., including the exposures of their own foreign offices but excluding 
inter-office positions (BIS 2003).  
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During the protracted depression of the 1990s at home, Japanese banks retracted 
most of their prior exposure in Latin America.  After the onset of the Asian financial 
crises, they were the first to pull out from Asia, and they withdrew assets of much 
greater magnitude than their competitors from Europe and the U.S.  At the end of 
2005, Japanese banks’ emerging market exposure ($110 billion) was less than one-
third of the U.S. banks’ ($314 billion) and U.K. banks’ ($347 billion) exposures.  
As such, it is hard to put all the blame on U.S. banks when it comes to the issue of 
the volatile bank lending that exacerbated the financial crises in emerging economies.  
In Asia, U.S. banks were slow to follow in the buildup phase of the early 1990s, with 
their exposure in Asia only half that of Japanese banks’ in 1997.  When things turned 
bad, it was Japanese and European banks who led the pull-out from the region.  
During the period 1998 through 2000, Japanese banks took out $58 billion and 
European banks withdrew $26 billion from the region, while the U.S. banks pulled 
out only $3 billion from their initially modest exposure in the region.  In Latin 
America, U.S. banks led the pullout at the onset of the debt crisis in early 1980s.  
Throughout the 1980s, they consistently cut exposure in the region.  Upon resolution 
of the crisis in the early 1990s, however, the U.S. banks were the first to get back in.  
Over the course of the financial roller-coasters in Argentina and Brazil in 2001-02, 
the U.S. banks initially expanded their exposure by 50% in 2001, only to cut it back 
substantially.  More recently, U.S. banks have begun to expand their Asian exposure 
more aggressively, nearly doubling their total claims in Asia between 2002 and 2005.  
As of 2005, Asia had become as big a destination for U.S. bank lending as Latin 
America.  
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As to the characteristics of U.S. banks’ emerging market exposure, Goldberg 
(2001) argues that U.S. banks’ emerging market lending has been relatively stable 
compared with other money-center banks from Japan or Europe.  She attributes this 
to the fact that U.S. banks’ external claims are highly correlated with U.S. macro 
conditions, but not with foreign demand situations.  For example, she demonstrates 
that tighter lending conditions in the U.S. are associated with higher claims in Latin 
America, while net claims in Asia tend to contract when the U.S. economy is 
expanding.    
In fact, when the same measure of volatility is calculated for the semi-annual data 
(Dec. 1984 - Dec. 2005) for each region of banks’ emerging market exposure, U.S. 
banks do not exhibit higher volatility on average.16  In Figure 2.8, the volatility 
measures for semi-annual bank lending from Europe, Japan, and U.S. are plotted over 
time.  In terms of the average volatility over the past twenty years, there do not seem 
to be material differences due to the nationality of lenders.  For emerging market 
claims as a whole, the volatility of U.S. bank lending (0.041) falls between that of 
their Japanese (0.038) and European (0.045) counterparts.  For Asian claims, U.S. 
bank lending (0.069) is more volatile than Japanese (0.044) or European (0.048) 
lending, but for Latin American claims, Japanese bank lending (0.063) shows higher 




                                            
16  The BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics report consolidated international claims of reporting 
banks on a semi-annual basis up to December 1999.  Starting in March 2000, quarterly data are 
available.  
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Figure 2.8  Volatility of emerging market claims, by nationality of  





































































Source: BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics 
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A closer look at the movement of volatility across different regions of banks 
reveals an interesting characteristic of U.S. bank lending, however.  In no case other 
than U.S. bank lending does the measure of volatility show any consistent pattern of 
movements — a trend.  Both to emerging markets as a whole and to the major 
destinations of Asia and Latin America, the volatility of U.S. bank lending has been 
increasing over time.  Despite the differences in both regional background and the 
timing of major financial crises, U.S. bank lending became more volatile into the 
2000s.  Since the BIS Consolidated Statistics provide quarterly claims data starting 
from March 2000, the averages for each region’s quarterly volatility measure after 
2000 are compared to the averages for the semi-annual volatility measures reported in 
Figure 2.8.  Table 2.2 sums up this exercise.  
 
Table 2.2  Average volatility of bank lending, by nationality of  
          lenders 
 Emerging market Asia Latin America 
 1984-2005* 2000-2005** 1984-2005* 2000-2005** 1984-2005* 2000-2005** 
Europe 0.045 0.032 0.048 0.039 0.051 0.035 
Japan  0.038 0.020 0.044 0.021 0.063 0.035 
U.S. 0.041 0.040 0.069 0.072 0.051 0.063 
Notes: *semi-annual claims **quarterly claims 
Source: BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics 
 
Given that quarterly figures tend to reduce the measure of volatility due to higher 
frequency, it is noteworthy that U.S. bank lending shows higher volatility during 
2000-2005 (with quarterly data) than the period average (with semi-annual data) for 
Asia and Latin America.  More remarkable is that, in every instance, U.S. bank 
lending after 2000 turns out twice as volatile as bank lending from their European or 
Japanese counterparts.  Again, this observation reflects the fact that U.S. banks are 
 - 38 -
the only ones whose lending volatility was on the rise during the past twenty years.  
Table 2.3 reports the trend coefficients for bank lending from each region of banks.  
Across regions, the trend coefficients for U.S. bank lending volatility are all positive 
and statistically significant at the 5% level.  No comparable trend emerges from 
European or Japanese lending, other than that the financial crises in Latin America in 
the 2000s, such as the Argentine/Brazilian crises of 2001-03, seem to have increased 
volatility in these banks’ lending to the region with opposite signs for trend 
coefficients.  This particular feature warrants further attention beyond the problems 
on the receiving end (in emerging economies), because U.S. banks did not behave 
differently than the banks from Europe or Japan when confronted with emerging 
market crises (Figure 2.7), nor did they exhibit higher volatility on average (Figure 
2.8). 
 
Table 2.3  Trend coefficients for emerging market bank lending 
 Emerging market Asia Latin America 
European banks -0.27 (-0.96) -0.22 (-0.68) 0.54 (1.45) 
Japanese banks -0.44 (-1.79)* -0.43 (-1.68)* 0.14 (0.32) 
U.S. banks 1.39 (3.00)*** 2.10 (3.03)*** 2.02 (2.10)** 
Notes: Dependent variable: (measure of volatility)*1000, independent variable: 1(Dec. 1984) through 
42(Jun. 2005).  T-statistics in parenthesis.  Regressions include a constant and are estimated by OLS 
with White’s correction of heteroskedasticity.  ***1%, **5% *10% significance. 
 
Volatility: Impact & Trend 
Showing the general trend of volatility in U.S. bank overseas claims across types 
and regions is one thing.  However, it would be meaningless if volatility did not 
have much of a negative implication to begin with.  In other words, why does the 
volatility of U.S. bank lending matter?  Does increasing volatility worsen the 
financial crises in emerging economies?  The emerging market financial crisis is a 
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complex matter.  It is unreasonable to expect that the volatility of U.S. bank lending 
alone could trigger such an event.  The ebbs and flows of actual U.S. bank claims in 
emerging economies matter, however, since the rolloff of bank credit lines remains a 
critical, if not dominant, component of such crises.  Accordingly, should the increase 
in volatility of U.S. bank lending be associated with the reduction of U.S. bank claims, 
it can be argued that U.S. bank lending gets more volatile when the banks pull out 
from the region, exacerbating, if not triggering, financial crises.   
To test this hypothesis, a pooled regression was conducted for the panel of 19 
countries between 1984 Q1 and 2005 Q3 (Table 2.4).  U.S. bank claims in sample 
countries — six in the G-10, six in Latin America, and seven in Asia — represent 
over 90% of total claims in each region.  First, the trend in U.S. bank exposure is 
easily discernible, with the claims in G-10 and Asia increasing while those in Latin 
America are cut back over time.  After controlling for major macro variables of U.S. 
bank foreign exposure, however, the trend coefficients for the claims in Latin 
America and Asia move together, decreasing over time and significant at the 1% level.  
The upward trend in G-10 claims, by contrast, remains strong despite the inclusion of 
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Table 2.4  Pooled OLS regression of U.S. bank claims, by region  
         
G-10 (6 countries) Lat. America (6 countries) Asia (7 countries) 




border claims ($ 
billions)          
0.39*** 0.43*** 0.66*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.11*** 0.01*** 0.02*** -0.02*** 
Trend  
(12.5) (13.3) (4.64) (-4.73) (-3.81) (-9.07) (4.12) (5.18) (-5.97) 
 -32.2*** -26.7***  -10.5 -32.1***  -2.57*** -3.75*** 
Volatility 
 (-3.78) (-3.23)  (-1.54) (-6.91)  (-3.54) (-5.78) 
  0.00   0.02***   0.00*** 
GDP ($ billions)   
  (1.62)   (27.4)   (10.8) 
  -1.47**   0.34***   0.39*** GDP per capita 
($ thousands)   (-2.07)   (3.06)   (17.8) 
  1.88***   -0.13***   -0.11*** 
GDP growth  
  (3.72)   (-3.06)   (-6.06) 
  0.58   -0.00   0.03*** 
Interest Rate  
  (1.35)   (-0.99)   (2.19) 
  1.16***   0.37***   0.32*** U.S. GDP 
growth   (1.99)   (2.53)   (5.24) 
  -1.53**   0.19   -0.05 
U.S. interest rate 
  (-2.61)   (1.32)   (-0.82) 
Number of obs.   522 522 498 522 522 496 609 609 494 
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.04 0.04 0.63 0.03 0.04 0.50 
Notes: All regressions include a constant. GDP growth, GDP per capita, Interest Rates are in real terms 
and GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth rates are annual, while the rest are quarterly figures.  T-
statistics are in parentheses denoting ***1%, ** 5% * 10% significance.  G-10 countries include 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom.  The six Latin American countries 
are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela.  The seven in Asia include China, 
Taiwan, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand.  Durbin-Watson d value in each case 
is well over 0.5, suggesting the variables in the regression are cointegrated.   
 
For the G-10 claims, the regression coefficients for the GDP growth of the U.S. 
and host economies are positive and significant at the 1% level.  The level of the U.S. 
interest rate, which does not show statistical relevance for Latin America and Asian 
countries, has a negative and significant sign as expected.  The coefficient for GDP 
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per capita has a negative and significant sign, suggesting that destinations of U.S. 
bank investments among developed countries have not much to do with the income 
level of the host economy.  For the Latin American and Asian claims of the U.S. 
banks, however, the size (GDP) and the income level (GDP per capita) enter as 
important determinants of bank investments, both with significant and positive signs 
at the 1% level.  Further, U.S. GDP growth has a positive coefficient for both 
regions, indicating larger investments in emerging economies when the U.S. economy 
is expanding.  The common negative sign of the host country growth rates is 
puzzling, possibly suggesting that short-term investment behaviors of the U.S. banks 
are affected by something other than growing opportunities in host economies.   
The most interesting feature of the OLS regression in Table 2.4, however, is the 
sign and significance of the coefficients for the volatility measure.  Although it does 
not improve the explanatory power of the model all that much, it does have a 
consistent negative association with the level of U.S. bank claims across countries in 
different regions.  It clearly points to the negative impact of volatile bank lending on 
the level of actual claims.  Initially, it was suspected that the measure of volatility, 
normalized by the average of bank claims for each three-quarter period, could be 
inherently biased toward this negative association.  For this suspicion to be valid, 
however, the standard deviation for each volatility measure would need to remain 
stable, which turns out not to be the case. 
In Figure 2.9, it can easily be seen that regional totals of U.S. bank claims in Asia 
and Latin America do not have much of negative association with the volatility for 
each region.  If anything, the regional total for the Asian claims seems to have a 
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positive association with the volatility measure.  As the level of U.S. bank claims 
increases in Asia, the volatility also increases, denying the existence of a strong bias 
in the volatility measure itself.  To the contrary, the volatility and level of claims in 
Latin America seem to have a negative association, although they do not share much 
of a trend.  Despite the fact that the volatility measure has been constructed from 
claims figures, these two do not demonstrate any significant temporal association, 
positive or negative, over time.  Accordingly, the significant negative coefficient for 
the volatility variable in Table 2.4 can be interpreted to provide ample grounds why 
the volatility of U.S. bank lending has real impact on emerging market financing. 
 
















































































Given the negative effect of volatility on the actual level of U.S. bank claims, it is 
important to figure out how the volatility itself has changed over time.  As a matter 
of fact, there has been an unmistakable trend in U.S. banks’ overseas claims towards 
higher volatility, especially to emerging economies, during the past twenty years.  
Figure 2.10 illustrates this trend across different regions.  Regardless of the 
destination of U.S. bank lending, its volatility has worsened over time.  It is on a 
consistent rising path for the exposures in emerging economies, while tailing off 
around 2000 for developed economies.  Outbreaks of financial crises in emerging 
economies during the period do not seem to play a major role in accounting for the 
overall picture of volatility.  While highly volatile U.S. bank lending took place in 
Asia around the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the highest volatility measure is 
witnessed in Asia in the early 2000s, with no further financial crises in the region.  
By contrast, the volatility measure for Latin American exposure is relatively stable 
even though it is heading upward and has had a few spikes around the crisis years, 
such as the Mexican crisis of 1994-95 and the Argentine sovereign default of 2001. 
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Figure 2.10  Trend of volatility in U.S. bank claims, by region 
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The richness of the Country Exposure Lending Survey (CELS) data makes it 
possible to see which type of U.S. bank lending tends to get more volatile over time.  
As noted, the CELS database details U.S. bank overseas claims by type of borrowers 
(banks, public sector entities, private non-bank entities) and by maturity of claims 
(less than one year, over one to five years, over five years).  Table 2.5 summarizes 
the regression results for different types and regions.  In each case, the volatility 
measure is regressed against the trend variable.  This table demonstrates that the 
overall volatility of U.S. claims has been increasing, regardless of the type or 
destination.  In examining the lending by type of claims, one can see that lending to 
public sector entities in host countries demonstrates a steeper upward trend than 
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lending to emerging economies, particularly to Asia.  The share of public sector 
borrowing among the three types of borrowers in emerging economies remained 
above 50% until the early 1990s, but plummeted below 20% in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s (Figure 2.1).  As such, explicit government guarantees behind public 
sector borrowing might have been instrumental in attracting bigger U.S. bank 
investments initially, but they were not able to stem the capital flight; rather, they 
seem to have encouraged boom and bust cycles in U.S. bank claims in emerging 
economies.  In terms of maturity, short-term claims tend to show higher volatility 
over time in emerging economies, as expected.  In Latin America, however, short-
term claims do not show increasing signs of volatility.  This rather unexpected result 
has to be put in context:  portfolio flows, not bank lending, played a larger role in 
Latin America’s external financing after the 1980s’ debt crisis (Suttle 2003).  
 
Table 2.5  Trend coefficients* for US lending volatility, by type &      
          region 
Notes: * Regression coefficients against trend variable, 1 (1984 Q1) through 87 (2005 Q3).  All 
regressions include a constant and are estimated by OLS with White’s correction of heteroskedasticity.  
***1%, ** 5% * 10% significance 
Developed economies Emerging economies ALL BANKS Total 
Sub-total G-10 non G-10 Sub-total Lat. America Asia 
Total 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0012*** 
by type         
Banks 0.0009*** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0012*** 0.0007*** 0.0010*** 0.0007*** 
private non-banks 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 0.0005*** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 
public sector 0.0013*** 0.0009*** 0.0004 0.0015*** 0.0018*** 0.0012*** 0.0041*** 
by maturity        
short (less than one) 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0008*** 0.0002* 0.0014*** 
medium (one to five) 0.0011*** 0.0016*** 0.0020*** 0.0017*** 0.0003** 0.0003 0.0002 
long (over five years) 0.0006*** 0.0003 0.0005* 0.0001 0.0004*** 0.0009*** 0.0004** 
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Determinants of Volatility 
Extant studies on the determinants of capital flows have focused on the role of 
external and internal factors contributing to financial crises.  On the external side, 
there have been a number of usual suspects leading to boom-bust cycles in emerging 
market financing:  (1) the low interest rate environment in the U.S. in the 1990s 
which caused the expansion of global liquidity; (2) technical innovations that 
facilitated frequent trading and short-term investments; and (3) BIS capital adequacy 
regulation which encouraged short-term lending.  With respect to the internal factors, 
as Vegh, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2004) point out, business cycles in the host country 
matter a great deal to the ebb and flow of foreign capital.  They show that, in 
emerging economies, capital flows as well as fiscal and monetary policies tend to be 
procyclical.  Capital inflows are associated with expansionary macro policies, 
capital outflows with contractionary macro policies.  Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
demonstrate that inflation stabilization programs based on pegged exchange rate 
systems are successful in attracting large capital inflows initially, only to be followed 
by sudden reversals when the credibility of the arrangements is questioned due to a 
wide range of reasons, such as political instability or government spending.  
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) relate boom and bust cycles of emerging market 
financing to bank fragility in receiving countries.   
Despite a plethora of studies on the determinants of capital flows into emerging 
economies, however, there are few empirical works that directly deal with capital 
flow volatility itself.  One such effort is Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych 
(2004).  The authors ran cross-country regressions using 97 countries for the annual 
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span of the period 1970-2000 to figure out determinants of capital flows volatility.17  
They note increasing volatility, especially for debt flows, in the 1990s and confirm 
the trend found in this study:  
 
The volatility of FDI has diminished over the last 30 years.  The same 
pattern is observed for portfolio equity flows, although these flows remain 
more volatile than FDI flows.  On the other hand, the volatility of debt flows 
increased….  As expected, the volatility of each component of net flows of 
capital is lower for the industrialized countries than for the developing 
countries. 
 
For the determinants of the volatility of different forms of capital flows, they find 
that macroeconomic policies such as the inflation rate and income level (GDP per 
capita) have a first-order effect in explaining the high volatility of capital flows.  
They interpret this as a strong suggestion that richer countries with lower levels of 
inflation tend to experience lower levels of uncertainty in terms of net flows of 
external capital.  These findings are born out by the OLS regression results for the 
volatility of U.S. bank emerging market claims in Table 2.7.  The estimated panel 
equation for all U.S. commercial bank claims in 13 emerging market countries is of 
the following form: 
 
    itititititit USMACROCrisisTimeVolatility εαβββββ ++++++= 43210   
 
The dependent variable is the measure of volatility (three-quarter rolling standard 
deviation of quarterly changes in U.S. bank claims divided by the average claims over 
                                            
17 The volatility measure is calculated as the standard deviation of corresponding net flows (FDI, 
portfolio equity, debt flows) per capita over the sample period divided by the average of the absolute 
values of the average gross inflows and gross outflows of capital per capita over the sample period.    
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the same period) for U.S. bank emerging market claims.  itTime  is the trend 
variable with 1 for 1984 Q1 through 87 for 2005 Q3 for 13 sample countries.  
itCrisis  is a (0,1) dummy variable for the quarters in financial crisis for each country.  
The data for the crisis dummy is from the World Bank (2003) and provided in 
Appendix D.  The first vector of variables, itMACRO , contains seven variables based 
on macroeconomic indicators of 13 sample countries: (1) current GDP in billions of 
U.S. dollar; (2) real GDP per capita in thousands of U.S. dollars; (3) average real 
GDP growth rate; (4) average consumer price inflation (CPI) rates; (5) the volatility 
of real interest premium (real lending rate in host country minus real lending rate in 
the U.S.); (6) financial sector development (private credit from the financial sector 
divided by GDP); and (7) openness (share of export plus import volume divided by 
GDP).  The second vector of explanatory variables, tUS , includes two variables 
based on U.S. macroeconomic situations at the time of lending: (1) U.S. real GDP 
growth rate; and (2) volatility of the U.S. real lending rate.  Volatility measures for 
explanatory variables are obtained in the same way as the volatility for U.S. bank 
claims.  Lastly, to represent unobserved differences in each country that is fixed over 
time, country fixed effect, iα , is introduced and F-statistics for the fixed effects are 
reported in Table 2.7.   
Table 2.6 first provides summary statistics for the variables included in the model.  
As shown, within-country variations account for a substantial part of the movement 
of each variable, justifying the introduction of country fixed effects that incorporate 
the heterogeneity in each country that does not change over time, such as the rule of 
law and degree of corruption.  Fixed effects regression will eliminate unobservable 
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differences across countries, thus minimizing endogeneity bias that stems from the 
unobservable inter-country differences in omitted variables (Dranove 2006).  
 
Table 2.6  Summary statistics for model variables 
Entire sample 
 (13 emerging 
market cos.) 
Number of  




(between)** Min. Max. 
Volatility (U.S. 
bank claims) 1131 0.098 0.117 0.100 0.063 0.001 0.931 
GDP (billions) 1131 258.3 289.9 181.8 234.9 16.4 2234 
GDP per capita 
(thousands) 1076 6.836 4.074 2.528 3.304 0.770 21.44 
GDP growth 1131 4.788 4.667 4.083 2.352 -13.1 17.9 
U.S. GDP growth 1131 3.296 1.458 1.458 0 -0.2 7.2 
Inflation (%) 1131 77.74 351.2 314.1 163.6 -1.4 3079 
Volatility (U.S. 
interest rate)  1131 0.093 0.068 0.068 0 0 0.311 
Volatility 
(Interest 
premium) 1012 0.911 1.356 1.284 0.4649 0 9.909 
Financial 
development (%) 893 51.43 39.22 17.64 36.07 8.127 165.9 
Openness (%)  1076 62.57 40.60 16.40 39.08 12.35 228.8 
Notes:  Financial Development measures the share of private credit from financial institutions over 
GDP.  Openness refers to the share of export and import volume over GDP.  *Within-country 
standard deviation refers to variations over time within each sample county.  **Between-country 
standard deviation refers to variations that are fixed over time between 13 different countries (six Latin 
American, seven Asian). 
 
Table 2.7 reports the results of this exercise, encompassing 13 emerging 
economies (six in Latin America, seven in Asia) over the quarterly period of 1984 Q1 
through 2005 Q3.   For the 13 emerging market claims as a whole, the trend 
coefficients for volatility are positive and significant across regions.  Even after 
introducing the country fixed effects along with macroeconomic indicators for the 
host economy (GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation rate, volatility of real 
interest rate differentials between the U.S. and host countries, share of private credit, 
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and openness) and the U.S. economy (GDP growth and volatility of real interest rate), 
the trend remains positive and, for the most part, significant.  The trend coefficient 
gets smaller with the control variables, however.  The coefficients for GDP, GDP 
growth, inflation, financial sector development, and openness of the economy are 
positive and significant, while GDP per capita and volatility of interest premium have 
negative and significant values.  With the country fixed effects, unexpected results 
for volatility of interest premium and financial sector development of the host 
economy lose their statistical significance.  In sum, U.S. bank claims tend to be 
more volatile for a larger economy with a higher inflation rate, especially when the 
economy is liberalized and reliant on trade.   
Across Latin America and Asia, however, regional differences stand out.  For 
Latin American claims, the volatility of U.S. bank claims is explained away by the 
inclusion of control variables.  GDP and inflation, as well as the volatility in interest 
premiums, explain much of the volatility in U.S. bank claims, when financial sector 
development and openness of the economy on average are associated with less 
volatile bank claims.  This conventional result stands in contrast to the case in Asia, 
where the volatility trend gets bigger with the control variables.  Interestingly, the 
coefficients for crisis dummies have negative and significant signs in Asia, growing 
larger with the inclusion of country fixed effects.  This odd result might reflect the 
inherent difficulties in identifying the actual timing of capital flow reversals during 
financial crises in emerging economies, often taking place in a matter of weeks, if not 
in days.   
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Table 2.7  Fixed-effects regression for volatility, emerging market  
          claims 
Dependent Variable: Volatility of U.S. bank claims in emerging economies, 1984 Q1 – 2005 Q3 
All samples (13 cos.) Lat. America (6 cos.) Asia (7 cos.) (Dependent 
Variable)*1000 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
1.46*** 1.20*** 0.37* 0.68*** 0.78*** 0.21 2.12*** 2.19*** 3.17*** Trend  
(8.93) (5.61) (1.93) (10.1) (5.40) (1.01) (7.99) (4.41) (3.39) 
 -0.39 -7.88  -2.86 6.92  -28.0** -45.9*** Crisis (dummy) 
 (-0.06) (-1.06)  (-0.54) (1.32)  (-1.99) (-2.85) 
 0.03** 0.09***  0.03* 0.18***  -0.05 -0.51*** GDP (billions) 
 (1.99) (3.00)  (1.91) (5.56)  (-1.01) (-2.81) 
 -4.02*** 0.67  -2.45* 3.01  -3.37 17.9*** GDP p/c (thousands)   
 (-3.02) (0.30)  (-1.84) (1.55)  (-1.54) (2.82) 
 1.10** 0.30  0.55 -0.03  0.67 -2.81 GDP growth (%) 
 (2.10) (0.57)  (1.20) (-0.06)  (0.52) (-1.58) 
 0.63 1.31  1.89 0.93  2.91 7.82** U.S. GDP growth (%) 
 (0.45) (0.95)  (1.52) (0.78)  (1.09) (2.51) 
 0.03*** 0.02***  0.01*** 0.02***  -0.47 -0.40 Inflation (%) 
 (4.96) (4.07)  (2.77) (3.62)  (-0.78) (-0.60) 
 25.1 31.1  -11.0 -0.64  116.4 29.3 Volatility of U.S. real 
interest rate   (0.59) (0.76)  (-0.31) (-0.02)  (1.47) (0.38) 
 -2.98** -1.24  3.61*** 2.83**  -14.8*** -12.2*** Volatility of interest 
rate premium  (-1.98) (-0.75)  (3.51) (2.18)  (-3.45) (-2.90) 
 0.56*** -0.01  -0.01 -0.94***  0.56*** -1.04* Financial  
Development (%)   (4.28) (-0.07)  (-0.06) (-3.46)  (2.74) (-1.87) 
 0.57*** 1.46***  -0.29 -0.56**  0.34* 0.00 
Openness (%) 
 (4.89) (4.27)  (-1.55) (-1.99)  (1.87) (0.00) 
Country fixed effects 
(F-stats) 
  5.07***   9.59***   4.22*** 
Number of obs.   1131 816 816 522 418 418 609 398 398 
R2 0.09 0.31 0.35 0.14 0.18 0.29 0.13 0.33 0.39 
Notes:  Financial Development measures the share of private credit from financial institutions over 
GDP.  Openness refers to the share of export and import volume over GDP.  All regressions include 




 - 53 -
At the same time, it also brings to attention that a marked increase in volatility of 
U.S. banks’ Asian claims took place after 2000, when financial crises in Asia 
concentrated in 1997-1999 period (Figure 2.10).  Figure 2.11 depicts a divergent 
path in volatility of claims across the sample countries in Latin America and Asia.  
U.S. bank claims in Asia have higher volatility in general, with an average of 0.137 
when the average volatility for Latin America is at 0.053.  In the case of Asia, the 
volatility of U.S. bank claims gets much higher toward the end of the sample period, 
whereas, in the case of Latin America, the volatility shows a more gradual upward 
trend.  Peculiarities of the volatility in Asian claims are further witnessed by 
unexpected signs for other control variables as well.  Unlike the case in Latin 
America, GDP and the volatility of real interest premium have negative and 
significant signs, while GDP per capita and U.S. GDP growth have positive and 
significant signs.  In other words, U.S. bank claims in Asia tend to get more volatile 
when the U.S. economy grows, for relatively smaller economies with higher level of 
income such as Taiwan and Thailand.18  Moreover, the volatility of real interest 
premium has a negative sign, strongly suggesting that real returns on bank claims do 
not explain the volatile trend of U.S. bank claims in the region.  Together, the usual 
suspects for volatile U.S. bank investments in emerging economies play only a 
limited role in explaining the trend of growing volatility over time.  As Table 2.7 
demonstrates, the trend is explained away with other control variables in the case of 
Latin American claims, while it is somewhat reinforced after the inclusion of control 
                                            
18 The average volatility for Taiwan during 1984 Q1 - 2005 Q3, which incidentally escaped the Asian 
financial crises, stands at 0.15, while the same measure for Indonesia, the hardest-hit country from the 
1997 financial crisis in terms of GDP loss, is at 0.08.   
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variables in the case of Asian claims.  
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A pooled sample of Latin America and Asian countries points to GDP, inflation 
rate, and openness variables as major determinants of the volatility in U.S. bank 
emerging market claims.  Even after the model specification, however, the trend 
coefficient remains positive and significant at the 10% level, leading one to suspect 
the existence of other major determinants of volatility not included in the model.  To 
fill this loophole, this study looks at the other end of the equation, regulatory changes 
in the U.S. that provided a common backdrop to individual banks’ investment 
decisions concerning emerging market economies. 
The U.S. domestic backdrop to this increasing trend of volatility in U.S. bank 
emerging market lending is a natural place to turn for an answer.  For one, the data 
overview in the beginning of this chapter clearly demonstrates that it was cross-
border lending from U.S. banks that drove the pull-out from emerging economies.  
Local claims of U.S. bank branches and subsidiaries in emerging economies increased 
tremendously over the past twenty years.  Since local claims are, by definition, 
extended by the bank offices set up in host countries and governed by local 
regulations, they are much less susceptible to changes, economic or institutional, 
stemming from within the U.S.   
Secondly, the U.S. banking sector has been going through a historic 
transformation in its regulatory environment during this period, unmatched in its 
depth and breadth by regulatory changes in Japan or in Europe.  Hence, it offers a 
unique, distinctive setting in which the particulars of U.S. bank emerging market 
lending — i.e. rising volatility — can be tested against the regulatory developments 
in the U.S.  To look into the potential linkages, however, we must first see what 
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actually took place in U.S. banking regulation and how it affected the banking sector 
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The American banking industry suffered a great deal in the 1980s.  
Internationally, it was reeling from the impact of the debt crises in Latin America.  
Domestically, the troubles with savings and loan associations (S&Ls) defied the 
existing regulatory forbearance and necessitated a drastic restructuring whose cost 
amounted to $30 billion for the 205 banks that were sold or liquidated (Kane 2004).  
Perhaps more significantly, Japanese banks surpassed their American counterparts in 
size of both their assets and market capitalization during this period.  For the next 
decade, however, the American banking industry pulled off a truly remarkable 
turnaround, which not only brought it back to dominance in global markets but also 
transformed its very way of business (The Economist 2003).  Surrounding this 
turnaround were two undercurrents of the institutional landscape that converged 
toward the direction of American-style universal banking: (1) consolidation of the 
banking industry; and (2) diversification of banking activities. 
Consolidation of the U.S. banking industry over the past twenty years has been 
nothing short of remarkable (Figure 3.1).  Mega-banks were born, only to be 
merged with each other.  In January 2004, J.P. Morgan Chase regained second place 
in the banking hierarchy by purchasing Chicago’s Bank One for $58 billion in shares 
(The Economist 2004a).  Following another big merger of $47 billion between Bank 
of America and FleetBoston in October 2003, an environment was created in which 
the three giants (Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Bank of America) were distinct 
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from other banks by any plausible measure — geographic coverage, asset size, or 
market capitalization.  In answering why, after decades of so little change, the 
industry began a dramatic consolidation in the 1980s, the Brookings Institution 
(1995) traced it to two major factors:  (1) the extraordinary number of major 
regulatory changes, from deposit deregulation in the early 1980s to the relaxation of 
branching restrictions later in the decade; and (2) the clearly identifiable innovations 
in technology and applied finance, including improvements in information processing 
and telecommunication technologies, the securitization and sale of bank loans, and 
the development of derivative markets.  A decade later, Jones and Critchfield (2005) 
confirmed the analysis and noted, 
 
The transformation of the banking industry is ongoing and the number of 
banking organizations continues to decline....  In two areas — banking 
activities and branching — legislative and regulatory efforts were particularly 
important for the consolidation trend: restrictions on permissible banking 
activities were relaxed, and geographic limitations on branching were 
removed….  There can be no doubt about the influence of deregulation on 
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Figure 3.1  Consolidation of U.S. banking industry 
 
Source: Jones and Critchfield (2005) 
 
Concurrent with the consolidation of the industry, another transformation — the 
diversification of banking activities — has been ongoing, no doubt with dynamic 
interactions between the two phenomena.  Through a gradual and often tedious 
deregulation process over the course of the past twenty years, age-old barriers 
separating commercial banks, investment banks, insurance firms, and securities firms 
have been all but eliminated, paving the way for universal banking.  Banks are now 
free to have, for example, a selective hedge fund, under little supervision, under the 
same financial holding company as their banking operations.  In turn, there is a near 
consensus view in the industry and academia alike that “advantages of universal 
banking are best achieved within the context of large-scale banking, where 
transactions and information costs of syndications are minimized” (Calomiris 2000).  
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Hence, in order to understand the implications of U.S. banking deregulation, and 
ultimately its impact on U.S. bank emerging market exposure, it is imperative to 
elaborate on the common backdrop to the consolidation and diversification of the 
industry:  U.S. banking deregulation.     
 
U.S. Banking Deregulation 
Historically, nowhere among industrial countries have restrictions on financial 
activity been stricter than in the U.S.  The Banking Act of 1933, known as the Glass-
Steagall Act, prohibited commercial banks from issuing, underwriting, selling, or 
distributing any type of corporate securities.  During the Great Depression, over 
9,000 banks — 26% of the total — failed.  Congressional sponsors of the Banking 
Act perceived that banks’ involvement in securities activities facilitated the Great 
Depression.  The sponsors were also motivated by concerns that combining lending 
activities and security and insurance underwriting presented a potential for conflicts of 
interest and moral hazard that was detrimental to investors.  The so-called “separation 
doctrine” focused on the undue risks from non-banking activities that could jeopardize 
the special trusteeship falling on institutions that engage in the lending of depositors’ 
money (Corrigan 1982).  In accordance with these concerns, Section 20 of the Act 
stated that commercial banks were prohibited from being affiliated with any 
organization “engaged principally” in underwriting or dealing in securities.  To 
circumvent the regulations, banks increasingly formed holding companies to which 
banks would be sold.  These holding companies acquired non-bank subsidiaries such 
as investment banks and used bank resources to engage in these activities.   
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 closed this loophole by stipulating that 
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non-bank companies owned by bank holding companies must be engaged in activities 
“closely related to banking,” whose boundaries were to be defined by the Federal 
Reserve.  The 1956 Act prohibited banking companies from engaging in insurance 
activities as well, but provided an exception for national banks in places with a 
population of less than 5,000 (Barth et al. 2000).  By the 1970s, post-war financial 
stability restored confidence in financial institutions and reduced the number of bank 
failures.  For example, by 1934, the number of bank failures had declined to 61, but, 
beginning in 1943, for the next three decades they numbered less than 10 per year 
(Yeager et al. 2005).  In turn, existing restrictions on geography and activity of banks 
came to be questioned.  A number of government studies were released that called for 
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Table 3.1  Watersheds in U.S. deregulation of banking activities 
Sources: Roten (2001) and various newspapers 
 
Subsequently, many studies established that the securities activities of commercial 
banks were not liable for the banking crises during the Great Depression (White 1986; 
Benston 1989; Puri 1996; Kroszner and Rajan 1994).  In the wake of technological 
advances that made the restrictions obsolete, U.S. authorities embarked on a gradual 
relaxation of the two distinct historical limitations on banks:  bans on branching and 





January 18, 1989 
 
 
September 20, 1990 
 
September 29, 1994 
 
December 20, 1996 
 
October 31, 1997 
 
 
November 4, 1999 
 
 
November 12, 1999 
 
The Federal Reserve Board allowed commercial bank holding companies 
to establish separate Section 20 securities affiliates as investment banks, as 
long as the revenue generated from the affiliates’ ineligible securities 
activities amounted to no more than five percent of the total revenues they 
generated. 
The Federal Reserve Board authorized five bank holding companies to 
underwrite corporate debt upon demonstrating adequate capitalization and 
formation of the appropriate subsidiaries 
The Federal Reserve Board granted corporate equity underwriting powers 
to J.P. Morgan. 
Congress passed the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act, which allowed interstate branching.  
The Federal Reserve Board increased the limit on security-underwriting 
revenue earned by bank holding company subsidiaries to 25 percent. 
The Federal Reserve Board lifted numerous bank holding company 
firewalls that limited information flows and dual employment across 
subsidiaries. 
United States Senate and House of Representatives passed the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 by votes of 90 
to 8 and 362 to 57 respectively. 
President Clinton signed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization 
Act of 1999. 
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non-banking activities (Table 3.1).  A period of deregulation culminated in the 
passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.  Appendix B discusses various 
features of the Act.   
Table 3.2 places this evolution of U.S. banking regulation in the context of parallel 
developments in other financial centers.  There are two major aspects of so-called 
“universal banking.”  The first is the ability to mix traditional banking with securities 
and insurance activities, such as issuing, underwriting, and brokering.  The second 
part involves relationship banking, whereby banks acquire shares in industrial firms 
and, in turn, develop ties with the firms in which they have equity stakes.  On both 
fronts, universal banking has been the norm for European banks.  German universal 
banks, for example, have been able to deal with any type of financial product while 
forging close ties with the industrial firms.  At the other end, both aspects of 
universal banking have been denied to U.S. banks until recently, as previously 
described in this chapter.  Interestingly, the Japanese banking environment falls in 
between the U.S. and European cases and is briefly described in Box 3.1.  
Statutory limits notwithstanding, Japanese banks created an elaborate network of 
cross-shareholding to form several groups of large firms, called keiretsu.  At the 
center of the keiretsu were banks and other financial institutions, such as trust banks or 
insurance companies, which lent to other members of the keiretsu and held their 
shares.  In fact, strong ties between banks and firms were the hallmark of financing 
of large Japanese corporations (Hoshi 2000).19   
 
                                            
19  For instance, in 1984, Japanese commercial banks held 20.5% of outstanding corporate equity in 
Japan, while domestic U.S. banks held only 0.2% of the outstanding equity of U.S. firms (Banerji et al. 
2002). 
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Table 3.2  Regulation of broad banking, international comparison 







Before GLB Act (1997) 
Germany Unrestricted Unrestricted Permitted Unrestricted 
France Unrestricted Permitted Permitted Unrestricted 
UK Unrestricted Permitted Unrestricted Unrestricted 
Japan Restricted Prohibited Restricted Restricted 
US Restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted 
After GLB Act (2005) 
Germany Unrestricted Unrestricted Permitted Unrestricted 
France Unrestricted Permitted Permitted Unrestricted 
UK Unrestricted Permitted Unrestricted Unrestricted 
Japan Permitted Restricted Restricted Restricted 
US Permitted Permitted Restricted Restricted 
Definitions: a Unrestricted – A full range of activities in the given category can be conducted directly in 
the bank; Permitted – A full range of activities can be conducted, but all or some must be conducted in 
subsidiaries; Restricted – Less than a full range of activities can be conducted in the bank or 
subsidiaries; Prohibited – The activity cannot be conducted in either the bank or subsidiaries. b 
Unrestricted – 100 percent ownership permitted; Permitted – Unrestricted, but ownership is limited 
based upon bank’s capital; Restricted – Less than 100 percent ownership; Prohibited – Prohibited.  
Sources: Barth, Caprio, and Nolle (2004). Institute of International Bankers. 2006. Global Survey. 
   
As such, the changes U.S. banks have experienced in their regulatory environment 
have been greater than those of their counterparts in other industrial countries.  
Transformation has not taken place without debates on the pros and cons of 
deregulation.  The survey of literature in Appendix C strongly points to overall 
benefits for the industry and consumers.  At the same time, even those in favor of 
deregulation seem to acknowledge that there are real dangers of conflicts of interest 
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and undue risk-taking for banks engaged in non-traditional activities.  The 
arguments for and against universal banking are both plausible in theory and have 
respective followings.  Ultimately, it is up to the empirics on specific banking 
activities.  The linkage between deregulation and emerging market lending, then, has 
to be based on the findings of deregulation’s impact on domestic banking 
performance.  
 
Box 3.1  Deregulation of Japanese Banking Industry  
In Japan, the range of services offered by banks has been strictly limited until recently.  
Starting in 1993, the Japanese government embarked on a complex series of measures 
to reform its financial system.  In 1993, the Financial System Reform Act (FSRA) 
allowed Japanese commercial banks to underwrite certain types of securities.  In the 
aftermath of the depression of the 1990s, the Japanese government adopted a more 
ambitious financial deregulation package, namely the Big-Bang financial reform, 
staggered from April 1998 to March 2001:  On April 1, 1998, a 50-year old ban on 
financial sector holding companies was lifted; in 1999, securities companies and trust 
banks were allowed to enter each other’s businesses through subsidiaries; in 2001, 
insurance companies were included, so that securities companies, trust banks, and 
insurance companies were allowed to enter each other’s businesses through 
subsidiaries (Patrikis 1998).  The range of permissible securities and insurance 
products that banks can sell is still limited, however, with the expansion subject to 
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Impact of Deregulation on Banking Activities 
Over the course of continual banking deregulation, the U.S. banking industry 
underwent marked changes in its market structure.  Following the wave of 
consolidation, larger banks’ share in assets, deposits, as well as the number of banking 
offices across the country, rose steadily and significantly.  Table 3.3 summarizes the 
trend.  From 1985 to 2003, total banking assets have grown by 127%.  The asset 
size of the average bank increased from roughly $270 million to over $1 billion.  The 
assets held by the top 25 organizations rose 367%; these banks’ market share 
increased from 28% in 1985 to 58% in 2003.  Over the same period, assets held by 
small community banks increased only 19%; these banks’ share dropped from 26% to 
14%.  The assets held by midsize banks increased only 42%; their market share 
dropped from 46% to 29%.  Similar shifts took place in terms of deposits and the 
number of banking offices.  The top 25 banks’ share in deposit rose from 25% to 
53%, while their share in the number of banking offices soared from 9% to 33%.   
A closer look at the changing asset composition during this period elucidates a 
source of expansion of the top 25 banks’ activities (Table 3.4).  These banks’ 
holdings of securities, such as mortgage-backed securities, nearly doubled as the share 
of their total assets, while the share of loans and other assets stagnated, if not fell.  
Against the industry total, the share of the largest banks’ traditional assets such as 
loans and leases doubled while the share in securities nearly quadrupled.  This 
phenomenon was largely confined to the largest banks.  The shares of community 
and midsize banks in securities declined from 39% to 17%, and 50% to 36% during 
the same period respectively.  
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Table 3.3  Banking assets, deposits, and offices (1985-2003) 
 
Notes: Community banks are defined as banking organizations (bank and thrift holding companies, 
independent banks, independent thrifts) with aggregate bank or thrift assets of less than $1 billion (in 
2002 dollars).  The top 25 banks are the 25 largest banking organizations, measured in terms of the 
banking industry assets they controlled at the indicated time.  Midsize banks consist of all remaining 
banking organizations.   
Source: Critchfield et al. (2004).  
 
Table 3.4  Share of different assets for top 25 banks 
 as percent of own total assets as percent of industry total  
 1985 1994 2003 1985 1994 2003 
Loans and leases 64.5 59.2 57.9 30.1 39.6 55.7 
Securities 8.3 14.5 15.5 11.2 28.2 47.6 
Other assets 27.2 26.2 26.6 39.7 61.7 73 
Total assets 100 100 100 28.1 41.6 57.7 
Source:  FDIC Banking Profiles. (various issues). 
 
Long denied access to the securities market, large money-center banks in the U.S. 
dramatically expanded their trading activities in securities, tailoring their business 
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models to embrace trading activities with fee income.  How does this characteristic 
of banking activities relate to the risk and return profile of a banking organization?  
White (1986) observes that banks engaging in securities activities such as stocks and 
bonds tend to have a higher return.  However, he finds that the return’s variance 
tends to be higher as well.  In their seminal work on universal banking in the U.S., 
Saunders and Walter (1994) describe and analyze the risks from combining securities 
and insurance business with traditional loan-making.  They show that, compared to 
commercial banking alone, returns from combined commercial and investment 
banking (and other activities, such as mortgage banking, insurance, and real estate 
investment) would be significantly higher, although risk would be higher as well.  
Together, they suggest that bank returns have clearly improved with new banking 
powers.  At the same time, the increased returns seem to be associated with higher 
variance (volatility) from new risks of non-bank activities.  In other words, many 
studies provide evidence that combining banking and non-bank activities has the 
potential of reducing risk via diversification.  However, an increasing number of 
them point out that some non-bank activities tend to increase bank risk; that the 
returns to diversification quickly diminish; and that any risk reduction achieved via 
diversification can be undone and is often outweighed by taking on other volatile 
activities, such as trading in securities or increasing financial leverage (DeYoung and 
Roland 2001).   
With respect to potential risk-reduction, Wall, Reichert, and Mohanty (1993) 
constructed synthetic portfolios based on the accounting rates of return earned by 
banks and by non-bank financial firms.  Their results suggest that, had banks been 
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able to diversify into small amounts of insurance, mutual fund, securities brokerage, 
or real estate activities, they could have experienced higher returns and lower risk 
between 1981 and 1989.  Laderman (1998) simulated mergers between bank holding 
companies and various non-banking financial firms between 1970 and 1994 and 
concluded that by offering “modest to relatively substantial amounts” of life 
insurance or casualty insurance underwriting, a bank holding company could reduce 
both the standard deviation of its return on assets and also its probability of 
bankruptcy.  Cornett et al. (2002) report that the establishment of Section 20 
subsidiaries, which were used to undertake investment banking operations, are 
associated with an increased return on assets, but no change in firm risk.   
On the other hand, Demsetz and Strahan (1995) found that, although bank holding 
companies tend to become more diversified as they grow larger, this diversification 
does not necessarily translate into risk reduction, because these firms also tend to shift 
into riskier mixes of activities and hold less equity.  Roland (1997) found that 
abnormal returns from fee-based activities were more volatile than abnormal returns 
from lending and deposit-taking.  Kwan (1998) compared the accounting returns of 
Section 20 securities affiliates to the accounting returns of their commercial banking 
affiliates between 1990 and 1997 and found that securities affiliates tended to be 
riskier (i.e., have more volatile returns over time), but not necessarily more profitable, 
than commercial banking affiliates.  In fact, DeYoung and Roland (2001) refute the 
conventional wisdom in the banking industry that earnings from fee-based products 
are more stable than loan-based earnings and that fee-based activities reduce bank risk 
via diversification.  By employing individual bank level data from 1988 to 1995, the 
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authors find that as the average bank tilts its product mix toward fee-based activities 
and away from traditional lending activities, and engages in more off-balance sheet 
activities following deregulation and competition from non-bank financial firms, their 
earnings tend to fluctuate more via higher leverage and revenue volatility.  DeYoung 
and Roland (2001) argue that this volatility in earnings reflects the low switching cost 
of fee-based activities compared to relationship-based lending, higher operating 
leverage due to greater reliance on fixed inputs like labor, and higher financial 
leverage due to little or no capital requirements.  Further, Stiroh (2004) finds that a 
greater reliance on non-interest income, particularly trade revenues, is associated with 
more volatile returns and lower risk-adjusted profits.  Stiroh (2005) notes that, 
especially in the years since passage of the GLB Act, the locus of risk has shifted off 
of the balance sheet and onto the non-interest income such as securitization income, 
i.e., gains from loan sales.  Consequently, diversification benefits exist for bank 
holding companies that expand into non-bank activities, but these gains are typically 
more than offset by increased exposure to more volatile activities (Stiroh and Rumble 
2005).  Indeed, Rajan (2005) clearly shows in Figure 3.2 the increasing earnings 
volatility in U.S. banking institutions since 1980 and explains,  
 
Technology helped spur deregulation, which in turn created a larger market in 
which technologies could be utilized, creating further technological advances.  
Both forces have come together to spur institutional change.  For example, 
not only has there been an enormous amount of bank consolidation but also 
the activities of large banks have undergone change….  As traditional risks 
such as mortgages or loans can be moved off bank balance-sheets into the 
balance-sheets of investment managers (e.g. mutual funds, hedge funds), 
banks have an incentive to originate more of these risks.  Thus they will tend 
 - 71 -
to feed rather than restrain the appetite for risk…  However, banks cannot 
sell all risk. In fact, they often have to bear the most complicated and volatile 
portion of the risks they originate, so even though some risk has been moved 
off their balance-sheets, they are being reloaded with fresh, more complicated, 
risks. 
 
Figure 3.2  S&P 1500 banks: earnings volatility 
 
Source: Rajan (2005) 
 
The red line in Figure 3.2 represents the earnings (net income) volatility, derived 
from the AR(1)-process residuals, over the past twenty five years.  Not only is there 
an upward trend, but there seems to exist upward shifts after the major deregulation 
initiatives in the U.S. — Section 20 affiliates in 1987 and the GLB Act in 1999.  This 
interesting coincidence paves the way for subsequent investigations in Chapter Four 
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Sample average of rolling 3-year standard deviations of
estimated AR(1)-process residuals
Sample average of estimated AR(1)-process residuals
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Against the backdrop of a remarkable transformation in U.S. banking deregulation, 
U.S. bank emerging market exposure has been associated with greater volatility over 
time.  However, efforts to relate these two concurrent developments have been 
conspicuous by their absence.  They have been mostly analyzed as distinct 
phenomena, driven by separate dynamics.  As Dahl and Shrieves (1999) point out, 
the empirical analysis of international expansion by U.S. banks has been mostly 
approached from the perspective of locational incentives, such as macroeconomic 
factors in host countries, the extent of foreign investment opportunities, and the 
severity of regulations.  These studies help understand the determinants and certain 
trends in the international activities of U.S. banks.  However, they are often limited 
by the fact that home-country influences on international activities are overlooked.  
If banks are managed and operated on a consolidated worldwide basis, the extent of 
investment opportunities in the U.S. will certainly affect the patterns of investment 
internationally.20  This chapter establishes the connection between the key outcomes 
of banking deregulation — consolidation and diversification — with the volatility of 
emerging market lending by U.S. banks.  Before addressing how the relationship 
comes about, however, it is essential to ask if there indeed is an apparent link between 
the two.   
                                            
20 Benston (1990), among others, encapsulates the enlarged domestic opportunities created by 
deregulation such as underwriting and advisory business previously denied to commercial banks. 
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Temporal Association 
Did a series of banking deregulation steps in the U.S. have an impact on the 
volatility of emerging market claims?  Table 4.1 summarizes and compares the 
average and variations of volatility before and after the major deregulation initiatives 
in the U.S.  The sample period, 1984 Q1 through 2005 Q3, is divided into three 
periods:  (1) pre-deregulation (before 1987 Q2), (2) early deregulation (1987 Q3 to 
1999 Q4); and (3) full deregulation (after 2000 Q1).  Two points in time indicate 
landmark changes in the U.S. banking deregulation:  (1) the introduction of Section 
20 securities affiliates (April 1987); and (2) the passage of GLB Act (December 1999).  
In every single case, be it regional total or country sample, there was an increase in 
average volatility after the two major deregulation initiatives. 
This pattern persists regardless of the size of variations in each period.  For 
example, the average volatility measure increases from 56.5 to 82.4 (pre- to early 
deregulation for 13 emerging market samples), 57.8 to 63.7 (early to full deregulation 
for six Latin American samples), and 88.3 to 103 (pre- to early deregulation for seven 
Asian samples) when standard deviation in each case changes from 86.4 to 75.2, 46.5 
to 47.4, and 107 to 87.7, respectively.  Thus, it is hard to argue that the increasing 
volatility in each period was brought about solely by the existence of influential 
outliers.21  It is noteworthy that a choice of dates, seemingly random except for 
specific changes in U.S. banking deregulation, produces a pattern of increasing 
volatility.  However, does each deregulation initiative exert influence beyond the 
general trend witnessed in the preceding period?  
                                            
21 Since the variances are different and tend to get bigger for each period, the homoskedasticity 
assumption cannot apply.  Accordingly, all regressions are estimated by OLS with White’s correction 
of heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 4.1  Summary statistics for volatility, before & after  
          U.S. banking deregulation initiatives 
(Measure of 
volatility)*1000 
Number of  
observations Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
Volatility of U.S. bank emerging market claims (regional total) 
Pre deregulation 14 8.99 3.61 2.50 16.9 
Early deregulation 50 27.9 20.0 2.73 82.4 
Full deregulation 23 52.0 24.5 11.5 105 
Volatility of sample emerging market claims (13 countries) 
Pre deregulation 182 56.5 86.4 0.96 562 
Early deregulation 650 82.4 75.2 2.09 576 
Full deregulation 229 158 174 3.33 931 
Volatility of U.S. bank Latin American claims (regional total) 
Pre deregulation 14 9.00 5.00 0.97 17.3 
Early deregulation 50 30.7 22.1 1.43 93.0 
Full deregulation 23 43.3 25.8 4.01 102 
Volatility of sample Latin American claims (6 countries) 
Pre deregulation 84 19.4 16.7 0.96 83.5 
Early deregulation 300 57.8 46.5 2.09 262 
Full deregulation 138 63.7 47.4 3.33 243 
Volatility of U.S. bank Asian claims 
Pre deregulation 14 28.7 13.3 4.80 59.9 
Early deregulation 50 44.2 34.7 11.6 168 
Full deregulation 23 114.3 85.5 19.4 334 
Volatility of sample Asian claims (7 countries) 
Pre deregulation 98 88.3 107 1.39 562 
Early deregulation 350 103 87.7 2.11 576 
Full deregulation 161 239 201 11.1 931 
Notes:  G-10 countries include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom.  
The six Latin American countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela.  
The seven in Asia include China, Taiwan, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand.  
Together they hold over 90% of U.S. bank claims in each region.   
 
To see if there indeed has been any significant change around the time of major 
banking deregulation initiatives, a regression with dummy variables for each 
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deregulation period has been conducted for each regional total of U.S. bank emerging 
















Simultaneously, a joint F-test for dummy and interaction variables has been 
conducted to see if there was a structural change between the two periods.  Table 4.2 
reports the outcome of this exercise.  The results indicate there indeed were 
structural breaks in the pattern of volatility after each important deregulation initiative. 
 
Table 4.2  Test results for structural changes 
< Volatility in Emerging Market Claims > 
 Impact of early deregulation (1987 Q3 – ) 
 Sample period:  pre- (1984 Q1 – 1987 Q2) vs. early deregulation (1987 Q3 – 1999 Q4) 
















Joint F-statistics for dummy and interaction variables: F( 2, 60) =  5.99,  Prob > F =  0.0043 
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< Volatility in Emerging Market Claims > 
 Impact of full deregulation (2000 Q1 –) 
 Sample period: pre- and early (1984 Q1 – 1999 Q4) vs. full deregulation (2000 Q1 – 2005 Q3) 















* Joint F-statistics for dummy and interaction variables: F( 2, 83) =  6.42,  Prob > F =  0.0026 
 < Volatility in Latin American Claims > 
 Impact of early deregulation (1987 Q3 – ) 
 Sample period: pre- (1984 Q1 – 1987 Q2) vs. early deregulation (1987 Q3 – 1999 Q4) 
 Result: Structural shift peaks in 1989 Q1  
* Joint F-statistics for dummy and interaction variables: F( 2, 60) =  12.89,  Prob > F =  0.0000 
 Impact of full deregulation (2000 Q1 – ) 
 Sample period: pre- and early (1984 Q1 – 1999 Q4) vs. full deregulation (2000 Q1 – 2005 Q3) 
 Result: Structural shift peaks in 2001 Q3   
* Joint F-statistics for dummy and interaction variables: F( 2, 83) =  5.48,  Prob > F =  0.0058 
< Volatility in Asian Claims > 
 Impact of early deregulation (1987 Q3 – ) 
 Sample period: pre- (1984 Q1 – 1987 Q2) vs. early deregulation (1987 Q3 – 1999 Q4) 
 Result: Structural shift peaks in 1988 Q2   
* Joint F-statistics for dummy and interaction variables: F( 2, 60) =  5.18,  Prob > F =  0.0084  
 Impact of full deregulation (2000 Q1 – ) 
 Sample period: pre- and early (1984 Q1 – 1999 Q4) vs. full deregulation (2000 Q1 – 2005 Q3) 
 Result: Structural shift peaks in 2002 Q3   
* Joint F-statistics for dummy and interaction variables: F( 2, 83) =  22.65,  Prob > F =  0.0000 
Notes:  Dependent variable = (Volatility)*1000.  All regressions are estimated by OLS with White’s 
correction of heteroskedasticity.   
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Several structural breaks can be found in the volatility of U.S. bank emerging 
market claims after the introduction of the Section 20 affiliates in 1987 Q2.  In 1989 
Q3, about two years after the initiative, the most pronounced shift occurred with the 
highest F-statistics during the span of pre-and early deregulation period.  Provided 
that U.S. banking deregulation indeed had a real impact on the volatility of emerging 
market exposure, it is natural to expect a time lag between deregulation and its impact 
on the volatility measure, given the fact that regulatory deregulation began with the 
Section 20 initiative and moved forward in earnest throughout the 1990s.  Box 4.1 
further discusses potential reasons for this lagged response.  After full legislative 
action was completed with passage of the GLB Act in 1999 Q4, one can witness 
another upward shift, starting from 2001 Q3.  Again, it took place after a time lag of 
approximately two years following passage of the GLB Act.  Both of these structural 
breaks are statistically significant at the 1% level.   
These shifts are not unique to the volatility in emerging market claims as a whole.  
Similar patterns are manifested in the volatility of Latin American and Asian claims 
during the same period.  For the Latin American claims, within two years of the 
introduction of the Section 20 affiliates, one can observe a pronounced upward 
structural break in 1989 Q1.  It took less time for a similar shift to take place in Asia 
in 1988 Q2, about one year after the Section 20 initiative.  Comparing the F-
statistics between these two regions suggests that the shift was more severe in Latin 
America than in Asia for the early deregulation initiatives.  The opposite is true for 
the impact of full deregulation in 1999 Q4.  Although pronounced shifts in the 
volatility trend are again witnessed within two years of passage of the GLB Act, 
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starting in 2001 Q3 for the Latin American claims and 2002 Q3 for the Asian claims, 
F-statistics is much bigger for Asia (22.6) than Latin America (5.48).  It clearly 
points to the dramatic ascent of volatility in U.S. bank Asian claims after 2002 Q3.  
 
Box 4.1  Potential reasons for the two-year lag  
•  Behavioral response to regulatory changes  
Any impact banking deregulation has on emerging market lending cannot materialize 
immediately, especially when it is the repercussions from deregulation measures, not 
the measures themselves, that exert influence on emerging market lending.  
•  Effective dates of legislative changes 
To facilitate adjustments by various stakeholders, legal provisions of specific 
deregulation initiatives often take time to become effective.  The Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, for example, was passed in 
September 1994, with its provisions taking effect in March 1995.  The key 
provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also had an adjustment period.  The 
provision facilitating affiliations among banks, securities firms, and insurance 
companies became effective 120 days after enactment.  The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) provisions became effective 18 months later. 
•  Initial rush after major deregulation initiatives 
Despite the usual lagged response to regulatory and legislative changes, those who 
chose to take advantage of these deregulation initiatives seem to have done so 
relatively quickly.  For example, the majority of banks established Section 20 
affiliates in the two years between 1987 to 1989, shortly after the Federal Reserve first 
allowed banks to expand their activities by establishing these separate securities 
affiliates (Cornett et al 2002). 
 
It is hard to reconcile this observation with the conventional idea that volatility 
would be mostly explained by the onset of financial crises in emerging economies.  
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After the Asian crisis of 1997-99, hardly any Asian countries experienced financial 
crises of such magnitude.  If anything, the financial turmoil in Argentina and Brazil 
in 2001-02 is more noteworthy.  Against this backdrop, Table 4.2 shows that U.S. 
bank lending became more volatile after each U.S. banking deregulation initiative, 
albeit after a time lag of about two years, with a bigger impact on Latin American 
claims after the early deregulation and on Asian claims after full deregulation.  
Figure 4.1 graphically illustrates distinct patterns of volatility before and after the 
structural shifts during each period.  The timing of significant shifts in volatility 
coincides with the major deregulation initiatives in 1987 Q2 and 1999 Q4, with a time 
lag of approximately two years.  Whether one examines emerging market, Latin 
American, or Asian claims, a comparison between each period of deregulation clearly 
demonstrates how, after a structural upward shift at the beginning of each period, the 
trend looks widely different from the previous period.  This characteristic in the 
volatility of capital flows bears a remarkable similarity across the regions of Latin 
America and Asia.  This common feature, however, stands in sharp contrast to the 
changing share of claims for each region over the same period.  For example, at the 
end of 1984 Q1, the share of claims in Latin America and Asia accounted for 21% and 
8%, respectively, of the total claims.  As of 2005 Q4, the regional share for Latin 
America and Asia changed to 7% and 8%, respectively.  The size of the claims in 
dollar terms dropped from $73 billion to $46 billion for Latin America and increased 
from $29 billion to $56 billion for Asia.  Although the claims for emerging 
economies as a whole also decreased from $138 billion to $116 billion, a directional 
change among different parts of emerging economies is clear.  In fact, there is a 
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statistically significant negative correlation (-0.71) between U.S. claims in Latin 
America and Asia after 2000.  U.S. bankers were pulling money out of Latin 
America and investing in Asian countries at the same time that the volatility of U.S 
bank lending had been experiencing similar structural shifts in both regions.  Indeed, 
the volatility measures for U.S. bank claims on sample countries experience similar 
patterns of increasing volatility (Table 4.1), coupled with spikes after the important 
deregulation initiatives.  The volatility measures for the claims in seven Asian 
countries, for example, had structural breaks in 1988 Q4 and 2002 Q3 after early and 
full deregulation initiatives.   
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What explains this unique commonality in the volatility trend across regions?  
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lending into emerging economies, it is natural to seek a dynamic through which 
banking deregulation imparts unique commonality to the volatility of U.S. bank claims 
in emerging economies over the past twenty years.  Regardless of varying situations 
individual U.S. banks faced in their emerging market investments, all of them had to 
go through a fundamental transformation in business environment at home over the 
past twenty years.  As noted, the transformation epitomized by the consolidation in 
the banking industry stemmed in part from banking deregulation in the U.S. (Jones and 
Critchfield 2005).  Although the impact of deregulation on industry consolidation is 
well documented, its potential spillovers onto international activities of banks are 
seldom brought up.   
Before proceeding, however, it is important to verify that the changes in the 
volatility trend is not determined by a few influential outliers.  To repress the 
potential sway by outliers, Cook’s D test has been used to eliminate any influential 
outliers.22  As a result, three observations have been deleted from the volatility of 
total emerging market claims, four from the volatility of Latin American claims, and 
seven from that of Asian claims.  The deleted data points are marked with red signs 
in Figure 4.1.  Even with the exclusion of these influential outliers, the average 
volatility remains on the rise as one moves from the pre-, to the early, to the full 
deregulation period (Table 4.3).  It is noteworthy that the increasing trend persists 
even when the variation gets smaller.  For example, the volatility for emerging 
market claims have larger standard deviation in the early deregulation period than in 
                                            
22  Cook’s D test is used to identify the data points that have high influence on the trend coefficients 
for the equation, tititi TimeVolatility εαα ++= 10 .  It detects an observation whose dependent-
variable value is unusual given its values on the predictor variables.  The conventional cut-off point of 
4/n, n being the number of observations in the data, have been followed.     
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the full deregulation period, highlighting a genuine shift in volatility between the two 
periods not dictated by the existence of a few outliers. 
 
Table 4.3  Summary statistics for volatility, without influential  
`         outliers 
(Measure of 
volatility)*1000 
Number of  
observations Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
Volatility of U.S. bank emerging market claims (regional total) 
Pre deregulation 14 8.99 3.61 2.50 16.9 
Early deregulation 50 27.9 20.0 2.73 82.4 
Full deregulation 20 47.9 19.3 11.5 77.4 
Volatility of U.S. bank Latin American claims (regional total) 
Pre deregulation 14 9.00 5.00 0.97 17.3 
Early deregulation 48 28.1 18.4 1.43 76.8 
Full deregulation 21 37.8 19.1 4.02 68.0 
Volatility of U.S. bank Asian claims 
Pre deregulation 14 28.7 13.3 4.80 59.9 
Early deregulation 47 36.6 17.6 11.6 77.3 
Full deregulation 19 80.9 39.6 19.4 153 
 
Furthermore, even with the filtered data, structural shifts in the volatility trend 
stand before and after major deregulation initiatives.  There is no change in the 
timing of these shifts for the emerging market claims.  For the Latin American claims, 
structural breaks take place in 1989 Q1 and 2001 Q2, the same result for the early 
deregulation period and one quarter earlier than the result for full deregulation in 
Table 4.2.  For the Asian claims, structural breaks are witnessed in 1988 Q2 and 
2002 Q3, again the same result with the original data in Table 4.2.  Thus, the 
temporal association between U.S. banking deregulation initiatives and the volatility 
in U.S. bank claims remains valid after having deleted a number of influential outliers.  
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It not only buttresses the relevance of the findings so far, but also justifies the use of 
the original data in its entirety since the so-called outliers are themselves the result of 
important developments in emerging market financing, such as the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997-99 and the Argentine default in 2002 Q1, both of which are classified as 
outliers by Cook’s D test. 
 
Consolidation & Bank Lending Volatility 
Due to the wave of consolidation in the U.S. banking industry over the past 
twenty years, the number of reporting banks to the FFIEC database has been 
decreasing as well.  The number of reporting banks plunged from 198 in 1984 Q1 to 
67 in 2005 Q4, losing nearly two-thirds of its initial total.  The loss in numbers 
notwithstanding, the size of the banking industry in terms of its total capital and 
assets has been on the solid rise over the same period.  Total capital jumped nearly 
ten-fold from $80 billion to $700 billion while total assets quintupled from $1,340 
billion to $7,150 billion (Figure 4.2).  At the same time, large money-center banks 
strengthened their position vis-à-vis smaller banks in the U.S. market.  Their share 
increased from 40% to 49% in total industry capital and 44% to 57% in total assets 
over this period.  Given the fact that the number of money-center banks has fallen 
from nine in 1984 Q1 to four in 2005 Q4, a handful of giant banks came to dominate 
the industry.23          
 
                                            
23  The top nine banks in 1984 consisted of Bank of America, Citibank, Chase Manhattan Bank, 
Manufacturers Hanover, Morgan Guarantee, Chemical Bank, Continental Illinois, Bankers Trust, and 
the First National Bank of Chicago.  Through subsequent mergers, in 2005, four banks qualified as 
the top banks in the FFIEC database: Citigroup, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, and Taunus Corp 
(the U.S. affiliate of Deutsche Bank). 
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Figure 4.2  Number and size (capital & asset) of FFIEC reporting  
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Where does this trend of consolidation stand relative to the parallel developments 
in U.S. banking deregulation?  First, when the rate of consolidation, measured by the 
log difference of the number of banks, is pitted against the milestones in banking 
deregulation over the same period, a clear pattern of accelerating consolidation 
emerges.  As in the previous section, the sample period is divided into three periods: 
pre-deregulation (before 1987 Q2); early deregulation (1987 Q3 to 1999 Q4); full 
deregulation (after 2000 Q1).  In the succeeding period of further deregulation, 
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Table 4.4  Quarterly percentage changes in number of reporting  
          banks 
Δ ln (no. of banks) No. of obs. Mean  Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
Pre-deregulation 13 -0.66 2.20 -2.65 5.56 
Early deregulation 50 -1.16 2.32 -6.72 5.19 
Full deregulation 23 -1.79 2.69 -11.1 2.06 
 
Second, expanding asset size of the reporting banks left their external claims 
shrunk in relative terms, particularly for emerging market cross-border claims.  Total 
external claims of the reporting banks doubled from $350 billion to $660 billion 
during 1984 Q1 to 2005 Q3 (Table 2.1).  Its share in total bank assets decreased 
from 26% to 9% over the same period, however.  For emerging market claims whose 
growth stagnated from $140 billion to $115 billion, the fall was much more dramatic, 
10% to 1% of the total assets of the reporting banks.  Consolidation of the U.S. 
banking industry in effect created fewer banks with a much smaller share of their 
assets devoted to emerging market exposure.  Enlarged domestic opportunities 
created by broader banking powers such as underwriting, trading, and advisory 
services could have pushed U.S. banks away from risky loans into emerging 
economies and, at the same time, made readily reversible short-term lending. 
This presumption is reinforced by the fact that local claims in emerging 
economies from the same banks increased more than ten times during the period, 
from less than $20 billion in 1984 to $196 billion in 2005 (Table 2.1).  In contrast to 
the restrictions on their domestic activities, U.S. banks have long been permitted to 
engage in non-banking activities through separate foreign subsidiaries with fewer 
constraints than domestic subsidiaries in terms of how they structure these operations.  
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Thus, banks with foreign subsidiaries enjoyed greater freedom in different lines of 
non-banking business long before deregulation at home.  With better profit margins 
in emerging economies, this could have facilitated a physical presence in emerging 
economies that was much harder to cut back despite changing incentives at home.24   
 Consolidation in the U.S. banking industry owes much of its evolution to 
successive deregulation.  In turn, reduction in both the number of banks and the 
share of emerging market claims in total assets are important by-products of industry 
consolidation.  Are these by-products related to the increasing volatility of U.S. bank 
emerging market claims?  U.S. bank emerging market lending has not been a point 
of contention for or against banking deregulation in the U.S.  As such, U.S. banking 
deregulation has no apparent bearing on the increasing volatility of U.S. bank 
emerging market exposure.  Its potential impact, if any, has to be exerted through 
trickle-down effects such as industry consolidation.  
As a result of consolidation, a handful of money-center banks increasingly control 
the total claims in emerging economies.  Table 2.1 from chapter 2 lists the changing 
share of money-center banks in U.S. bank cross-border exposure over time.  The 
share has increased from 64% in 1984 Q1 to 80% in 2005 Q4.  Furthermore, this has 
to be put in context:  the number of money-center banks in the database shrunk from 
nine in 1984 Q1 to four in 2005 Q4.  These four banks (Bank of America Corp., 
Taunus Corp., J.P. Morgan Chase, and Citigroup) have also led the rest in terms of 
their volatile investment patterns.  Table 4.5 illustrates the phenomenon.  There is 
an apparent discrepancy between big U.S. banks (money-center banks) and small U.S. 
                                            
24  Claessens, Demirguk-Kunt, and Huizinga (1998) report that, in emerging market countries, foreign 
banks tend to have bigger margins and profits than local banks, whereas the reverse is true in 
developed countries.   
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banks.  In almost every category, big money-center banks are driving up the trend in 
volatility for all banks.  The trend coefficients for claims by money-center banks are 
on average 20-25% larger than those for all reporting banks.  By sharp contrast, 
smaller banks diverge from the overall trend and, in many occasions, such as lending 
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Table 4.5  Trend coefficients† for lending volatility, by size of banks 
Notes: † Regression coefficients against trend variable, 1 (1984 Q1) through 87 (2005 Q3).  Negative 
numbers are in parentheses.  All regressions include a constant and are estimated by OLS with 
White’s correction of heteroskedasticity.  ***1%, ** 5% * 10% significance 
 
 
Developed economies Emerging economies ALL BANKS All  
Total G-10 non G-10 Total Lat. America Asia 
All 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0012*** 
by type         
Banks 0.0009*** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0012*** 0.0007*** 0.0010*** 0.0007*** 
private non-banks 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 0.0005*** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 
public sector 0.0013*** 0.0009*** 0.0004 0.0015*** 0.0018*** 0.0012*** 0.0041*** 
by maturity        
short (less than one) 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0008*** 0.0002* 0.0014*** 
medium (one to five) 0.0011*** 0.0016*** 0.0020*** 0.0017*** 0.0003** 0.0003 0.0002 
long (over five years) 0.0006*** 0.0003 0.0005* 0.0001 0.0004*** 0.0009*** 0.0004** 
Developed economies Emerging economies MONEY-CENTER 
BANKS All  
Total G-10 non G-10 Total Lat. America Asia 
All 0.0004*** 0.0002** 0.0003** 0.0005*** 0.0008*** 0.0007*** 0.0016*** 
Banks 0.0009*** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0016*** 0.0019*** 0.0030*** 0.0019*** 
private non-banks 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 0.0007** 0.0007*** 0.0003*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 
public sector 0.0015*** 0.0011*** 0.0003 0.0020*** 0.0021*** 0.0012*** 0.0048*** 
short (less than one) 0.0004*** 0.0002 0.0004** 0.0006*** 0.0010*** 0.0002 0.0016*** 
medium (one to five) 0.0015*** 0.0022*** 0.0023*** 0.0024*** 0.0003* 0.0005* 0.0002 
long (over five years) 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0012*** 0.0009** 0.0004*** 0.0010*** 0.0006*** 
Developed economies Emerging economies SMALLER BANKS All  
Total G-10 non G-10 Total Lat. America Asia 
All 0.0006* 0.0007 0.0009* 0.0011** 0.0000 0.0001 (0.0007)** 
Banks 0.0009** 0.0011** 0.0016*** 0.0020*** 0.0000 (0.0002) (0.0006)** 
private non-banks (0.0006)** (0.0012)*** (0.0015)*** (0.0004) (0.0003) 0.0000 (0.002)*** 
public sector 0.0010 0.0026 0.0024 0.0033 0.0004 0.0011*** (0.0008) 
short (less than one) 0.0009** 0.0013** 0.0018*** 0.0023*** (0.0006)** (0.0004)** (0.0009)* 
medium (one to five) 0.0004** 0.0006* 0.0006 0.0010** 0.0002 (0.0000) 0.0001 
long (over five years) 0.0007* 0.0002 0.0003 (0.0017)* 0.0007** 0.0009** (0.001)*** 
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Further, there is an interesting relationship between the rate of consolidation and 
the volatility of emerging market lending.  Figure 4.3 plots quarterly percentage 
changes in the number of reporting banks (after a two-year lag) against the same 
banks’ emerging market lending volatility over 1984 Q1 through 2005 Q3.  There is 
a negative correlation significant at the 1% level.  It clearly illustrates that, as the 
number of banks changes, the volatility of U.S. bank emerging market claims 
fluctuates in a similar fashion to an opposite direction, albeit with a time-lag.   Does 
it merely reflect a spurious correlation?  It is highly likely that there exist the 
omitted variables that are correlated with the consolidation trend, making the 
percentage change in the number of reporting banks an endogenous variable 
correlated with the disturbance term.  In many econometric analyses, an 
instrumental variable (IV) is employed to rectify this endogeneity problem.   
 
Figure 4.3  Percentage change in the number of reporting banks vs.    
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To use deregulation as an instrument, it needs to meet the usual requirements for 
such a use — relevance and validity.  An instrument needs to be correlated with the 
suspected endogenous variable at hand (relevancy) and uncorrelated with the 
disturbance term from the original equation (validity).  While the relevancy 
condition is easily tested with potential instruments, the validity condition cannot be 
easily tested.  Since consolidation of the banking industry is likely to be correlated 
with some omitted variable in explaining the volatility of emerging market lending, 
the exogenous policy variable — deregulation of the U.S. banking industry — is a 
natural candidate for such an instrument.  Deregulation, if it affects the volatility of 
emerging market lending beyond temporal association, is likely to do so through 
trickle-down effects such as industry consolidation.     
Debates on the U.S. banking deregulation in Appendix C suggest why the banking 
consolidation, with a small number of giant banks dominating the industry, could 
result in riskier and more volatile investments into emerging economies.  
Consolidation of the banking industry is essentially an outcome of increased 
competition.25  However, as better performers grow larger through synergies from 
multiple activities, often the problem of conflicts of interest intensifies.26  Ironically, 
remedies to deal with conflicts of interest – such as new risk management system and 
more transparency – may also end up increasing volatility of lending into emerging 
economies.  Persaud (2000) shows how the increasing use of the daily earnings at 
risk (DEAR) model, while perfectly rational from the standpoint of the individual 
                                            
25  Stiroh and Strahan (2002) find the link between a bank’s relative performance and its subsequent 
market share growth strengthens significantly after deregulation as competitive reallocation effects 
transfer assets to better performers.   
26  White (2004) acknowledges that synergies from multiple activities and conflicts of interest are a 
package deal.  Walter (2003) notes that the bigger and broader the financial intermediaries, the greater 
the agency problems associated with conflicts of interest. 
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bank, can work to increase overall volatility.   
 
The DEAR estimates the future distribution of daily returns based on past 
measures of market correlation and volatility.  Both rising volatility and 
rising correlation will increase the potential loss of the portfolio, increasing 
DEAR….When DEAR exceeds the limit, the bank reduces exposure, often by 
switching into less volatile and less correlated assets.  
 
Daily publication of statistics can also accelerate and intensify the spread of any 
bad news that may break, with declining asset values and increasing volatility as 
sophisticated positive feedback mechanisms (Williamson 2005).  With the reduced 
number of banks having claims on emerging economies, there is increasingly less 
room for actions by others that can mitigate the volatile lending by giant banking 
institutions.  
In fact, when deregulation dummies are used as instrumental variables, a clear 
picture emerges in which deregulation raises the volatility of U.S. bank emerging 
market lending via consolidation in the number of banks making investments into 
emerging economies.  That deregulation, by legally permitting the geographical and 
functional expansion of existing banking organizations, contributed to the 
consolidation of the banking industry in the U.S., has been supported by numerous 
existing studies summarized in Chapter Three.  Table 4.6 shows the effects of 
deregulation dummies on the percentage change in number of reporting banks.  
Given that structural breaks in the trend of volatility came about after an 
approximately two-year time lag in Table 4.2, two deregulation dummies — 
deregulation (1989 Q3 to 2005 Q3) and full deregulation (2002 Q1 to 2005 Q3) — 
start two years after important milestones in U.S. banking deregulation — the 
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introduction of Section 20 affiliates (1987 Q2) and the passage of GLB Act (1999 Q4).   
 
Table 4.6  Effect of deregulation on industry consolidation 




(1989 Q3 – ) 
-0.29** (-2.13) -1.27*** (-3.76) 
Full deregulation 
dummy (2002 Q1 – ) 
-0.92*** (-3.91) -1.16*** (-4.19) 
Trend   0.00 (0.96) 
Crisis (dummy)  -0.19 (-0.84) 
GDP (billions)  0.00 (0.39) 
GDP p/c (thousands)    0.12 (1.54) 
GDP growth (%)  0.05** (2.37) 
U.S. GDP growth (%)  -0.28*** (-4.02) 
Inflation (%)  0.00* (1.73) 
Volatility of U.S.  
real interest rate  
 -10.8*** (-8.06) 
Volatility of interest 
rate premium 
 -0.09 (-1.32) 
Financial 
Development (%)  
 -0.01 (-1.53) 
Openness (%)  0.00 (0.47) 
Country fixed effects 
(F-statistics) 
 0.34  
F-test (p-value)† 12.86*** (0.000) 12.16*** (0.000) 
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis.  All regressions include a constant and are estimated by OLS with 
White’s correction of heteroskedasticity.  ***1%, ** 5% * 10% significance.  †F-statistic is for a test 
of the hypothesis that the deregulation dummies jointly have no effect.  
 
Column (1) of Table 4.6 shows that, while deregulation has a negative and 
significant effect on the percentage change in the number of reporting banks, full 
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deregulation has a negative effect over and above the entire deregulation period.  
Moreover, in column (2) of Table 4.6, when other control variables for the volatility 
are included, coefficients for deregulation dummies remain negative and significant, 
with F-test rejecting the null hypothesis of “no joint effect of deregulation dummies” 
at the 1% level.  Accordingly, it is relevant to use deregulation dummies as 
instruments to see if consolidation contributed to the increasing volatility of U.S. 
bank emerging market lending. 
For deregulation to be a valid instrument, it should be uncorrelated with the 
disturbance term from the original regression with the volatility on one hand and 
consolidation on the other.  In other words, deregulation needs to be outside the 
volatility “production function” (Levitt 1997).  As emphasized in the introduction of 
this study, as well as surveyed with literature on the effects of deregulation in Chapter 
Three, nowhere in the debates on the pros and cons of banking deregulation has the 
issue of emerging market lending volatility entered the picture.  U.S. banking 
deregulation was largely a domestic affair, although often buttressed by concerns 
about the international competitiveness of U.S. banking organizations (Hammond and 
Knott 1988; Kroszner and Strahan 2000).          
The result of the exercise is reported in Table 4.7.  When the percentage change 
in the number of reporting banks is regressed with conventional control variables in 
OLS, it loses its statistical significance.  However, in the 2-Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS) model with the deregulation dummies as instruments, the coefficients turn 
significant.  The large and significant differences in estimated coefficients suggest 
that the consolidation variable is indeed endogenous.  More importantly, the results 
 - 95 -
strongly suggest that deregulation, via consolidation of the banking industry, 
negatively affected the volatility of U.S. bank emerging market lending.  
 
Table 4.7  OLS & 2SLS estimates of emerging market lending  
          volatility 
Dependent Variable:  Volatility of U.S. bank claims in 13 emerging economies, 1984Q1 – 2005Q3 











Trend  1.58*** 0.34 1.24*** 0.95*** 0.31 -0.05 
Δ ln (no. of banks) 
with two-year lag 
-2.66 -78.7* -1.33 -18.0** -1.47 -17.5** 
Crisis years (dummy)   0.03 0.19 -8.54 -8.42 
GDP (billions)   0.03* 0.03* 0.08** 0.10*** 
GDP p/c (thousands)     -3.79*** -3.27** 1.96 3.07 
GDP growth (%)   1.40** 2.27** 0.58 1.36* 
U.S. GDP growth (%)   0.05 -2.51 1.26 -1.26 
Inflation (%)   0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 
Volatility of U.S.  real 
interest rate  
  -1.36 -169* 5.79 -156* 
Volatility of interest 
rate premium 
  -3.28* -4.89** -1.38 -2.97 
Financial   
Development (%)  
  0.56*** 0.48*** -0.14 -0.25 
Openness (%)   0.59*** 0.63*** 1.61*** 1.69*** 
Country fixed effects  
(F-statistics) 
    4.90*** 3.31*** 
Number of obs.   988 988 717 717 717 717 





Notes:  Financial Development measures the share of private credit from financial institutions over 
GDP.  Openness refers to the share of export plus import over GDP.  All regressions include a 
constant and are estimated by OLS with White’s correction of heteroskedasticity.  ***1%, ** 5% * 
10% significance. 
 
Not only did the number of reporting banks fall as a result of industry 
consolidation, but the share of emerging market claims (in total assets) of these 
reporting banks experienced a drastic downfall as well.  In Table 4.8, the share of 
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emerging market claims in total assets of reporting banks is used as an additional 
control variable.  As noted, the share has been dramatically decreasing over the past 
twenty years, from the 10% to the 1% level.  Since the volatility of emerging market 
lending has been increasing during the period, the two variables move in opposite 
directions.  This divergence is manifested in the first column of Table 4.6.   
 
Table 4.8  Share of emerging market claims vs. lending volatility 
Period of Deregulation 
All samples (13 countries 
over entire period)  
(Dependent Variable: emerging 
market lending volatility)*1000 
Pre Early Full (1) (2) (3) 
Trend  -0.91 0.49* 2.35** 1.07*** 1.19*** 0.68** 
Share of emerging market claims -62.6*** -80.1*** -304*** -74.9*** -0.64 46.5** 
Crisis (dummy)     -1.03 -11.1 
GDP (billions)     0.03* 0.11*** 
GDP p/c (thousands)       -4.07** -0.29 
GDP growth (%)     1.13** 0.36 
U.S. GDP growth (%)     0.48 0.42 
Inflation (%)     0.03*** 0.02*** 
Volatility of U.S. real interest rate      20.0 21.1 
Volatility of interest rate premium     -2.72* -1.01 
Financial Development (%)      0.57*** -0.08 
Openness (%)     0.58*** 1.44*** 
Country fixed effects (F-statistics)      5.32*** 
Number of obs.   169 637 299 1118 807 807 
R2 0.16 0.09 0.04 0.13 0.31 0.36 
 
As elaborated in the previous section, successive periods of deregulation 
witnessed the growing volatility of U.S. bank emerging market claims.  Against this 
trend, the share of emerging market claims in total bank assets maintains a consistent 
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negative association with the volatility measure.  The negative coefficients grow 
ever larger in each succeeding period of deregulation.  Due to the opposite direction 
in which each variable is heading, an increase in the share of emerging market claims 
in total banking assets is associated with a decline in volatility in each period in the 
first column.  However, this negative correlation between the two variables is turned 
on its head when additional control variables are included in the equation.  In the 
second column, conventional determinants of lending volatility from Table 2.7 have 
been regressed against the volatility measure, with and without country fixed effects.  
Even without country fixed effects, the coefficient for the share of emerging market 
claims loses its statistical significance, as shown in column (2) of the second group of 
columns.  When unobserved differences in each country are controlled with country 
fixed effects, the coefficient for the share of emerging market claims turns positive, 
significant at the 5% level.  Thus, each percentage increase in the share of emerging 
market claims in total banking assets is positively associated with greater volatility.  
The so-called “Calvo-Mendoza problem” stipulates that, for institutions whose 
holdings of cross-border loans and securities are small relative to their total assets, it 
is not cost-effective to acquire detailed knowledge of country fundamentals.  And, 
such institutions become susceptible to country-specific rumors (Calvo and Mendoza 
2000).  As the level of the share of emerging market claims declines, incremental 
gains in the share seem to increase the volatility of such claims, after controlling for 
other variables.   
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Diversification & Bank Lending Volatility 
Another obvious outcome of banking deregulation has been the diversification of 
banking activities in the U.S.  Long denied access to non-banking business, U.S. 
banks dramatically increased their holdings of securities upon the lifting of regulatory 
restrictions.  In fact, the largest banks nearly doubled their holdings of securities, 
such as mortgage backed securities, as the share of their own total assets (Table 3.4).  
With the opportunities for new lines of business, however, the potential for abuse has 
been continually raised by critics.  As emphasized in Appendix C, the possible 
extension of public safety nets and bigger risks associated with fee-based non-banking 
activities remain important points of contention regarding U.S. banking deregulation 
over the past twenty years.   
Opponents to deregulation have argued that allowing banks to expand their 
activities into securities and insurance would extend the safety net and add to the 
subsidy, and, as a consequence, encourage moral hazard by encouraging banks to take 
on excessive levels of risk.  Although there is little disagreement about the positive 
impacts of U.S. banking deregulation in generating benefits to consumers of new, 
cheaper products and more efficient financial transactions, the survey of literature in 
Chapter Three strongly suggests that banks indeed have taken on more risk over time 
and demonstrate greater volatility in their earnings streams, partly as a result of 
diversifying their business activities.   
A closer look at the source data of Figure 3.2 reveals temporal shifts in U.S. bank 
earnings volatility over time (Figure 4.4).27  When the annual data is plotted against 
                                            
27 Ioannis Tokatlidis of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) generously provided the raw data.  
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each period of gradual banking deregulation — pre-deregulation (1984-1987), early 
deregulation (1988-1999), and full deregulation (2000-2005) — an unmistakable 
pattern of upward shifts is noticeable in Figure 4.4.  Not only is there a significant 
break in the trend of earnings volatility for early and full deregulation, but every 
single data point in each period has a higher value than those in the previous period.  
Although there is a mismatch in the frequency of data (annual earnings data versus 
quarterly claims data), a similar trend of volatility is evident in both measures.  
Compared to the temporal association between deregulation and the volatility of U.S. 
bank emerging market claims, where structural shifts took place after a time lag of 
approximately two years, the shifts in U.S. earnings volatility seem to have 
immediately followed the deregulation initiatives in each period.   
Again, are these patterns simply a matter of coincidence?  Is it possible to see if 
the pattern of volatility in U.S. bank earnings leads to a similar movement in U.S. 
bank emerging market claims?  In other words, is there a way to verify the existence 
of temporal causality between the volatility of bank earnings and bank emerging 
market claims?  As noted previously, there are a number of important studies 
establishing a link between banking deregulation and earnings volatility.  One such 
finding is that important characteristics of banking deregulation, such as the dealing of 
mixed financial products by commercial banks, are shown to increase bank earnings 
volatility (DeYoung and Roland 2001).  Given such findings in previous studies, one 
can argue that U.S. banking deregulation, via higher earnings volatility, in turn led to 
the trend of increasingly volatile U.S. bank emerging market claims.  For this 
argument to be valid, however, there needs to be strong evidence showing temporal 
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causality between the earnings and lending volatility beyond the simple temporal 
association demonstrated so far.     
 
Figure 4.4  Trend of volatility for S&P 1500 bank earnings 
 
 
The “Granger Test” statistically detects the direction of causality when 
temporarily there is a lead-lag relationship between two variables.  A standard 
statistics textbook notes, 
In a regression of Y on other variables (including its own past variables) if we include 
past or lagged values of X and it significantly improves the prediction of Y, then we 
can say that X (Granger) causes Y.” (Gujarati 1995).  More specifically, if X causes 
Y and Y does not cause X, it is said that unidirectional causality exists from X to Y.  






1987 1999 1987 1999 1987 1999
volatility 
Source: Datastream and IMF staff estimates 
Pre-deregulation Early -deregulation Full deregulation 
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independent.  Lastly, if X causes Y and Y causes X, it is said that feedback exists 
between X and Y.  It is no more than an F-test for the restricted regression (without 
lagged X variables) and the unrestricted (with lagged X variables).   
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In order to conduct the Granger test, several conditions have to be met.  First, 
since the test is a form of Vector Autoregression (VAR), where the dependent variable 
is explained in terms of its own lagged values as well as the lagged values of 
explanatory variables, it is critical to have the data with the same frequency — be it 
monthly, quarterly, or annual.  Second, all the variables included should be jointly 
stationary.  If this is not the case, the data has to be transformed appropriately (e.g., 
first-differencing).  Harvey (1990) further notes, “The results from the transformed 
data may be unsatisfactory.  The usual approach adopted by VAR aficionados is 
therefore to work in levels, even if some of these series are non-stationary.  In this 
case, it is important to recognize the effect of unit roots on the distribution of 
estimators.”  Thus, a test of stationarity — the “Dickey-Fuller” test — should 
precede the actual Granger test.  Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Granger-
causality test is very sensitive to the number of lags used in the analysis and the 
direction of causality often depends critically on the number of lagged terms included.  
Thus, the right choice of lag length needs to be explained in advance. 
As noted, the raw data used in Figure 4.4 are annual figures and cover only the 88 
banking institutions listed in the S&P 1500.  They reflect a trend in U.S. bank 
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earnings volatility similar to the volatility in U.S. bank emerging market claims.  To 
verify a causal link between the two variables, however, quarterly data on U.S. bank 
earnings are needed.  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) issues 
quarterly banking profiles whose data on U.S. commercial bank earnings (net income) 
date back to 1992 Q2.  They cover total earnings from over 11,400 U.S. commercial 
banks in 1992 Q3 to 7,526 banks in 2005 Q4.  The “bank earnings volatility” was 
calculated using the identical method from the volatility in U.S. bank overseas claims.  
In Figure 4.5, the annual average of the measure is produced and plotted against the 
volatility measure used in Figure 3.2.  Although there is a slight difference in 
methodology and coverage, the two measures demonstrate a similar trajectory over 
the past 12 years.    
 
Bank Earnings Volatility = three-quarter rolling standard deviation of quarterly 
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Figure 4.5  Juxtaposition of bank earnings volatility against Figure     
           3.2 
 
  
Like bank claims, quarterly U.S. bank earnings data suffer from a unit root 
problem and are non-stationary in nature.  When the data are transformed to measure 
volatility, however, the bank earnings volatility measure escapes from a unit root 
problem, in the same way the volatility measure from the bank claims data turns out 
to be stationary.  Table 4.9 summarizes the results of the “Dickey-Fuller” tests on the 
volatility measures of both U.S. bank overseas claims (1984 Q1 to 2005 Q3) and bank 
earnings (1993 Q1 to 2005 Q3).  All the test statistics are bigger than the 5% 
McKinnon Critical Value in absolute terms, meaning that one can reject the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity at the 5% level.  The stationary nature of both 
volatility measures enables the Granger test between the two.  For the following 
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estimated AR(1)-process residuals (Figure 7)
Quarterly bank earnings volatility (annual average)
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to reflect the apparent time lag from the dummy tests for structural shifts in lending 
volatility and earnings volatility.  In Figure 4.1, it has been shown that there exist 
structural breaks in volatility around 2001 Q2 and 2002 Q1 for emerging market 
claims.  In Figure 4.4, for bank earnings volatility, a structural break can be 
witnessed in 2000.  Table 4.10 reports the Granger test results. 
 
Table 4.9  Dickey-Fuller unit root test results  
---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller on Volatility of U.S. Bank Overseas Claims ----
-----  
Grand Total                                          Number of obs = 86 
    Test Statistic   1% Critical Value    5% Critical Value    10% Critical Value 
Z(t)        -3.481           -3.530           -2.901            -2.586 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0085 
 
Developed economies                                  Number of obs = 86 
    Test Statistic   1% Critical Value    5% Critical Value    10% Critical Value 
Z(t)        -3.950           -3.530           -2.901            -2.586 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0017 
 
Emerging economies                                   Number of obs = 86 
    Test Statistic   1% Critical Value    5% Critical Value    10% Critical Value 
Z(t)        -3.656           -3.530           -2.901             -2.586 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0048 
 
Latin America                                        Number of obs = 86 
    Test Statistic   1% Critical Value    5% Critical Value    10% Critical Value 
Z(t)        -3.687           -3.530           -2.901             -2.586 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0043 
 
Asia                                                 Number of obs = 86 
    Test Statistic   1% Critical Value    5% Critical Value    10% Critical Value 
Z(t)        -2.924           -3.530           -2.901             -2.586 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0427 
 
---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller on U.S. Bank Earnings Volatility ---------  
                                                    Number of obs = 50 
    Test Statistic   1% Critical Value    5% Critical Value    10% Critical Value 
Z(t)        -2.974           -3.580           -2.930             -2.600 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0374 
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Table 4.10  Granger-causality tests for volatility  
Null Hypothesis 
<Total Overseas Claims> 
F-Statistics 
Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 
0.15 0.47 0.40 0.49 0.82 
Lag 9 Lag 10 Lag 11 Lag 12 Lag 13 
“Bank earnings volatility does 
not Granger-cause volatility of  
bank overseas claims” 
1.13 1.02 0.77 0.83 0.82 
Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 
0.77 0.65 0.84 0.74 0.74 
Lag 9 Lag 10 Lag 11 Lag 12 Lag 13 
“Volatility in bank overseas 
claims does not Granger-cause 
bank earnings volatility”  
0.64 0.49 0.70 0.80 0.77 
<Developed Market Claims>  
Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 
0.03 0.25 0.44 0.56 0.80 
Lag 9 Lag 10 Lag 11 Lag 12 Lag 13 
“Bank earnings volatility does 
not Granger-cause volatility of  
bank overseas claims” 
0.86 0.86 0.71 0.56 0.67 
Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 
0.53 0.73 0.84 0.75 0.86 
Lag 9 Lag 10 Lag 11 Lag 12 Lag 13 
“Volatility in bank overseas 
claims does not Granger-cause 
bank earnings volatility”  
0.75 0.54 0.59 0.62 0.66 
<Emerging Market Claims>  
Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 
1.55 1.30 2.13* 2.65** 2.96** 
Lag 9 Lag 10 Lag 11 Lag 12 Lag 13 
“Bank earnings volatility does 
not Granger-cause volatility of  
bank overseas claims” 
3.29** 2.51** 2.49** 3.07** 2.49* 
Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 
0.72 0.60 0.62 0.40 0.32 
Lag 9 Lag 10 Lag 11 Lag 12 Lag 13 
“Volatility in bank overseas 
claims does not Granger-cause 
bank earnings volatility”  
0.77 0.77 0.43 0.53 0.44 
Notes: *Reject the null hypothesis at 10% level,  **Reject the null hypothesis at 5% level. 
 
From Table 4.10 emerges a clear direction of causality for emerging market 
claims of U.S. banking institutions.  With the 6- to 13-quarter lag, one can safely 
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reject the null hypothesis, “bank earnings volatility does not Granger-cause volatility 
of bank emerging market claims,” at the 5% level.  With the same lag length, 
however, it is not possible to reject the reverse causality, “volatility in bank emerging 
market claims does not Granger-cause bank earnings volatility.”  Interestingly, the 
model loses its power for emerging market claims when two variables are lagged over 
14 quarters, as is the case with 1 to 3-quarter lag.  There seems to be a specific 
window of time during which this relationship materializes.  The estimated F-
statistics reach the highest level with the 9-quarter lag, rejecting no causality 
assumption at nearly the 1% level.   
 
Direction of causality              F-Statistic       P-Value of F   Decision 
Earnings volatility→Lending volatility      3.29               0.0101        Reject 
Lending volatility→Earnings volatility      0.77               0.6424   Do not reject 
 
The existence of uni-directional causality from earnings to claims volatility is 
unique in emerging market claims.  Neither the volatility measure for total overseas 
claims nor that for developed market claims exhibits any causality with bank earnings 
volatility.  The above evidence successfully establishes a link between U.S. earnings 
volatility and emerging market claims and substantiates a major argument of this 
study: when U.S. bank earnings get volatile, after a time lag of approximately two to 
three years, those same banks’ emerging market claims get negatively affected with 
higher volatility.    
Since it is often hard to establish Granger-causality with transformed variables 
(e.g., volatility measure) that satisfy the stationarity condition, the uni-directional 
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causality from bank earnings to emerging market claims deserves further elaboration.  
Specifically, what type of emerging market claims, inter-bank exposure, or public 
sector lending, for example, demonstrate this unique phenomenon?  Is exposure to 
Asia different from exposure to Latin America in terms of absorbing the impact of 
volatile bank earnings in the U.S.?  With the available data, it is possible to dissect 
U.S. bank emerging market claims and to compare different components of emerging 
market claims in light of this unique linkage.  Table 4.11 summarizes the outcome of 
this exercise. 
 
Table 4.11 Granger-causality tests for volatility, by type and region  
Notes: *Reject at 10% level, **Reject at 5% level. No case of reverse causality with statistical 
significance has been found. 
 
For different types of emerging market claims, the Granger test points to claims 
on private non-banks as the main driving force behind the unique temporal causality 
between the two volatility measures.  Uhlmann (2002) argues that private non-bank 
F-Statistics for the null hypothesis “Earnings volatility does not cause lending volatility” 
ALL U.S. BANKS 
Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 Lag 11 Lag 12 
To All Recipients 1.55 1.30 2.13* 2.65** 2.96** 3.29** 2.51** 2.49** 3.07** 
by type 
 to banks 0.32 0.64 1.44 1.24 1.37 1.21 1.31 1.14 2.22* 
 to private non-banks 1.52 2.32* 2.92** 3.40*** 2.78** 2.88** 3.07** 2.62** 1.81 
 to public sector 0.77 0.77 0.68 0.82 1.04 1.01 0.89 0.77 1.23 
by maturity 
 short (less than one) 1.46 1.67 1.85 2.03* 1.85 2.54** 2.24* 2.84** 2.63** 
 medium (one to five) 1.74 1.81 1.35 0.51 0.55 0.86 0.77 1.25 1.02 
 long (over five years) 0.41 0.58 0.45 0.44 1.17 0.80 0.82 0.71 0.65 
by region 
 to Latin America 1.41 1.76 2.11* 1.83 2.07* 1.89 1.62 1.45 1.19 
 to Asia 1.08 1.03 0.81 1.12 2.18* 2.11* 2.49** 2.03* 1.92 
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claims on emerging economies can be the riskiest category from the lender’s point of 
view, not only because they seldom have guarantees from local government in times 
of trouble, but also due to the fact that borrowers often do not have adequate financial 
infrastructure at home.  Thus, one could argue that banks, faced with a volatile 
earnings stream, have incentives to deal with their private non-bank claims with no 
guarantees first.   
Furthermore, a substantial shift away from inter-bank and public sector claims 
matched the rise in private non-bank claims in emerging economies over the past 
twenty years.  The relative share of private non-bank claims (from 28% in 1984 to 
46% in 2005) has skyrocketed while inter-bank claims (31% in 1984 to 21% in 2005) 
and public sector claims (41% in 1984 to 31% in 2005) declined (Figure 2.1).  From 
this remarkable stride in volume, private non-bank claims presumably came to 
dominate the movement in entire emerging market claims.  
Examining the different maturities of claims in Table 4.11, one can see that short-
term claims react to the changing volatility of bank earnings.  It is no surprise that 
medium- to long-term claims simply have longer contracts to abide by before action is 
taken.  Also, in size terms, short-term claims, or those with maturities of less than one 
year, still dominate U.S. bank emerging market claims, as described in the data 
overview section of Chapter Two (Figure 2.1).  The share increased from 55% in 
1984 to 73% in 2005.  This stands in sharp contrast to the dwindling shares of 
medium-term claims (31% in 1984 to 20% in 2005) and long-term claims (14% in 
1984 to 7% in 2005).  This in part represented a response to the problems in Asia and 
elsewhere, as lenders sought to lessen default risk by preferring short-term exposure.  
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It is natural, then, that the effect of bank earnings volatility is reflected on the volatility 
of short-term claims, which in turn aggravated the vulnerability of emerging 
economies. 
Lastly, examining claims across regions, one can see that claims in Latin America 
and Asia do show temporal causality with bank earnings.  It is interesting to note that 
the claims in Latin America tend to have shorter reaction time (shorter lag length) than 
those in Asia, while Asian claims show more sustained temporal causality with U.S. 
bank earnings.  Together, the above findings can be roughly summarized as follows:  
increasing volatility of U.S. bank earnings had a causal effect on short-term private 
non-bank claims in their emerging market exposure, with the chain effect taking its toll 
earlier in Latin America than in Asia.   
 
Determinants of Volatility: Revisited 
This analysis has so far demonstrated: (1) the temporal association between U.S. 
banking deregulation and the volatility of emerging market claims; (2) the dominance 
of mega-banks created out of consolidation in explaining the volatility of U.S. 
emerging market claims; (3) the temporal causality between the volatility of bank 
earnings and emerging market claims.  Together, they suggest an important missing 
element in explaining the trend of increasingly volatile emerging market claims of U.S. 
banks over the past twenty years:  U.S. banking deregulation initiatives that made 
domestic bank earnings more volatile.   
To successfully verify this linkage, however, one needs to test the outcome of the 
analysis against other control variables that are shown to have explanatory power on 
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the volatility measure (Table 2.7).  For 13 emerging market sample countries, the 
trend in the volatility of U.S. bank claims remains positive and significant after the 
inclusion of conventional explanatory variables, although its size and t-value get 
smaller with additional control variables.  This baseline result is summarized in the 
far-left column of Table 4.12.   
To the right of the baseline result is the outcome of the country fixed-effects 
regression with (0,1) dummy variables for deregulation with a two-year time lag:  (1) 
the lagged dummy variable for deregulation (1989 Q3 to 2005 Q3) has a positive and 
significant coefficient when regressed against the volatility measure; (2) the lagged 
dummy variable for full deregulation (20002 Q1 to 2005 Q3) has a positive and 
significant coefficient, whose size is nearly two times as large as that for the 
deregulation dummy.  This indicates that the volatility measure intensified its rising 
trend with the full-fledged deregulation initiatives; (3) two dummy variables for U.S. 
banking deregulation are added onto the baseline equation for emerging market 
lending volatility.  If the coefficients for these dummies remain positive after the 
inclusion of other control variables, they reinforce the temporal association between 
the deregulation initiatives and the volatility of emerging market claims.          












The result confirms the existence of this relationship.  Not only does the 
coefficient for the full deregulation dummy remain positive and significant, but that for 
the trend variable loses its statistical significance (Table 4.12).  The increasing trend 
of volatility is explained away by the addition of dummies for banking deregulation.  
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The impact of full deregulation dominates this dynamic.  In the process, the 
coefficient for the deregulation dummy, after a two-year time lag, no longer has a 
significant sign, while the full deregulation coefficient, again after a two-year time lag, 
has the positive and significant sign at the 5% level.  The direction and size of 
coefficients for the other control variables remain virtually unchanged, suggesting a 
direct impact of full deregulation initiatives on the trend of volatility itself.  This 
finding substantiates the broad temporal analysis presented in Chapter Two and 
highlights the importance of U.S. banking deregulation initiatives relative to the 
conventional variables in explaining the volatility of U.S. bank emerging market 
claims.  
The Granger-causality test established a lead-lag relationship between the bank 
earnings volatility and the lending volatility in Table 4.10 and Table 4.11.  Again, 
there is a time-lag of approximately two years before earnings volatility granger-cause 
the lending volatility.  The far-right column of Table 4.12 tests this finding against the 
baseline model with other control variables.  First, bank earnings volatility after a 
two-year lag has a positive and significant coefficient when regressed against the 
lending volatility alone.  The size of the coefficient, when compared with the 
similarly constructed volatility measures for real interest rates in the U.S. and interest 
premiums between the U.S. and the host country, is remarkably large.  Second, the 
trend coefficient turns negative and significant at the 1% level when the bank earnings 
volatility measure is regressed with the other control variables.  The coefficient for 
bank earnings volatility remains positive and significant at the 1% level, strongly 
suggesting its unique role in turning the baseline result upside down.   
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The coefficients for other control variables experience changes with the bank 
earnings data.  Interestingly, the financial development of a host country, measured 
by the share of private credit from financial institutions over GDP, generates an 
expected negative sign for its coefficient.  The income level of a host country and U.S. 
GDP growth turn out to have a positive sign, resembling a regression outcome for the 
Asian claims reported in Table 2.7.  Thus, with bank earnings volatility as an 
additional explanatory variable, U.S. bank claims on average get more volatile for 
larger economies with higher income and an open trade regime with less developed 
financial systems, especially when the U.S. economy is expanding.  The fit of the 
model, R-squared, improves substantially from 0.33 to 0.43 by controlling for the bank 
earnings volatility.  Third, the lagged full deregulation dummy as well as the bank 
earnings volatility is added on top of the baseline equation.  With the bank earnings 



















The outcome in Table 4.12 reinforces the previous analysis of the links between 
U.S. banking deregulation and the volatility of emerging market claims of U.S. 
banking institutions.  At the same time, it establishes a linkage through which U.S. 
banking deregulation leads to more volatile exposure in emerging economies — 
volatile U.S. bank earnings.  The existing studies on international activities of U.S. 
commercial banks suffer from an unbalanced emphasis on the changing economic and 
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regulatory environments in host countries, when the U.S. banking industry has 
undergone transformations not matched by any previous developments (Benston 1990, 
Dahl and Schrieves 1999, Jones and Critchfield 2005).  This phenomenon is 
generally attributable to the fact that the analysis on the consequences of U.S. banking 
deregulation on bank behavior is only in its infancy, mostly limited to the domestic 
implications of such initiatives.  Particularly, existing findings, such as Goldberg 
(2001), that argued that U.S. banks were not the major source of financial disruptions 
in emerging economies seem to have waned attention away from any potential linkage.  
Although this lack of attention is understandable, it fails to capitalize on the historic 
opportunity of U.S. banking deregulation as a major explanatory event in approaching 
the issue of volatile bank lending to emerging economies.   
Utilizing U.S. banking deregulation as a common background for banking 
activities in general, the above findings fill this crucial gap by focusing on the impact 
of snowballing financial deregulation on the increasing volatility of U.S. bank 
emerging market exposure.  In this regard, the lump-sum coverage in Table 4.12 of 
emerging economies across different destinations of U.S. bank investment (Latin 
America and Asia), is useful to infer an overall influence of U.S. banking deregulation 
on overseas investments.  Nevertheless, each region has its idiosyncratic features, 
geographic and historical, when it comes to its relationship vis-à-vis U.S. banking 
institutions.  It stands to reason, then, to see if the outcome of Table 4.12 withstands 
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Table 4.12  Regression of volatility for emerging market claims,  
           revisited 
Dependent Variable:  Volatility of U.S. bank claims in emerging economies, 1984 Q1 – 2005 Q3
 Baseline Result (Table 2.7) + Deregulation dummies  + Bank earnings volatility  (Dependent 
Variable)*1000 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Trend  1.46*** 1.20*** 0.37*   0.00  -2.21*** -3.26*** 
Crisis (dummy)  -0.39 -7.88   -6.20  -21.9 -19.8 
GDP (billions)  0.03** 0.09***   0.10***  0.12* 0.14** 
GDP p/c (thousands)    -4.02*** 0.67   -0.54  22.6** 20.6** 
GDP growth (%)  1.10** 0.30   0.34  -0.16 -0.25 
U.S. GDP growth (%)  0.63 1.31   1.54  11.1** 9.25* 
Inflation (%)  0.03*** 0.02***   0.02***  -0.25 -0.47 
Volatility of U.S.  
real interest rate  
 25.1 31.1   14.9  55.8 83.9 
Volatility of interest 
rate premium 
 -2.98** -1.24   -0.93  -5.22 -5.10 
Financial 
Development (%)  
 0.56*** -0.01   0.14  -2.04** -1.88** 
Openness (%)  0.57*** 1.46***   1.47***  3.03*** 3.35*** 
Deregulation dummy 
(2 year lag) 
   46.3***  7.53    
Full deregulation 
dummy (2 year lag) 
    94.9*** 32.7**   26.3 
Bank earnings 
volatility (2 year lag) 
      292*** 255*** 185* 
Country fixed effects 
(F-statistics) 
  5.07*** 23.6*** 23.5*** 4.98*** 14.2*** 6.08*** 6.33*** 
Number of obs.   1131 816 816 1131 1131 816 546 398 398 
R2 0.09 0.31 0.35 0.29 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.43 0.43 
Notes:  Financial Development measures the share of private credit from financial institutions over 
GDP.  Openness refers to the share of export plus import over GDP.  All regressions include a 




 - 115 -
Table 4.13 repeats the same exercise as Table 4.12 for the U.S. banks’ Latin 
American claims during the period 1984 Q1 through 2005 Q3.  As previously noted 
in discussing the baseline result in Table 2.7, Latin America fits a priori expectations 
about the volatility of U.S. bank international lending.  As summarized in the far-left 
column of Table 4.13, the volatility of U.S. bank claims in the region is mostly 
explained away when controlled for other variables such as GDP, inflation, financial 
sector development, and the openness of the host economies, as well as the volatility 
of real interest premiums.   
The results stand even with the dummies for U.S. banking deregulation in the 
second column:  First, when the lagged (0,1) dummy variable for banking 
deregulation (1989 Q3 to 2005 Q3) is regressed with country-fixed effects against the 
volatility measure alone, it has a positive coefficient with significance at the 1% level.  
Second, when the lagged (0,1) dummy for full deregulation (2003 Q1 to 2005 Q3) is 
regressed with country-fixed effects against the volatility measure alone, it also has a 
positive coefficient.  But it has a size (13.6) less than one-third of the coefficient for 
the deregulation dummy (41.9) and is significant at the 5% level.  This indicates that 
the impact of banking deregulation was concentrated in the early deregulation period 
of the 1990s, with lesser effects later on after full deregulation in 1999 Q4.  Third, 
when the deregulation dummies are added on top of the baseline equation, the 
importance of early deregulation on Latin American claims manifests itself.  With no 
particular changes in the coefficients for other control variables, other than the 
openness of the host country losing its significance, the dummy coefficient for full 
deregulation turns negative, highlighting a strong surge in volatility in the early 
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deregulation period relative to the movement after full deregulation.   
The far-right column of Table 4.13 incorporates the bank earnings volatility in the 
equation.  The trend coefficient remains insignificant throughout as with the 
deregulation dummies.  There are some noteworthy features:  First, the bank 
earnings volatility, when regressed against the lending volatility alone, does not show 
a significant relationship. Second, when it is regressed with other control variables as 
in the baseline scenario, however, it has a large positive coefficient significant at the 
1% level.  Interestingly, the coefficient for the volatility of the U.S. real interest rate 
produces a very large positive coefficient as a result.  It strongly suggests that there 
exists a correlation between the volatility measures of the U.S. real interest rate and 
the lagged bank earnings when explaining the lending volatility to Latin America.  
Third, the combined result from adding the bank earnings volatility with the full 











 - 117 -
 
Table 4.13  Regression of volatility for Latin American claims,  
           revisited 
Dependent Variable:  Volatility of U.S. bank claims in Latin America, 1984 Q1 – 2005 Q3 
 Baseline Result (Table 2.7) + Deregulation dummies + Bank earnings volatility  (Dependent 
Variable)*1000 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Trend  0.68*** 0.78*** 0.21   0.28  -0.52 0.35 
Crisis (dummy)  -2.86 6.92   7.84  0.46 3.38 
GDP (billions)  0.03* 0.18***   0.16***  0.19*** 0.16** 
GDP p/c (thousands)    -2.45* 3.01   -2.59  -1.88 3.58 
GDP growth (%)  0.55 -0.03   -0.18  0.62 0.43 
U.S. GDP growth (%)  1.89 0.93   1.91  9.68*** 11.1*** 
Inflation (%)  0.01*** 0.02***   0.01***  0.88** 1.08*** 
Volatility of U.S. real 
interest rate  
 -11.0 -0.64   35.0  198.2*** 182.5*** 
Volatility of interest 
rate premium 
 3.61*** 2.83**   2.27*  2.67 2.80 
Financial Development 
(%)  
 -0.01 -0.94***   -0.96***  -0.77 -1.57 
Openness (%)  -0.29 -0.56**   -0.38  -0.60 -1.09 
Deregulation dummy 
(2 year lag) 
   41.9***  12.0*    
Full deregulation 
dummy (2 year lag) 
    13.6** -22.1***   -28.8** 
Bank earnings 
volatility (2 year lag) 
      -61.7 104** 166*** 
Country fixed effects 
(F-stats) 
  9.59*** 2.74** 2.28** 8.58*** 3.06** 4.92*** 4.98*** 
Number of obs.   522 418 418 522 522 418 258 222 222 
R2 0.14 0.18 0.29 0.17 0.03 0.31 0.04 0.31 0.33 
Notes:  Financial Development measures the share of private credit from financial institutions over 
GDP.  Openness refers to the share of export plus import over GDP.  All regressions include a 
constant and are estimated by OLS with White’s correction of heteroskedasticity.  ***1%, ** 5%, * 
10% significance. 
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For the Asian claims of U.S. banks, Table 4.14 repeats the same exercise.  The 
characteristics of the volatility in U.S. bank Asian claims are distinct from those for 
Latin American claims.  First of all, U.S. bank claims in Asia have higher volatility 
in general than the volatility for claims in Latin America.  In the case of Asia, the 
volatility of U.S. bank claims gets much larger after full deregulation, whereas in the 
case of Latin America, the surge concentrated during the early deregulation period.  
Furthermore, the volatility trend gets larger with the control variables in the baseline 
result in the far-left column, reproduced from Table 2.7.  Secondly, the coefficients 
for conventional control variables have unexpected signs.  Unlike previous exercises 
in Table 4.12 and Table 4.13, the volatility of real interest premium has a negative and 
significant sign of its own, for example.  This rather odd result is perhaps due to the 
fact that Asia enjoyed an overall stable interest rate environment, unlike that of Latin 
America, where small changes in the direction of real interest rates were less of a 
motivation for U.S. bank investments in the region.  Despite the idiosyncratic 
features of volatility in Asian claims, however, it ironically epitomizes the effect of 
U.S. deregulation on lending volatility.   
In the center column of Table 4.14, two dummy variables are added on the 
baseline equation.  As a result, the trend coefficient, although it grew even larger 
with other control variables in the far-left column, starts to get smaller and loses some 
of its statistical significance.  Moreover, in the far-right column with the lagged bank 
earnings volatility, the increasing trend is finally explained away and loses its 
significance.  Furthermore, the coefficient for the bank earnings volatility remains 
positive and improves the fit of the model at the same time, with substantially higher 
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R-squared value.  
Whatever the differences across regions, the important role played by U.S. 
banking deregulation in aggravating volatile lending to emerging economies persists.  
The evidence illustrated thus far strongly suggests that U.S. banking deregulation 
supplies a crucial missing element in explaining U.S. lending volatility in emerging 
economies.  Divergent trends in Latin America and Asia broadly converge after the 
introduction of deregulation dummies, with an earlier impact on the Latin American 
claims than on the Asian claims.  With the addition of tbank earnings volatility, the 
remaining differences are washed away, with no more increasing trend found in either 
region.  The explanatory power of the variables related to banking deregulation 
survives the test.  In fact, it solves the conundrum of increasing volatility in the 
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Table 4.14  Regression of volatility for Asian claims, revisited 
Dependent Variable:  Volatility of U.S. bank claims in Asia, 1984 Q1 – 2005 Q3 
 Baseline Result (Table 2.7) + Deregulation dummies  + Bank earnings volatility  (Dependent 
Variable)*1000 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Trend  2.12*** 2.19*** 3.17***   1.55*  0.97 -2.76 
Crisis (dummy)  -28.0** -45.9***   -28.6*  -62.7*** -40.5 
GDP (billions)  -0.05 -0.51***   -0.33*  -0.76*** -0.70*** 
GDP p/c (thousands)    -3.37 17.9***   9.08  43.5*** 38.0*** 
GDP growth (%)   0.67 -2.81   -0.63  0.61 0.57 
U.S. GDP growth (%)  2.91 7.82**   3.28  36.5*** 29.0** 
Inflation (%)  -0.47 -0.40   -0.00  -1.19 -1.61 
Volatility of U.S. real 
interest rate  
 116.4 29.3   -8.66  17.9 116.7 
Volatility of interest 
rate premium 
 -14.8*** -12.2***   -11.3***  -23.0*** -22.5*** 
Financial 
Development (%) 
 0.56*** -1.04*   0.02  -2.58** -2.18* 
Openness (%)  0.34* 0.00   0.52  2.61** 3.47*** 
Deregulation dummy (2 
year lag) 
   50.1***  -8.77    
Full deregulation 
dummy (2 year lag) 
    164*** 91.4***   92.8*** 
Bank earnings 
volatility (2 year lag) 
      574*** 589*** 340* 
Country fixed effects 
(F-stats) 
  4.22*** 21.8*** 24.2*** 3.98*** 13.1*** 9.51*** 10.9*** 
Number of obs.   609 398 398 609 609 398 294 182 182 
R2 0.13 0.33 0.39 0.19 0.36 0.42 0.24 0.51 0.52 
Notes:  Financial Development measures the share of private credit from financial institutions over 
GDP.  Openness refers to the share of exports plus imports over GDP.  All regressions include a 
constant and are estimated by OLS with White’s correction of heteroskedasticity.  ***1%, ** 5%, * 
10% significance. 
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The volatility of U.S. bank lending to emerging economies has increased during 
the past twenty years.  This finding is noteworthy in its own right.  Systemic 
financial crises, such as the Latin American debt crises of the 1980s and the 
Asian/Russian/Brazilian crises of the 1990s, overwhelmed each period of emerging 
market financing with global implications.  Emerging market financial crises in the 
2000s, most notably the Argentine default of 2002, reminded leaders of the ever-
present danger of another bust, but had more limited, regional impact than previous 
crises.  In fact, compared to Russia’s default in 1998, the contagion effects on other 
countries of the Argentine default were much more muted (Blustein 2005).  In 
general, the impact of successive shocks on developing-country debt have been milder 
in recent years than in the late 1990s, when risk premiums were typically raised more 
steeply and interruptions to capital-market access were frequent and prolonged.  For 
example, the average of the peaks in the developing-country risk premium during the 
crises in Turkey (2000), Argentina (2001), and Brazil (2002) was about 900 basis 
points, much lower than the average of about 1,550 basis points during the Mexican 
(1994) and Russian (1998) crises (World Bank 2004).  Nevertheless, U.S. bank 
lending has become more volatile in the 2000s, regardless of the regional destination 
of its loans, be it Asia, Latin America, or particularly Eastern Europe.   
And, the issue of volatile bank lending is not going away, either.  More recently, 
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there has been a renewed surge in private capital flows to emerging economies, aided 
by stable macroeconomic situations on the receiving end and the yearning for higher 
returns in the face of rock-bottom interest rates in the U.S. and many other industrial 
countries.28  Table 5.1 shows that the surge has been concentrated in Asia and 
Eastern Europe.  Despite its decreasing share of total private capital flows to 
emerging economies, bank lending occupies an integral part of emerging market 
financing.29  Over time, the size of bond and equity financing exploded, and bond 
financing alone overtook the size of bank lending to emerging economies in the 2000s.  
Nonetheless, for each region bank, lending accounts for a bulk of gross private capital 
inflows, less so for traditional destinations of private capital flows (Asia and Latin 
America) than the new destination (Europe).  As a precaution against banks’ renewed 
appetite for emerging market assets, the most recent World Economic Outlook (2006) 
notes,  
 
The most recent surge reflects to a large part lending by banks in advanced 
economies to Emerging Europe and Central Asia and to a lesser extent a 
revival of private debt flows to East Asia, notably China...  In the event of a 
reversal, fixed exchange rates — which remain widespread in the region — 
might be difficult to maintain.  Floating the exchange rate would help to 
restore external balance, but would weaken balance sheets, as a sharp 
depreciation would increase the burden of the private sector’s foreign 
currency debts, a process illustrated by earlier experience elsewhere….  
                                            
28  Until June 2004, when the Federal Reserve started a series of .25 percentage point increases in 
Federal Funds Rate (FFR), the U.S. maintained a 50-year low level of 1% FFR for nearly a year.  
29  Over the past twenty years, portfolio equity flows accounted for less than 6% of all net inflows 
(including FDI and bank loans of all types) to emerging economies.  By contrast, FDI has been more 
than seven times as large and net debt flows — public and private combined — almost nine times as 
large (IMF 2006).      
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Furthermore, even if private debt inflows did not reverse but “only” fell back 
to historical averages, this would still imply a substantial decline in net 
external financing, and could force sharp adjustments on many economies. 
 
 Table 5.1  Emerging market financing: portfolio equity and debt  





























































































Bonds  4.2 63.3 80.5 89.0 64.2 99.8 134.9 187.0 
Equities 0.3 13.0 46.2 11.5 16.6 27.7 45.1 78.1 
Loans* 16.3 67.1 109.9 69.6 69.4 81.1 117.5 163.6 
Note:  *The syndicated loan data are limited to loans issued by at least three financial institutions 
working together.  They are limited to a maturity of at least one year and for an amount more than $1 
million, thus do not include short-term inter-bank lending.  In parentheses are the share of syndicated 
loans in total financing.   
Source:  IMF, International Capital Markets (2000).  IMF, Global Financial Stability Report (2006).  
  
 
Findings:  Unintended Consequences 
To explain the across-the-board, increasing volatility of U.S. bank emerging 
market claims, this study turns to the supply side of the equation:  the deregulation in 
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the U.S. banking sector that imparted this commonality to their banks’ investment 
patterns to emerging economies.  In so doing, it unveils the linkages through which 
U.S. banking deregulation ratcheted up the volatility of U.S. bank lending into 
emerging economies.  It starts with the detection of a particular feature of U.S. bank 
emerging market lending that warrants further attention — increasing volatility over 
time.  Unlike bank lending from Europe or Japan, U.S. bank lending exhibited the 
unique feature of increasing volatility over time, regardless of its destination.  By 
looking into domestic push factors that could have contributed to this characteristic, 
this study identified a temporal association between important deregulation initiatives 
in the U.S. banking industry and the volatility of emerging market lending by U.S. 
banks during the same period.  This association was then explained by the linkages 
between the major outcomes of deregulation — consolidation of the banking industry 
and diversification of banking activities — and the increased volatility of lending into 
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Figure 5.1  Schematic illustration of the findings & line of    
           arguments 
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The incentives and constraints that creditors in industrial countries face have 
inevitable effects on the form and magnitude of lending to borrowers in emerging 
economies.  Blustein (2005) superbly illustrates how misaligned incentives in U.S. 
financial institutions poured easy money to Argentina only to cut back en masse 
following the crisis.  On the sell-side, there were familiar conflicts of interest at work 
because those analysts touting the Argentine miracle in the 1990s were working at 
firms raking in fees selling Argentine bonds.  On the buy-side, the system of 
evaluating fund managers against an index such as the EMBI-Plus forced them to 
design their investment portfolios not too far off the index.  Argentina, at its peak in 
late 1998, accounted for 28.8% of the index.  Not surprisingly, money managers did 
not dare be too far underweight on the country.   
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The findings in this study add one more dimension to the supply-side dynamics: 
banking deregulation in the U.S. leading to increasingly volatile bank lending to 
emerging economies.  The most interesting aspect of this argument lies in its 
unexpectedness and, at the same time, general applicability.  After all, the process of 
deregulation, regardless of the industry in which it takes place, is in itself a 
remarkable phenomenon beyond the control of any particular actor.  Following their 
research into the deregulation of the airline, trucking, and telecommunications 
industries, Derthick and Quirk (1985) famously observed, 
 
As adopted by commissions and courts, policy change came in fits and starts, 
with no predictable schedule or end point…  As the uncoordinated result of 
separate cases in separate forums, such policy change also contained no 
careful balancing of interests or equities, but rather imposed burdens on 
particular firms and industry segments almost randomly.  Most importantly, 
policy change by commissions and courts, instead of subsiding, accelerated. 
 
That random assignment of burdens generated by U.S. banking deregulation 
seems to have inflicted collateral damage in one particular component of emerging 
market financing — higher volatility of U.S. bank lending.  To be clear, this study, 
while highlighting the negative nature of such an outcome, neither argues nor proves 
that the increasing volatility of U.S. bank lending to emerging economies has been the 
defining feature of recent financial crises.  Still, the findings are troublesome, 
because bank lending remains a major source of funding for many emerging 
economies (Table 5.1), and the U.S. is the second biggest source of such funding 
among industrial countries.30   
                                            
30  At the end of March 2006, U.S. banks had consolidated claims on developing countries in the 
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Since financial deregulation has shown the tendency to snowball, picking up 
momentum as it progresses (Hammond and Knott 1988), unheeded externalities from 
deregulation could magnify, especially when coupled with the innate vulnerabilities of 
emerging economies to bank flows that have time and again brought ambitious 
emerging economies to their knees.  Given the intertwined nature of the findings in 
this study, it is natural to seek a remedy that is international and systematic, al the 
more so if the unexpected nature of such repercussions renders impractical relevant 
discussions on the issue in the place where it originates — the U.S.  It is not only 
hard, but practically unreasonable, to imagine that U.S. regulators would tailor their 
domestic banking policies to stable the supply of funds to emerging economies.   
 
Policy Implications 
Throughout the course of historic banking deregulation in the U.S., debates on 
potential risks posed by banking deregulation raised issues that guided the actual 
policy.  These issues provided the main points of contention around which the 
direction of policy changes toward deregulation has been set.  The GLB Act, for 
example, epitomized a series of compromises between competing interests.  The 
adoption of the unique financial holding company structure in Figure B.1 was the 
outcome of a compromise between the U.S. Congress, Treasury Department, and the 
Federal Reserve.  To reduce the likelihood that risks taken by non-banking 
subsidiaries would be transmitted to the parent bank, certain activities that were 
deemed close to banking were housed in bank subsidiaries, while other activities, such 
                                                                                                                            
amount of $356 billion, only next to the U.K. banks ($348 billions) among BIS reporting banks from 
twenty-four different industrial countries (BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics).   
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as merchant banking, were housed in subsidiaries of the holding company.  This 
complex regulatory structure, illustrated in Figure B.2, reflects the compromise 
between those in favor of regulatory consolidation, similar to the unitary supervisor 
structures that exist in the U.K. and Japan, and those arguing for “functional 
regulation” and “regulatory competition” among different agencies.  As a result, 
legacies of overlapping mandates over different kinds of financial services institutions 
continue, despite the emergence of the Federal Reserve as the main supervisor of 
financial holding companies.   
For another example, the potential curtailment of the Community Reinvestment 
Act (CRA) became a major obstacle as the intense negotiations between Congress, the 
Treasury Department, and the Federal Reserve inched the GLB Act toward passage 
(Barth et al. 2000).  The CRA of 1997 required banks and insured depository 
institutions to make credit available to all segments of their communities, including 
small businesses and low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.  Many studies since 
passage of the CRA have found that bank consolidation in the U.S. reduced small 
business lending substantially due to the relationship-based characteristics of small 
business lending (Berger et al. 1995 ; Berger and Udell 1996; Peek and Rosengren 
1998; Strahan and Weston 1998).  Partly as a result of these concerns, further 
deregulation of banking activities and ensuing consolidation in the industry were 
considered to have a negative impact on small business, relationship-based lending.  
On the other hand, many industry lobbyists argued that compliance with the CRA, 
including frequent reporting requirements, presented unwarranted burdens on the 
industry, especially when various regulatory hurdles in the CRA complicated the 
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process of mergers and acquisitions with smaller banks (Department of Treasury 2000).  
In the end, the GLB Act required that “financial holding companies and banks with 
financial subsidiaries will not be allowed to engage in any new activities or make any 
new acquisitions unless each of the insured institutions in the company received at 
least a ‘satisfactory’ ratings in its prior CRA exam” (Barth et al. 2000), while at the 
same time relaxing reporting requirements for smaller banks with less than $250 
million in assets.   
The findings in this study of the relationship between deregulation and emerging 
market bank lending notwithstanding, nowhere in the debates over the various 
deregulatory initiatives in the U.S. was the issue of volatile emerging market lending 
even brought up.  As far as U.S. banking deregulation is concerned, its spill-over 
effects on emerging market lending have been a non-issue.  Without a perceived 
problem, it is only natural that there have been no serious discussions on the topic.  
Given the relative size of emerging market claims in the asset class of the U.S. 
commercial banks (1%), the lack of attention on the topic from U.S. stakeholders is 
understandable.  However, it is not as easy to accept what have essentially been futile 
attempts to mitigate boom and bust cycles of international bank lending at the 
international level.  Given the near unanimous view on the inherent volatility of bank 
flows in emerging market financing, numerous ideas have been proposed, only to be 
blocked on the grounds of impracticality or competing priorities.  Table 5.2 
summarizes the achievements to date in the new international financial architecture 
towards crisis prevention and better resolution in emerging economies. 
 
 - 130 -
Summary of reforms  Actual policy reforms have taken place in four broad areas 
related to emerging market financing:  (1) standard setting activities; (2) IMF 
reforms; (3) bond restructuring; and (4) the new Basel capital accord.  By far the 
most progress has been made on new standards and codes at the international level.  
Demand for more transparency was a clear outcome of the financial architecture 
debate, which in turn resulted in more benchmarks against which the performance of 
an emerging economy can be evaluated.  The IMF is at the center of this effort, since 
the work of other bodies comes together in the context of IMF surveillance and is 
published in its “Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes” (ROSCs).  The 
role of the IMF in directly dealing with crises through its “catalytic financing” has 
been scrutinized and is evolving as well.  The debate on how the IMF should 
structure its lending practices and curtail the moral hazard inherent in any bail-out 
operation is far from settled.  In practice, “IMF and the G-7 have preferred to dole 
out their funds in a series of programs that try to catalyze the voluntary restoration of 
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Table 5.2  Reforms in the new international financial architecture  
Standards and Codes 
A set of international standards of minimum best practices has been 
developed, covering the whole range of the financial system -- data 
dissemination, banking supervision, insurance supervision, securities 
regulation, bankruptcy, corporate governance, accounting, auditing, 
payment and settlement, market integrity, fiscal transparency, and the 
transparency of monetary and financial policy.  The Financial Stability 
Forum, a group at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, was 
created in 1999 to oversee these efforts by different international 
organizations, from the IMF to BIS.   
IMF Lending Facility 
• The Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF), a special lending window 
designed to provide very large amounts of financing for a very short term  
in the event of sudden capital outflows, was created after the crisis broke 
out in Thailand in 1997.  It was used in Korea (1997) and subsequently 
in Brazil (1998), Turkey (2000), Argentina (2001), and Uruguay (2001). 
• The Contingent Credit Line (CCL), which provides exceptional access 
to large financial resources upon prequalification, was introduced in 1998.  
However, no member country ever applied for prequalification for fear of 
raising investor concerns.  The facility was phased out in 2003. 
Basel II Framework 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) finalized the 
revised accord in June 2004, and the EU began the process of 
implementation in 2007.  Due to the Quantitative Impact Study, however, 
its implementation in the U.S. has been postponed until (at least) 2009. 
Bond Restructuring 
• Mexico’s 2003 decision to introduce Collective Action Clauses (CACs) 
into its New York law bonds in line with the G-10 recommendation 
started a series of such sovereign bond issues by Brazil, Guatemala, and 
South Africa.  There was little price penalty against the inclusion of 
CACs and the use of CACs has become a market standard.   
• The adoption of CACs in new sovereign bond issues will not change the 
terms of existing international bonds without the provision ($200 billion),  
and the IMF predicts that it will take another 10 years for 80 percent of 
the entire stock of external-law bonds to include CACs 
Source: Williamson (2000, 2005); Dobson & Hufbauer (2001); World Bank (2004); Roubini & Setser 
(2004).  
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More directly on the creditor side, the new Basel Capital Accord — the Basel II 
framework — improved upon weaknesses in the original 1988 Accord, which 
notoriously encouraged risky short-term exposure of industrial banks in emerging 
economies.  In the new Accord, for example, the lower risk-weights for short-term 
inter-bank loans were rectified, and larger banks will be subject to a 20% risk weight 
for all inter-bank lending regardless of maturity.  However, the effect of the new 
accord in taming the boom-bust cycle of international bank lending is far from clear.  
In fact, many critics argue that, due to higher risk weights for emerging market assets 
and cyclic assessments of the risks, the new risk assessment models could discourage 
bank lending to emerging economies in general and amplify the procyclicality of the 
lending.31   
Last, but certainly not least, the official proposal for the adoption of Collective 
Action Clauses (CACs)32 in sovereign bonds finally materialized in early 2003 when 
the government of Mexico issued its sovereign bonds under New York law with the 
provision.  From then on, the use of such clauses has been rapidly accepted and 
become the norm in sovereign bond issues in international capital markets.  The 
proposal for CACs was first made by Eichengreen and Portes (1995) and then taken 
up by the Rey Report (Group of 10 1996).  International bondholders vigorously 
resisted adoption on the grounds that any measure making sovereign restructuring 
easier would increase the borrowing costs for emerging market countries.  It was 
                                            
31  Critics also argue that the Accord may also accelerate the process of disintermediation, 
encouraging an increasing proportion of lending to originate from financial institutions not subject to 
the regulatory requirements of the Accord (World Bank 2004).  
32  Collective action clauses (CACs) enable a qualified majority of bondholders to make decisions that 
become binding on all holders of a particular bond issue, thereby encouraging a more orderly and 
prompt restructuring of distressed bond debt.  The use of CACs in bonds governed by U.K. and 
Japanese law has been a longstanding practice.  However, bonds issued under New York law, which 
account for a large share of developing country bonds, do not have this provision (Williamson 2005).   
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only after Anne Krueger, the then-first deputy director of the IMF, proposed the 
creation of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) — an international 
bankruptcy system for countries — in November 2001 that private investors realized 
CACs were a lesser evil and dramatically changed their attitudes to fend off the 
SDRM proposal.  Whatever the motivations, many economists seem to think this is a 
move in the right direction, although its effect will certainly be a gradual one, since it 
will take many more years to replace many old-style bonds requiring unanimous 
approval for changes in payment terms (Williamson 2005; Blustein 2005).       
  
Missing out on bank lending  Despite a few notable improvements, making 
headway on international financial reform has been fraught with difficulties.  Even 
the Basle II Accord, the most obvious reform on the creditor side, is facing formidable 
hurdles since the U.S. postponed its implementation upon the results of the 
Quantitative Impact Study and strong opposition from smaller banks.33  Moreover, 
when it comes to taming the volatility of international bank lending, a near consensus 
view on the problem was not enough to bring about actual policy changes.  As Table 
5.3 illustrates, cross-border bank runs accompanied nine out of the fourteen emerging 
market crises after Mexico’s (1994).  In six of those nine cases, rollover of inter-bank 
loans, voluntary or coercive, happened regardless of the misgivings on investors’ part.  
The two most successful cases of crisis resolution — in Korea (1997) and Brazil 
(1998) — involved the comprehensive rollover of bank credits.   
 
                                            
33 Contrary to the basic intention, the study indicated “material reductions” in the aggregate minimum 
required capital for the large banks under the new system.  Smaller banks, following on these results, 
reinforced their opposition on the grounds that the accord would work to larger banks’ advantage.  
 - 134 -
 




Default or coercive 
restructuring of 
sovereign bond 
Default on private 
sector’s external debt 
Private Sector 
Involvement (PSI) 
Mexico (1994) No No No No PSI 
Korea (1997) Yes No Some 
Coercive on inter-
bank loans 
Thailand (1997) Yes No Some 
Coercive on some 
inter-bank loans 
Indonesia (1997) Yes No A lot 
Coercive on some 
inter-bank loans 
Malaysia (1997) Yes No No No PSI 
Russia (1998) No 
Yes, domestic and 
external debt 
No Default on GKO 
Brazil (1998) Yes No No Inter-bank rollover 
Ecuador (1998) Yes 
Yes, domestic and 
external debt 
Yes 
Coercive default and 
debt reduction 
Pakistan (1998) No Yes, external debt No 
Restructuring of 
external debt, no 
reduction 
Ukraine (1998) No Yes, external debt No 
Restructuring of 
external debt, no 
reduction 
Turkey (2000) Yes No No Inter-bank rollover 
Argentina (2001) Yes 
Yes, domestic and 
external debt 
A lot 
Full default on 
domestic & external 
debt 
Uruguay (2001) Yes 





Brazil (2002) No No No 
Voluntary inter-bank 
rollover 
Source:  Roubini and Setser (2004).  
 
Why then cannot a remedy be devised at a systemic level that explicitly makes the 
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process less painful and, in turn, enhances market discipline for risky investors?  It is 
certainly not a dearth of ideas that is at issue.  From capital surcharge (Truman 2001) 
to rollover option with a penalty (Buiter and Sibert 1999) to forward-looking 
provisioning (Ocampo 2003), convincing proposals on curtailing volatile bank lending 
abound.  According to Roubini and Setser (2004), 
 
The focus on bonds has deflected attention away from the risks posed by the 
rolloff of external bank lines, even though short-term bank lending is often a 
bigger problem than long-term bonds.  Neither the IMF nor the G-7 seem to 
have seriously considered making a real commitment by the banks to maintain 
their exposure a part of Brazil’s recent rescue package…  At times, the short-
term creditors of a crisis country will need to refrain from exercising their 
option to exit in order to give the country a better chance of emerging from its 
crisis.  Institutional innovations like rollover options could help. 
 
A monitored rollover arrangement ex ante for cross-border bank exposure level 
appears to be one eminently reasonable way to tackle the problems in bank lending.  
The resistance to such systemic remedies for volatile bank flows seems almost 
inevitable at the same time.  After all, despite the apparent enthusiasm of U.S. 
Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill for the SDRM from the IMF, Undersecretary John 
Taylor quashed it declaring, “the decentralized approach… makes much more sense 
and is much more workable” than Krueger’s plan (Blustein 2005).  The right mix of 
policy incentives for its success is beyond the scope of this study, given its legal 
ramifications.  However, a systemic approach should carry more weight since a 
substantial portion of the volatility in bank lending is an unintended by-product of 
 - 136 -
domestic deregulation in industrial countries, with no apparent debates and remedies 
on the problem in these countries.  This study, by establishing linkages between U.S. 
banking deregulation and the volatility of U.S. bank emerging market claims, argues 
that this indeed has been the case.  For creditors such as the U.S., a decentralized 
national initiative in dealing with bank lending volatility would thus be an unlikely, 
albeit desirable, turn of events. 
As any serious policy prescriptions to emerging market financial crises to date 
demonstrate, reforms by borrowers are as important as reforms by lenders.  Putting 
too heavy a burden on lenders’ shoulders would undoubtedly create another set of 
problems, with negative consequences, such as reduced overall liquidity available for 
the borrowers in emerging economies.  At the very least, however, those in emerging 
economies are by now fully aware of the dangers inherent in short-term bank loans as 
a form of external financing.  Further, the vast bulk of the international action up to 
now has been in reforming the policies of debtors (Williamson 2005).34  Reforms by 
lenders, despite a few recent breakthroughs, remain muted by comparison and are 
quickly being shelved by the improving situations in many emerging economies.  
The findings in this study further demonstrate that the stepped-up efforts by borrowers 
alone will not solve the problem.  A systemic approach in dealing with volatile bank 
lending is warranted and necessary to square the circle, especially when the problem 
gets inadvertently made worse by the domestic regulatory changes in lenders’ home 
markets.  
                                            
34  Demand for external finance in emerging economies has been diminished by the desire to limit 
vulnerability in times of trouble.  As a result, many emerging economies run current account 
surpluses and accumulated unprecedented level of reserves, while increasingly corporations are 
reluctant to borrow in foreign currency.  Overall, these adjustments have resulted in significant 
improvements in the external liability positions of developing countries, which have been a factor in 
recent credit rating upgrades (World Bank 2004).    
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Appendix A.  Comparisons on Capital Flows Data35 
Data on different types of capital flows to emerging economies come from three 
sources: the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the Institute of International Finance 
(IIF); and the World Bank (WB).  Different sources give somewhat different pictures 
of capital flows in emerging economies depending on each source’s classification 
method.  Tables A.1 through Table A.3 reorganize each database closely in line with 
the IMF balance of payments classification methods.  Despite obvious compatibility 
problems, this exercise reveals some useful insights about important aspects of capital 
flows.  There are three main differences between the data sources: (1) how they treat 
net capital outflows by residents of the emerging market economies; (2), the scope of 
the category, “bank loans and other debt (net);” and (3) the treatment of interest 
payments (on “bank loans and other debt (net)”) and profit remittances (on “foreign 
direct investment (net)”).   
 
 Table A.1 Net capital flows to emerging economies (IMF, $ billions) 
Net Flowsa 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
Emerging markets            
 Total private capital inflows  47.7 123.8 119.3 181.9 152.8 193.3 212.1 149.2 64.3 68.3 1,312 
  Bank loans and other debtb 11.9 55.6 32.7 11.5 -35.5 55.4 16.3 -57.6 -104 -71.8 -85 
  Portfolio investmentc 17.4 36.9 51.1 113.6 105.6 41.2 80.8 66.8 36.7 21.6 571 
  Foreign direct investment  18.4 31.3 35.5 56.8 82.6 96.7 115 140 131 118.5 826 
 Net official flows 26.6 36.5 22.3 20.1 1.8 26 -0.9 24.4 41.1 9.4 207 
Notes: a  Net flows equal to disbursements minus principal repayments.  b “Other debt” includes trade 
credits and loans; currency and deposits; and other assets and liabilities.  c Net portfolio investment 
includes both equity securities and debt securities (bond and notes, money market instruments, 
financial derivatives).  
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook (2000).  IMF International Capital Market (1999).  
                                            
35  Appendix A draws on my work in “World Capital Markets: Challenge to the G-10” (Dobson and 
Hufbauer 2001). 
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 Table A.2 Net capital flows to emerging economies (IIF, $ billions) 
Net Flows 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
Emerging markets            
 Total private capital inflows 42.2 72.9 122 185 165 231 328 266 148 149 1,708 
  Bank loans and other debta 12.4 17.7 33.7 22.7 40.3 101 116 35.6 -58.8 -40.5 280 
  Portfolio investmentb 14.0 31.8 56.8 118 59.1 53.3 122 115 77.1 45.6 692 
  Foreign direct investment 13.8 23.4 31.1 44.3 65.2 76.8 91.7 115 118 139 718 
 Net official flows 39.3 37.0 36.8 27.1 28.8 37.9 7.6 38.9 52.8 11.9 318 
Notes:  a“Bank loans and other debt” refers only to commercial bank activities.  b The IIF 
classification of debt securities depends on the identity of holder.  If a bank is a holder, they are 
classified under “bank loans and other debt.”  If a non-bank financial institution is a holder, they are 
under “portfolio investment.”  Sources: IIF Capital Flows to Emerging Market Countries. various 
issues.  
 
Table A.3 Net capital flows to emerging economies 
                                         (World Bank, $ billions) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
Panel 1:  Net flows 
Emerging markets            
 Total private capital inflows  59.2 82.6 136 202 223 271 325 324 220 228 2,071 
  Bank loans and other debt 31.1 29.9 64.7 48.7 60.6 98.9 82.7 74.9 -6.1 -17.1 468 
  Portfolio investment 3.9 18.3 25.1 87.7 73.3 66.9 112 79.1 55.2 52.6 574 
  Foreign direct investment 24.1 34.4 46.1 66.0 88.8 105 131 170 171 192 1,028 
 Net official flows 27.7 27.2 23.5 25.0 13.2 21.2 3.0 13.9 23.5 25.6 204 
Panel 2:  Net-net flowsa 
Emerging markets            
 Total private capital inflows  -6.2 15.9 73.3 137 147 177 222 211 96.2 87.3 1,160 
  Bank loans and other debt -12.1 -10.6 30.8 15.8 24.0 52.6 31.7 20.2 -63.8 -81.4 7 
  Portfolio investment -0.7 10.5 17.2 78.1 59.2 45.5 89.3 52 24.3 18.3 394 
  Foreign direct investment 6.6 16.0 25.2 43.1 63.9 78.5 101 139 135.7 150 759 
 Net official flows 7.5 5.8 1.2 1.2 -12.4 -9.3 -28 -14.9 -4.5 -6.2 -60 
Notes:  a Net-net flows subtract interest payments from “bank loans and other debt (net),” profit 
remittances from “foreign direct investment (net),” in panel 1.    
Sources: World Bank Global Development Finance (2000).    
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Treatment of resident outflows  In Table A.1 (IMF Table), capital outflows such as 
net lending or acquisition of assets abroad by emerging market residents are offset 
against inflows from abroad.  Neither Table A.2 (IIF Table) nor panel 1 of Table A.3 
(WB Table) reflects such outflows.  This differing treatment of resident outflows 
creates a startling difference in the apparent magnitude of “total private capital flows 
(net)” over the 1990s.  The decadal totals differ by between $400 billion (Table 1 vs. 
Table 2) and $760 billion (Table 1 vs. Table 3).  The big differences are in “bank 
loans and other debt (net).”  The differences in this category explain, on average, 
more than 80% of the gap.  Residents of emerging markets place a considerable 
amount of money abroad, and how this money is recorded importantly affects the 
measure of “total private capital inflows (net).”   
 
Scope of “bank loans and other debt (net)”  In Table A.1 (IMF Table) and Table A.3 
(WB Table), “bank loans and other debt (net)” includes items such as loans, trade 
credits, currency and deposits, and kindred assets and liabilities, whether placed by 
banks or other financial institutions.  “Portfolio investment (net)” includes both 
equity securities and debt securities (bonds and notes, money market instruments, and 
financial derivatives).  By contrast, “bank loans and other debt (net)” in Table A.2 
(IIF Table) only covers commercial bank activities.  The approximately $200 billion 
difference between decadal totals in “bank loans and other debt (net)” between Table 
A.2 (IIF Table) and Table A.3 (WB Table, Panel 1) stems from holdings by non-bank 
financial institutions of currency, trade credits, and other debt instruments.   
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Treatment of interest payments and profit remittances  In both Table A.1 (IMF 
Table) and Table A.2 (IIF Table), “interest payments” are not subtracted from “bank 
loans and other debt (net).”  Likewise, “profit remittances” are not subtracted from 
“foreign direct investment (net).”  In Table A.3 (WB Table), however, these 
payments and remittances are subtracted from Panel 1 (net flows) to generate Panel 2 
(net-net flows).  Thus, the cumulative size of “interest payments” and “profit 
remittances” can be seen by comparing the two panels of Table A.3.  For “bank loans 
and other debt,” the difference between Panel 1 (net) and Panel 2 (net-net) figures add 
up to a decadal magnitude of $460 billion.  The decadal gap between “foreign direct 
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Appendix B.  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act eliminated the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933’s 
proscriptions against banking, insurance, and securities firms entering each other’s 
businesses.36  The GLB Act also repealed the parts of the Bank Holding Company 
Act of 1956 that separated commercial banking from the insurance business.  Before 
these newly authorized activities can be conducted, however, a bank holding company 
must qualify as a financial holding company (FHC) with the Federal Reserve.  For 
the existing bank holding companies that elect to be FHCs, qualification requirements 
must be met before they can engage in broad banking.37  These financial holding 
companies may exercise activities “financial in nature” as long as the Federal Reserve 
and the Treasury Department determine that the activity does not pose a substantial 
risk to the safety and soundness of banks (Yeager et al. 2005).  Figure B.1 shows the 
organizational structure of a financial holding company. 
With respect to individual banks, the GLB Act enables them to affiliate with non-
bank financial firms through an FHC structure or to set up financial subsidiaries to 
engage in such activities as securities and insurance underwriting and brokerage 
activities.  Hence, any or all GLB activities may be conducted at the FHC level or in 
a subsidiary of the FHC other than a bank.  With the exception of merchant banking38 
and insurance underwriting, GLB activities are also permitted by a subsidiary of the 
                                            
36  The Act is named after Chairmen Phil Gramm (R-Texas), James A. Leach (R-Iowa), and Tom 
Bliley (R-Virginia) of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, House 
Committee on Banking and Financial Services, and House Committee on Commerce, respectively.   
37  The qualification criteria require each related bank to be “well-capitalized” and “well-managed.”  
“Well-capitalized” means that a bank has and maintains capital ratios of at least 5% for the leverage 
ratio, 6% for the Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio, and 10% for the total risk-based capital ratios.  “Well-
managed” means a bank has received a satisfactory rating on its safety and soundness examination 
(Walleghem 2001). 
38  After 2004, the Federal Reserve and the Department of the Treasury had the authority to jointly 
determine that merchant banking be permitted for a financial subsidiary of a bank.   
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bank (Walleghem 2001).   
Figure B.1  Structure of a financial holding company by GLB Act 
   Financial Holding Company    
   May conduct GLB activities directly    
              
              
Nonbank Subsidiary   Bank 
  No new GLB authorized activities other than 
May conduct GLB activities directly 
  municipal revenue bonds   
           
      Financial Subsidiary 
      May conduct any GLB activity other than  
      merchant banking and insurance underwriting
Source: Walleghem (2001) 
    
Along with the advances made in terms of deregulation, supervisory burdens were 
consolidated, giving the Federal Reserve the main supervisory role over financial 
holding companies (Figure B.2).  The GLB Act subscribes to the principle of 
“functional regulation,” which holds that similar activities should be regulated by the 
same regulator.  Banking, securities, and insurance regulators examine banking, 
securities, and insurance activities respectively.  Banking agencies examine banks 
and affiliated companies but are limited in their authority to examine functionally 
regulated subsidiaries.  They are generally directed to use examinations made by 
federal and state securities and insurance regulators.  The GLB Act requires the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to set general rules for new financial products 
before seeking to regulate bank sales of such products (Barth et al. 2000).    
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Figure B.2  U.S. Financial Supervision after the GLB Act 
Fed: Federal Reserve; OCC: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; FDIC: Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation; SEC: Securities Exchange Commission; OTS: Office of Thrift Supervision  
 
However, legacies of overlapping mandates over different kinds of financial 
services institutions continue.  The Federal Reserve shares supervisory and 
regulatory responsibilities with the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (over 
national banks), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (over state non-member 
banks), and the Office of Thrift Supervision.  Depending on whether the bank is part 
of a holding company or conducts securities or insurance activities in an operating 
subsidiary, other supervisors, such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Financial institutions and their supervisors 
Retail banking Wholesale banking Securities Insurance 
Financial Holding Companies 
Federal Reserve (Fed) = umbrella supervisor 
 
• National banks (OCC) 
Federal Reserve Securities and Exchange Commission Regulated by States 
• State banks:    
Members (Fed) • National banks • Insurance companies 
Non-members (FDIC)  
• Primary issuers of 
  Securities  
• Cooperative banks 
 (FDIC/Fed) 
• Investment banks • Stock exchanges • Insurance brokers 




• Stock brokers  
• Thrift holding 
 companies (OTS) 
 • Investment advisors  
• Savings banks 
 (OTS/FDIC/Fed) 
 • Mutual funds  
• Savings and loan 
 association (OTS) 
 • Public utility holding 
 Companies 
 
• Edge Act corporations (Fed)    
 - 144 -
(FDIC) or the SEC, may also have some supervisory authority.  At the same time, the 
insurance industry is regulated at the state level.  In this way, the U.S. supervisory 
system involves multiple supervisors, unlike in the U.K. or Japan, where financial 
supervision has been consolidated in a single supervisor.  As a result, there is an 
ongoing debate on the effectiveness of different supervisory structures, which is no 
more than one in a series of debates regarding the relative benefits and costs of the 
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Appendix C.  Debates on U.S. Banking Deregulation 
The deregulation of U.S. banking activities was a hotly-debated topic in academic 
circles leading up to the passage of the GLB Act in 1999.  An array of corporate 
scandals during the period 2001-2003, so soon after this ground-breaking change in 
the law, caused lingering doubts about the idea of universal banking to resurface in 
policy circles.  In the infamous Enron scandal, Merrill Lynch, JP Morgan, and 
Citigroup structured and financed off-balance-sheet special-purpose entities such as 
LJM2 and Mahonia Ltd. that conducted energy trades with Enron.  These banks 
were both lenders to and investors in these special-purpose entities created solely to 
misrepresent Enron’s financials to the market.  At the same time, these financial 
giants performed a range of advisory and underwriting services for Enron, provided 
equity analyst coverage, and were Enron’s principal derivatives trading counterparties 
(Walter 2003).39  In July 2003, JP Morgan Chase and Citigroup agreed to pay $192.5 
million and $126.5 million, respectively, in fines and penalties (without admitting or 
denying guilt) to settle SEC and Manhattan District Attorney charges of financial 
fraud.  The ensuing scandals such as the Citigroup-Worldcom case were a setback 
for the giant universal banks that advance credit as well as advice.  Thus, despite 
passage of the GLB Act, age-old controversies around the issue of universal banking 
in the U.S. are yet to be settled, with ongoing debate along the following lines. 
 
 
                                            
39 According to the final report of Enron bankruptcy examiner Neal Batson, both Citigroup and JP 
Morgan (1) “…had actual knowledge of the wrongful conduct of these transactions;” (2) helped 
structure, promote, fund and implement transactions designed solely to materially misrepresent 
Enron’s financials; and (3) caused significant harm to other creditors of Enron (Walter 2003).   
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Advantages  Proponents of expanded banking powers have long emphasized 
potential benefits to banks, including gains in efficiency from the realization of 
economies of scope, risk reduction through greater diversification, and greater 
competition, resulting in more options, lower prices, and greater convenience for 
customers.  At least from the academic studies to date, positive effects have seemed 
to prevail.40  For instance, Berger and Udell (1996), Ramirez (1995 and 2002), and 
DeLong (2001) found expanded banking powers to be associated with lower cost of 
capital and less stringent cash-flow constraints.  Vander Vennet (2002) found that 
unrestricted banks have higher levels of operational efficiency than banks with 
restricted powers.  In terms of diversification, Eisenbeis and Wall (1984) and Kwan 
and Laderman (1999) argue that, because profits from providing different financial 
services are not highly correlated, there are diversification benefits from allowing 
broader powers.  Drawing upon a comprehensive cross-country dataset, Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine (2001) found that greater regulatory restrictions are associated 
with: (1) a higher probability of a country suffering a major banking crisis; and (2) 
lower banking sector efficiency.  They found no countervailing positive effects from 
restricting banking activities.  More recently, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) 
examined a much larger group of countries and showed that restricting banking 
activities is negatively associated with bank performance and stability, as compared to 
when banks can diversify into other financial activities.  Furthermore, they found no 
evidence that restricting bank activities produces positive results in particular 
institutional or policy environments, i.e., different supervisory structure or deposit 
                                            
40  Barth, Caprio, and Nolle (2004) provide a good review that focuses on the potential benefits and 
costs of mixing banking and non-banking financial products. 
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insurance schemes.   
Additionally, Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) and Dick (2006) empirically 
illustrated that, by opening new avenues for bank takeovers and for bank expansion 
into new markets, deregulation has unleashed competitive pressure on bank managers, 
leading to greater efficiency, higher quality, and lower pricing of bank services.  
Stiroh and Strahan (2002) found the link between a bank’s relative performance and 
its subsequent market share growth strengthens significantly after deregulation, as 
competitive reallocation effects transfer assets to better performers.  The authors 
emphasized the substantial reallocation of market share toward better banks after 
deregulation.  Indeed, influential academics such as Calomiris (2000) came out in 
favor of industry consolidation as a means of maximizing the benefits of universal 
banking.  The consolidation of the U.S. banking industry after major deregulation 
initiatives has been welcomed as an outcome of increased competition.       
       
Potential Disadvantages  Arguments against universal banking can be divided into 
two distinct categories:  (1) conflicts of interest; and (2) undue risk-taking.  The 
problem of conflicts of interest lay at the core of the rationale behind the separation of 
commercial and investment banking in the Glass-Steagall Act.  The Report of the 
Senate Banking and Currency Committee (1933), issued just prior to passage of the 
Glass-Steagall Act, stated: 
 
Unsound loans were made in order to shore up the price of securities or the 
financial position of companies in which a bank had invested its own asset. 
(And) a commercial bank’s financial interest in the ownership, price, or 
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distribution of securities inevitably tempted bank officials to press their 
banking customers into investing in securities which the bank itself was under 
pressure to sell. 
 
Over time, the increasing weight of empirical evidence successfully refuted the 
notion that the securities activities of commercial banks bore direct responsibility for 
the banking debacle of the Great Depression.  For example, Benston (1994) notes 
that all except ten of the over 9,000 banks that failed during the Great Depression 
were unit banks, most of which were located in small towns.  Kroszner and Rajan 
(1994) show that the securities commercial banks underwrote performed better than 
those underwritten by investment banks in the 1930s.41  In the most comprehensive 
study on this issue, White (1986) found that “while 26.3% of all national banks failed 
during 1930-1933, only 6.5% of the 62 banks which had securities affiliates in 1929 
and 7.6% of 145 banks which conducted large operations through their bond 
departments closed their doors.”  The author uses information from the income 
statements of 18 banks operating in financial assets between 1925 and 1932 and 
concludes that banks operating in financial markets of stocks and bonds had a higher 
return, although this return’s variance was also higher.     
However, in the post-Enron environment, the innate conflicts of interest in 
financial dealings have been again highlighted and scrutinized with a deeper sense of 
urgency.  A series of scandals so soon after the passage of the GLB Act, and the 
prominence of conflicts of interest therein, led many to doubt the wisdom of the GLB 
Act.  For example, when the proceeds of a debt issue are used to refinance existing 
                                            
41 Kroszner and Rajan show that, partly because commercial banks dealt with older and larger firms, 
the securities that they underwrote performed better than those underwritten by investment banks.   
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bank debt, and the underwriter is a commercial bank whose loans are being 
refinanced, there is a potential conflict of interest.  The commercial bank, in its role 
as underwriter, could try to misrepresent the quality of the security to potential buyers.  
As such, it has been widely acknowledged that synergies from combining multiple 
activities and conflicts of interest are a package deal (White 2004).  A 2002 survey 
of corporations with more than $1 billion in annual sales found that 56% of firms that 
refused to buy fee-based bank services had their credit restricted or lending terms 
altered adversely, and 83% of the surveyed CFOs expected adverse consequences 
should they refuse to buy non-credit services (Association for Financial Professionals 
2003).  On balance, conflicts of interest seem to be an ever present possibility in any 
financial system, except in an imaginary one with pure commercial and specialized 
banks with a single business.  Investment banks normally combine operations on 
capital markets with financial consulting, for example.  Universal banks might offer 
more opportunities for dishonest behavior, but it is more a matter of professional 
morality than a by-product of universal banking per se (Canals 1997).   
Secondly, opponents argue that universal banking offers incentives for increased 
risk-taking to banks and financial holding companies.  Their arguments are based on 
two related grounds:  (1) the inherent risk of combining banking with non-bank 
activities; and (2) the extension of the public safety net to non-bank activities.  On 
the first point, non-banking financial services may be fundamentally riskier than plain 
loan making, and banks may be less efficient than those specializing in the provision 
of these services.  Many financial operations encourage agents to take more risks, 
because their income structure is arranged for additional bonuses to be linked with 
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profits, even though they do not lose their fixed salary if operations fail.  Further, in 
financial operations that require fast decisions, a great deal of decentralization is 
required.  Once the operations have been executed, the decisions are already 
irreversible and can only be offset by future operations.  Thus, the necessary 
coordination among the various units of a universal bank could add costs to the 
operations (Canals 1997).  The other point refers to the potential coverage of deposit 
insurance over non-bank activities, granting an unfair advantage to universal banks 
over rival non-bank financial firms offering similar products and services.  The 
argument goes as follows:  The access to a safety net allegedly creates a net subsidy 
for commercial banks, which, in turn, they transfer to subsidiaries engaged in 
nontraditional activities.  As a consequence, the extension of the subsidies will 
encourage them to take excessive risks.   
Indeed, many studies on financial crises focus on the question of whether deposit 
insurance stabilizes or destabilizes the banking system.  Arteta and Eichengreen 
(2000) show that the effects of deposit insurance on financial stability are inconsistent.  
While stabilizing the banking system by curtailing incentives for bank runs, the 
protection from deposit insurance creates a moral hazard whereby banks imprudently 
invest in high-risk assets, expecting external assistance in the case of failures.  
Depositors do not distinguish among banks according to their asset quality.  
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) pioneered a study finding a negative 
relationship between bank stability and deposit insurance in their cross-country 
econometric analysis.42  In addition, different affiliates under the same holding 
                                            
42  The negative impact of deposit insurance on bank stability essentially refers to the moral hazard 
problem Kane (1989) summarized in the wake of the U.S. savings and loan crisis.  “Managers were 
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company could have all the incentives to move some of their risky funds onto the 
bank balance sheet, expecting a bailout in hard times by the public safety system.  
An empirical analysis by Kwast and Passmore (2000) indicates that US bank holding 
companies operate on much smaller equity-asset ratios than a large range of other 
financial institutions (e.g., investment banks, life insurance companies).  Typically, 
the bank equity-asset ratios are about half the levels in other institutions.  Moreover, 
the authors detected a tendency for holding companies to move activities that could 
be performed either by a bank or a non-bank into their bank subsidiaries, implicitly 
putting it under the protection of the public safety net.   
Efforts to identify the net subsidy granted by the deposit insurance scheme have 
been fraught with technical difficulties in obtaining reliable measures of the 
regulatory costs born by banks43 (Whalen 1997).  Even more difficult is the 
detection of the alleged spillover of safety-net subsidies into non-bank subsidiaries or 
affiliates of the commercial banks.  There are studies that have examined the returns 
and risks associated with the non-banking activities permissible for banks and bank 
holding companies.44  These studies indicate that the experience of holding 
companies in specific non-banking lines of business is not uniform, implying that the 
                                                                                                                            
using cosmetic approaches to disguise the magnitude of insolvency; regulators practicing forbearance 
even though they knew of the deteriorating risk profiles for the institutions for which they were 
responsible; and legislators increasing deposit insurance without regard for any offsetting changes in 
supervision.”  Subsequently, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Improvement Act of 
1991 created “a stronger signal to management and investors by targeting deposit insurance at small 
depositors only and by risk-weighting the deposit insurance premiums paid by banks to reflect their 
capital adequacy and bank examiner ratings” (Kane 2004).   
43 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency used a standard option pricing model to measure the 
gross subsidy accruing from the deposit insurance portion of the safety-net.  Under this approach, the 
median value of deposit insurance, as of June 1996, was four basis points for the top 50 banking 
companies in the U.S. (Whalen 1997).  For 137 listed banks from 12 countries during 1991-1998, the 
World Bank staff found that the gross safety-net subsidy is increasing over time from two basis points 
per annum in 1991 to 216 basis points per annum in 1998 (Laeven 2000).   
44 Boyd and Graham (1986), Gunther, Zea, and Zograf (1994), Kwast (1989), Liang and Savage 
(1990), Wall, Reichert, and Mohanty (1993), and Wall (1987).   
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performance effects of particular activities are company-specific, possibly due to 
differences in management quality.  Interestingly, despite the ongoing debates 
regarding the existence and size of safety-net subsidies, it has been readily assumed in 
policy circles that the potential leakage of the safety-net subsidy to banking affiliates 
is real and warrants significant attention.  The GLB Act does prohibit FDIC 
assistance to affiliates and subsidiaries of banks, although it begs the question of 
whether assistance to a bank might end up helping those affiliates and subsidiaries 
(Barth et al. 2000).  In fact, alternatives to allowing “universal banking” whereby 
commercial banks are free to choose their organizational form were proposed around 
the adoption of the GLB Act.  One such alternative was the “bank subsidiary 
model,” whereby banks would be required to lodge securities and certain other non-
banking activities in separately incorporated subsidiaries of banks.  The intended 
effect of the mandatory bank subsidiary structure, possibly supplemented by some 
array of firewalls, would be to reduce the likelihood that risks taken by subsidiaries 
would be transmitted to the parent bank.  Another alternative was the “holding 
company model,” whereby non-banking activities would be required to be conducted 
in separate subsidiaries of a holding company that could own one or more 
commercial banks.  As in the bank subsidiary model, a variety of firewalls could be 
imposed to decrease the probability that risk would be transferred from either the 
parent or its non-banking subsidiaries to any bank affiliates.  Among these 
competing bank structures, the GLB Act struck a compromise between Congress, the 
Treasury Department, and the Federal Reserve.  That is, certain activities deemed 
close to banking were housed in bank subsidiaries, while other activities such as 
 - 153 -
merchant banking were housed in subsidiaries of the holding company.  All in all, 
arguments for or against universal banking are both plausible in theory.  There 
seems to be convincing evidence of overall benefits.  By contrast, potential 
disadvantages are far more controversial.  Ultimately, it is up to the empirics on 
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Appendix D:  Data Definitions and Sources 
 
Emerging Economies (FFIEC Database) 
Asia (18 countries):  China, Taiwan, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Korea, 
Kuwait,   Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and other Asia. 
Latin America (19 countries):  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela, and 
other Latin America.  
Eastern Europe (9 countries):  Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia & Montenegro, Slovakia, and other Eastern Europe. 
Africa (16 countries):  Algeria, Cameroon, Congo (Kinshasa), Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, 
Tunisia, Zambia, and other Africa.  
 
Country Sample 
The 19 countries in the sample are:  Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the 
U.K. from the G-10; Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela in 
Latin America; China, Taiwan, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand 
in Asia.  
 
Dependent Variables 
•  U.S. cross-border bank claims:  Amounts owed U.S. banks by foreign borrowers 
   by residence of borrowers.  All data are presented on a fully consolidated basis,    
   netting out inter-office transactions and including adjustments to reflect guarantees  
   and indirect borrowings.   
   Source: FFIEC Country Exposure Lending Survey (CELS).  
•  Volatility of U.S. bank cross-border lending:  three-quarter rolling standard  
   deviation of quarterly changes in U.S. bank claims divided by average claims over  
   the same period. 
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Explanatory Variables 
The set of explanatory variables covers basic macroeconomic variables, including 
trend and crisis dummies.  Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1997) provide a 
comprehensive review of the empirical consensus on what may cause currency crises, 
and they emphasize the lack of empirical consensus on what may cause crises.    
 
•  Time:  trend variable with 1 for 1984 Q1 through 87 for 2005 Q3. 
• Crisis:  (0,1) dummy variable for the quarters in financial crisis for each 
emerging market country in the sample.  Argentina (1989-1990; 1995; 2001-
2005), Brazil (1990; 1994-1999), Chile (1984-1986), Colombia (1984-1987), 
Mexico (1984-1991; 1994-1997), Venezuela (1994-1995), China (1990-1999), 
Taiwan (1997-1998), Indonesia (1997-2002), Korea (1997-2002), Malaysia 
(1997-2002), Philippines (1984- 1987; 1998-2002), Thailand (1984-1987; 1997-
2002).  Source: Caprio and Klingebiel (2003).  
• GDP:  current GDP in U.S. dollars of the host.  Source: Penn World Tables. 
• GDP p/c:  real GDP per capita in U.S. dollars of the host.   
   Source: Penn World Tables. 
• GDP growth:  average real GDP growth rate of the host.  Source: IMF. 
• Inflation:  average consumer price inflation (CPI) rates.  Source: IMF. 
• Real interest premium:  real lending rate in host minus real lending rate in the  
   U.S.   
• Openness:  share of export plus import volume divided by GDP.  Source: IMF. 
• U.S. GDP growth:  average U.S. real GDP growth rate.  Source: IMF. 
• Volatility of U.S. real lending rate:  three-quarter rolling standard deviation of 
U.S. real lending rate divided by the corresponding mean. 
• Volatility of real interest premium:  three-quarter rolling standard deviation of 
U.S. real lending rate divided by the corresponding mean. 
• Financial sector development:  private credit from financial sector divided by 
GDP.  Source: Barth, Caprio, and Nolle (2004).  
• Δ ln (no. of banks):  percentage change in number of FFIEC reporting banks.  
Source: CELS.  
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• Share of emerging market claims:  share of U.S. bank cross-border claims in 
each sample country divided by the total assets of reporting banks.  Source: 
CELS.  
• U.S. bank earnings:  U.S. commercial bank net income from 1992 through 2005.  
Source:  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Quarterly Banking Profiles.  
• U.S. bank earnings volatility:  three-quarter rolling standard deviation of 
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